NON APPEASEMENT

A NEW DIRECTION FOR INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

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ABHINAV PUBLICATIONS
NEW DELHI
1972

FIRST PUBLISHED 1972
ABHINAV PUBLICATIONS
E-37, HAUZ KHAS
NEW DELHI- 110016

PRINTED IN INDIA BY
INDIA PRINTERS
423, ESPLANADE ROAD,
DELHI-16.

Distributor

Trimurti Publications, W-152, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe a debt of gratitude to many persons in the academic profession, in the armed forces, in the Indian political sphere and in Indian journalism who have stimulated my thinking in various ways.

I wish to thank T.V. Raghavan, Senior Administrative Officer of the School of International Studies, and Shakti Mallik of Abhinav Publications for their help and active cooperation and their interest in the completion of the present work.

The assistance of the staff of the Sapru House Library and of the India International Centre Library merits grateful acknowledgement.

Cordial thanks are tendered to India Printers Esplanade Road, Delhi, for efficient and expeditious production.

Finally, I must thank my wife, Madhuri Sondhi with words borrowed from Sister Nivedita: “the divine mingles with the domestic fire on every hearth.”

PREFACE

The accomplishment of the mission of Indian forces in Bangla Desh should be seen in the wider context of Asian relations. Thus Bangla Desh may find new and determined supporters in countries like Afghanistan, Nepal, and Singapore. The prospect is in sight for Afghanistan to press for amelioration of the present situation in which the Pashtuns find themselves under Islamabad's rule. It will be for the ruling elite in Pakistan to develop new forms of co-existence if they have to avoid a final break with Pashtunistan. The sense of shock in Islamabad and in certain other world capitals over the dramatic collapse of colonial rule in East Bengal is understandable. Political realism will, however, soon impel more specific analysis to come to terms with the new Balance of Power in Asia.

In practical terms, the Indo-Pak war upset the normal structures of Indian diplomatic action. India's relations with the Arab world came under severe strain. It was perhaps surprising that the crisis reinforced Franco-Indian relations. The actions of European countries generally, and France in particular were realistic and cooperative towards India. In rethinking India's foreign policy Indian decision-makers will have to work on a comprehensive review of Indo-European relations.

India can record satisfaction at the understanding the Soviet leaders gained of the Bangla Desh problem since the Soviet President N.V. Podgorny asked for a political solution to the problem in April 1971. When it became clear to the Soviets that India was determined to call Pakistan's bluff, Alexei Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev were highly responsive to India's security concerns. The Soviet representative at the United Nations did not shirk from placing the responsibility of aggravating the situation on Pakistan's military junta. It was also refreshing to find the Soviet leaders avoiding haughty moralising on Indian national politics and adopting a pragmatic approach towards different elements of the Indian democratic system. The Soviet posture throughout the Indo-Pak war has suggested optimistic conclusions regarding the working of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. It would, however, be wise for Indian decision-makers to proceed cautiously and make full investigation of Soviet viewpoints on the Treaty so that misconceptions do not prevail to the effect that India's relations with Bangla Desh are henceforth to be under Soviet auspices. New Delhi should adroitly maintain the spontaneous movement forward which 1971 events have created, and it must not allow vicious Super-Power "aid and advice" from any quarter whatsoever to dominate the Indian scene.

The United States Government failed to understand the anguish of the Bangla Desh problem and was evidently prepared to see New Delhi involved in a growing danger of unparalleled magnitude, As Super Powers there is an important difference in the thinking between the United States and the Soviet Union towards developing new forms of cooperation with India. Nixon's policy in particular has been so highly unrealistic towards Bangla Desh that India has found itself increasingly the target of United States blackmail in respect of economic aid and arms supplies. Both the Super Powers, however, share out-of-date political thinking in refusing to whole-heartedly endorse India's power role as an essential contribution towards the new Asian peace order.

India's all out military action to free Bangla Desh will be meaningful only if the Government of India commits itself to a Declaration of Non-Appeasement. India's democratic commitment to Bangla Desh, India's obligation to work for relaxation of tensions in Asia, and the decisive role of the Indian military should be reflected in a new foreign policy programme firmly anchored in the Principle of Non-Appeasement.

There is no doubt that the foreign relations of India should be conducted within a new conceptual framework. A number of reasons suggest themselves. The first has to do with the present phase of India's modernisation in which the desire of the Indian people to play an independent role can no longer be fulfilled by merely balancing between the United States and the Soviet Union, but requires us to assume a special responsibility for strengthening our collaboration with Asian countries so that international action can avoid the threat of catastrophe in the environment of our region. In the second place, the growing importance of nuclear scientific developments and space technology is having its impact on India's international relationships and the fields of science, technology and communication are likely to be a central preoccupation of our decision-makers in the days to come. The technical details of the arms race, arms control, disarmament and the growth of strategic thought suggest the specific need for clarifying India's foreign policy-cum-defence posture in a manner very different from that in the past, when our major concern was only to isolate Indian behaviour with reference to the confrontation of the Americans and the Russians. The third reason is related to the fact that there is increasing evidence of a social crisis of alarming proportions in American and Soviet societies whose psychological and moral dimensions are compelling both of them to give up their macro-ideological goals. The ultimate consequences for the Americans and the Russians could be far reaching. Indian statecraft will require courage to take an over-all view of the important questions relating to political and social order in a world in which

the psychological difficulties of the two greatest military powers are disagreeable realities. The cognitive function of Indian foreign policy requires our policy makers to think more deeply on the several questions relating to the organisation of the foreign policy machinery. For several years there has been a degree of complacency in solving the practical difficulties in the organisation of external affairs activities. A vigorous Indian approach to foreign policy will require us to surmount the paralysis of the national will under external pressures. Our policy makers should recognise the direct relationship between national power and manifold sources of ideological strength which were tapped during the historical development of the Indian Independence Movement.

An examination of the Cold War provides a historical perspective for understanding the particular situation in which Indian foreign policy gravitated towards the concept of Non-alignment. The central issue of defining India's role in the World Nuclear Environment was ignored leading inevitably to an unrealistic and dogmatic moralising. Non-alignment hardened into a static view which hindered India from fully utilising her policy options. The status quo attitude towards the two Super Powers prevented India from developing an effective approach to new Power channelisation like that which took place in the case of Post-war Europe. The indiscriminate Appeasement ingrained in Indian Foreign Policy resulted in failure to formulate national objectives with clarity, especially in the context of Indo-Pakistan relations.

The ways and means of fostering an improvement in India's image abroad cannot be found unless effort is first directed towards identifying the chief reason which has reduced India's policy options. I have indicated in my approach to this problem that the pre-condition of restoring dynamism to Indian leadership in world affairs is to construct a relevant foreign policy on the bedrock of Non Appeasement, which will give a tenacious strength to our national interest and integrate it with the emerging world order.

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INTRODUCTION

Indian Non Alignment: A Closed System in a World of Change

Indian Foreign Policy in recent years has given the impression of uncertainty and neglect of priorities and has become the object of persistent criticism in Parliament and in the Press. International relationships have changed radically since the time when a charismatic leader provided a formula for determining India's role in a welter of conflicting ideologies and strategic and tactical policy goals. Compared with the leverage which India exerted in the milieu of emergent Non-alignment, Indian decision-makers find themselves today in an environment which breeds diffidence. The lowered prestige of India in the comity of nations contrasts painfully with the reverberations of hope and optimism which had greeted Indian independence.

If India has to speak meaningfully on behalf of herself and if she has to participate in peace settlements in order to help strengthen peace and freedom in the world, then what is actually at issue is the transformation of the present policy of Non-alignment with the help of a perspective that leads beyond the Bipolar world and transcends the closed system in which the chief contribution of India was to perform the service of the "honest broker" between the United States and Soviet Russia. Indian policy, strangely enough, has been preoccupied with regulation of our relationship with the Super Powers for performing this function often in anticipation of illusory possibilities.

The structure of the Indian Non-alignment system provides only a bipolar view for political decision-making; it does not provide for the articulation of India's positive ideological role in achieving specific foreign policy objectives; the reflexive character of the Super Powers' involvement in India is reinforced by non-alignment and prevents India from neutralising their ideological and political pressures; the ignorance of the dynamics of American-Soviet collusion politics impairs the operational value of innovations and results in undermining Indian bargaining positions ; India's aversion to the development of national-regional links reflects the failure of Non-alignment as a system to utilise integrating factors in the regional Asian environment; and finally India has been unable to take a rational view of its national interest in relation to the exercise of its nuclear option because non-alignment is more misleading than helpful when the perspective of a political system includes nuclear military doctrine and strategy.

The Indian effort to base decision-making on the foundation of a rigorous non-alignment theory has an effect quite the opposite of that which was wished for. Indian national interest has not been served by pretending that non-alignment provided an institutional framework that would bring

about practical cooperation between countries. Tensions, frictions and antagonisms have been accentuated and these are not comprehensible to those who believe that non-alignment releases forces which lead to limitation of conflict and promotes the organisation of peace. The hard fact of the matter is that perceptions of Indian non-alignment have continued to ignore problems which are not on the periphery but are unmistakably central issues of foreign policy. In the contemporary situation, the following issues which should be priorities in Indian policy are unfortunately not on the agenda of political analysis. First, India has not taken any serious initiative which reflects our understanding of the conviction shared by most other Asian decision-makers that military strategy and foreign policy are interrelated. Those negotiating with the Indians have regretfully noted that a realistic assessment of Indian strategic ideas on their part does not find reflection in any forward looking solutions in which Indian diplomatic assistance would be assured. Second, in the present technological environment, it is of the essence to identify the innovations made by others in their scientific and technical enterprises. Indian policy-makers will remain starved of vital supporting data unless fields of activity appropriate to intelligence work are developed. The presumption at present is that intelligence work is unattractive for a non-aligned country because if it is ever publicised, the activities which would be identified would threaten the balance of expectations arising out of the politico-military aims of the power-blocs in the world. A third factor which Indian non-alignment ignores is the management of worldwide mass media. The "total and comprehensive understanding" which Indian non-alignment has fostered, with the hope of building bridges between the United States and the Soviet Union, has loaded with many stereotyped prejudices the minds of those who handle India's external publicity. The proper discharge of the function of media-management in foreign affairs comes up against the wishful conceptions and dogmatic imputations of non-alignment. Fourthly, while the ideology of non-alignment argues for the relevance and utility of international economic cooperation, a non-aligned foreign policy is not related to the ethos of a dynamic nation which seeks to maximise economic benefits through the technological and economic effects of its foreign policy. We are struck by the contrast between the marginal weight given to economic problems in India's decision-making and the bold, energetic and innovative manner in which Japan has conducted its economic diplomacy in recent years.

The neglect of these four factors has been the cause of the numerous foreign policy failures which have exposed the Government of India to mounting domestic criticism.

A Bipolar View

Indian decision-makers look upon the two Super powers, the United States and Soviet Union as dynamic factors par excellence in the creation of a new world order. The Indian perceptual image of the United States and the Soviet Union is similar to that forecast by de Tocqueville and its distinctive characteristic is the political, social, economic and cultural predominance of the two powers that it takes for granted. Yet both the United States and the Soviet Union, in spite of the crusade each has launched to claim the right to be regarded as in the vanguard of human progress, are increasingly regarded as conservative powers whose ruling elites would like to organise and discipline the forces of change in the international environment into fairly rigid structures. Empirical examination of the United States interventionist role in Latin America and the Soviet failure to reconcile themselves to the dynamic social and political changes in Eastern Europe would help Indian decision makers to disentangle themselves from the Bipolar bias in their image of world society and from the exaggerated veneration of the fragile value systems of the Americans and the Russians. When we emerged as an independent power on the world scene India was guided by the consideration that Soviet-United States cooperation would help to lead the world out of the desperate situation which was created by the military confrontation in Europe. But today after two decades of rigidly clinging to an out-of-date perceptual image we are merely exhausting the psychological resources which could harmonise our position in the multipolar world in which we find ourselves. The anxiety to maintain a historic foreign policy for fear of the reproach of having deviated from the Nehru heritage goes to the very core of the inability of India to enhance its autonomous action in (a) situations like those in South East Asia, where were India motivated to help, she could directly perform certain vital functions (b) situations like those in the Middle East, where India could take the initiative rather than wait for others to encourage political contacts (c) situations where India could help foster multilateral organisation provided she did not regard herself as an instrumentality of Soviet and United States objectives e.g. the Indian -Ocean.

India can ill afford the kind of rigid and dogmatic world outlook which has come to be associated with the policy of non-alignment. Although it is often paraded as having contributed to the development of a constructive role for Indian diplomacy, in fact the non-alignment cult has resulted in depriving India of flexibility in the choice of means in a rapidly changing world situation.

Some of the ill-effects of non-alignment have been:

1. The rationale of non-alignment was to oppose the division of the world into two hostile power blocs, but operationally it has implied a sanction of the existing state of affairs by exaggerating the dangers in every structural adjustment which was not to the liking of Moscow or Washington.

2. It has encouraged an attitude of conservatism on the part of Indian decision-makers, who have not been so much concerned with planning an Indian perspective on foreign affairs as in making India an honest broker between East and West.

3. It is essentially a static way of looking at the world, and it has prevented India from anticipating future hostile attitudes. Indian official thinking took for granted that China would adhere to Pancha Shila for ever. The government was inhibited from undertaking a study of the political efficacy of India's China policy in relation to a potential enemy perspective. Nor was India able to speedily re-evaluate its position to fit a new global environment of detente. Non-alignment allowed only for a simplistic treatment of the China problem.

4. Non-alignment has prevented India from checking Pakistan's aggressiveness and from exposing the incompatibility of the long term interests of Pakistan and those of the United States and the Soviet Union.

5. Non-alignment failed to project the core values of a secure Asian peace order when Communist China and India were set on a collision course.

6. The two Super Powers, United States and Soviet Union, interpret our non-aligned stances primarily as dimensions of Appeasement. Whenever India was subjected to "local hostilities" by hostile powers, the advice of the Super Powers was against escalation in our retaliatory response. We have been consistent in our friendship with the United States and the Soviet Union, but we have failed to secure a commitment to our territorial integrity from either of them. Diplomatically both of them have brought pressure on us to "appease" those who have territorial claims against us.

7. Non-alignment has discouraged us from developing an independent and sophisticated military complex. We have also failed to get moral sanction for our policies from middle and small

powers since our military-political pattern has entangled us inextricably with the Anglo-Saxon powers and the Soviet Union.

8. Non-alignment has made India status quo-minded in respect of international organisation. The Indian official attitude regards the Charter of the United Nations as something eternal, and has not shown any incentive towards reforming the United Nations in accordance with the realities of the situations in the post-war world, which require a healthy, new scepticism towards theories and conceptions of international organisation in the western tradition.

It is often claimed by apologists of Indian foreign policy that India's profit from the policy of non-alignment was enhanced by the substantial consensus that emerged in the attitudes of the Soviet Union and the United States and both have accorded India a special status in world and regional politics. This is clearly a superficial way of looking at crucial problems of diplomacy, as it ignores the severe limitations which are imposed by the United States and Soviet Union on the pursuit of national interest by a non-aligned country. The convergence between the United States and Soviet Union and the resulting agreements between them have often been reflected in exceptional demands on countries like India which are accompanied by pressure tactics. If India persists in Non-alignment this pressure activity by the Super powers is likely to be vastly increased in the future.

Non-alignment is rooted in a bipolar view of the world. As against this a multi-polar world requires a national policy of Non appeasement, to meet the challenges of a highly complex power configuration in the world.

Indian non-alignment is being discredited because it continues to be a serious obstacle to new insights which are necessary if we are to use improved techniques of diplomacy to effect politico-military control of regional and international conflict. Our efforts to justify our role of mediation and conciliation in the context of persistent divergence of values and day to day counter-pressures in the United States-Soviet relationship are totally inadequate and merely serve to divert our own attention from the absence of a well thought out policy to exercise our freedom to promote political cooperation in the multipolar environment.

These observations lead to the conclusion that Indian Foreign Policy has to give up the blind acceptance of the bipolar logic which has made India a handmaid of the two Super Powers and keeps us out of the multiple communication grid. The key approach to the restoration of functional

value to Indian foreign policy is the termination of our subordinate role to the Super Powers and the development of a mutually supportive role with the new power holders, who were hitherto relegated to inferior positions under the Super Power hegemonies.

This view implies an obligation on our part to resist Super Power interventionism under the guise of maintenance of world order. Simultaneously we have to increase the possibility of our trying different approaches in obtaining the cooperation of those who are striking out a role of political independence. Non appeasement, therefore, implies increasing self-management in foreign policy and coordination of our efforts with countries which are emerging as distinct links in the post-bipolar pattern of the world.

India's Positive Ideological Role

It is fashionable to talk of the decline of ideology in the world. Indeed the disintegration of the monolithic unity of the world communist movement is a development of crucial significance. Soviet authority is no longer what it was during Stalin's time and Chinese ideological influence has enabled national communist party leaders to pursue polemics which have undermined communist unity. In the Western world the unity created by the United States with the politico-military integration of the North Atlantic treaty is today badly shaken. What is the role of ideology in Indian foreign policy? The Bandung Conference was interpreted as a proclamation of the Ideology of Anti-Imperialism by the Asian and African States and Indian apologists claimed that it had initiated a new era in Indian foreign policy. India's ideological role cannot help being trivial if it is described in a negative fashion.

At Bandung we suffered a crucial defeat at the hands of China because it was Chou En-lai who projected the psychological impression of his country setting the pace for Asia, while Nehru was content, it seems in retrospect, to move around without operative norms guided only by the subjective criterion of personal influence. Nehru missed the opportunity at Bandung to base India's prestige on the sheet anchor of national achievement and aspiration, translated in terms of our domestic values.

India has a legitimate ideological role in world politics. The natural links that exist between India and other traditional cultures, make opportunities available to translate into action the historical and cultural point of view which abjures fanaticism and undertakes international community

organisation on the basis of a non-hegemonial system in which each unit country follows its own Swadharma.

The advent of Indian freedom signalled a new era in Asia, the chief characteristic of which was the claim to national identity and integrity of a people which had been suppressed and ignored. It was the Indian Freedom Movement which had played a decisive role in challenging imperialism in all its forms, by projecting a positive basis for self-development, by positing that Su-rajya was no substitute for Swa-rajya. It was, therefore, expected that India would play a historic role in protecting and developing the national identity of countries which aspired to maintain their distinctive culture and civilisation.

When the Government of India allowed Tibet to be swamped by the Chinese Communists, this single event distorted relations between India and China. The Communist Chinese threatened Tibet with a nominal force while they were contemporaneously involved in the Korean War; so if India had offered serious diplomatic resistance, the Chinese with their limited capacity for military action in the Himalayas at that time, would in all probability have come round to accepting Tibet as a distinct political unit. This may all be regarded as hypothetical but if Indian policy is to aim at a greater degree of integration with our ideological intention and if it is to come to grips with the real crisis in Sino-Indian relations, there is little doubt that India must begin by accepting its responsibility for the circumstances in which the violation of the national sovereignty of the Tibetans was encouraged. How will the members of the international community react if Tibet is placed at the centre of foreign policy innovation by India? It is worthy of note that most Asian countries withdrew their interest in favour of Tibet only when India failed in ideologically orienting its policy in favour of Tibetan Swaraj. As part of the search for a new China Policy, India's Tibet policy must be so conducted as to secure the acceptance of the conception of a tripartite face-to-face contact between New Delhi, Peking and the Dalai Lama. The practical problem posed by the reintroduction of the ideological factor in Indian foreign policy will be solved if the Peking regimes can be assured that cost-advantage calculations of commencing negotiations, leading to gradual Chinese military withdrawal from Tibet, will lead to meaningful answers in relation to Peking's long term interests. The significance of the new Indian approach would lie in a realistic attitude which takes account of China's military confrontation with the Soviet Union and the United States, the intensification of the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict, and the novel assumptions of the more flexible United States posture towards Peking.

Apart from the necessity of having a Tibet policy, India must put an end to the tendency of accepting the status quo regarding the occupation of Indian territory by the Chinese. India cannot afford to acquiesce in the Communist Chinese acquiring title to Indian territory by allowing the present situation to persist. India's posture of political and military strength must, therefore, be one not only of defence of our border posts but also of deterring the Chinese through development of conventional, para-military and non-conventional forces. Our intelligence network should cover China thoroughly and we should not stint in cooperating with the regime in Taiwan in this sphere.

The Chinese Cultural Revolution whose dynamics have wrought far-reaching changes requires empirical examination and we need to think about the future of Communist China on our own and not rely blindly on what the Soviet Union or the United States feel about Chinese developments. Since we are very much concerned with Peking-backed movements in neighbouring Asian countries, it would be good commonsense to develop friendly contacts with Chinese populations living away from the Mainland of China. India should quietly strengthen cultural and economic relations with the Nationalist regime in Taipeh as well as with the several overseas Chinese communities in South East Asia, while avoiding risky postures to which Peking may overact.

We should closely watch the strategic developments in Communist Chinese foreign policy and every opportunity must be utilised for probing Communist Chinese intentions provided the question of Tibet occupies the central place in whatever informal discussions we have with them after the pattern of the Chinese-United States Ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. India can straightaway offer a plan of making Tibet a nuclear free zone after the model of the Rapacki Plan for Central European disengagement, without prejudice to our support of Tibetan Swaraj.

Communist China has been actively supported by Pakistan in its challenge to democracy and pluralism in Asia. Pakistan's medievalism threatens all its neighbours which seek political and economic modernisation. Militarily it is evident that Pakistan seeks access to the Gangetic valley to overcome its lack of economic viability. Moreover, it is also subject to the compulsions of a pan-Islamic geo-theology, aimed largely against India. India has thus been drawn into a conflict in which to be ideologically on the defensive serves only to depreciate Indian influence and enhance the credibility of the other side.

Soviet Union and India: The limits of Involvement

The theme of "historical inevitability" has not infrequently introduced unreasonable presuppositions which have come in the way of improvement of Indo-Soviet relations. The public events and historical trends of the Indian struggle for freedom have made a non-absolutist outlook a significant ingredient of the Indian heritage. As a modernising movement the assimilation of new social forces in the Indian struggle was typically conducive towards winning mass support. The pattern of political participation was not contained within the narrow limits of a highly organised elitist group characteristic of the Leninist model. Indians have been aware of the importance of the Russian Revolution for developing societies, but the Soviet claim to exclusive "moral leadership" has not blunted Indian analysis into accepting sectarian mistakes and dogmatisms which are often presented as guidelines by Soviet diplomacy. The intellectual climate of India often produces a negative reaction among the Soviet establishment and there is no doubt that the intentions and capabilities of Soviet diplomacy are in opposition to Indian public opinion when it seeks to undermine India's traditional pluralism. The perspectives of Gokhale, Tilak and Gandhi present a real challenge to the political and propagandist claims that the Soviet organisational and institutional framework is the precondition for innovating policies of political, social and economic modernisation. The key element in strengthening the process of mutual accommodation in Indo-Soviet relations would be found in the recognition by the Soviet ideologists that Soviet experience does not contain all the answers relevant to the circumstances in which India is renovating its economic and social structure. Understanding between the Soviet Union and India requires the diplomacies of both countries to function in a reciprocal manner to underline the rather narrow community of interests in Asia, but both sides can seek substantial agreement if they regulate their relationship on the basis of non-entanglement reminiscent of the broad perspective of the relations of the Soviet Union with France under the leadership of de Gaulle. There was something appropriate about the formulations relating to Indo-Soviet relations at the time of the Twentieth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U. But the hope aroused at that time of a balanced Soviet diplomacy towards India has grown pale as it now seems likely that the Soviet Union is persuaded that with the transfer of the Cold War from Europe to Asia the escalation of the ideological struggle justifies a massive effort to compel India to accept the Russian model. That this may leave a legacy of bitterness shows the increasing risks which are attached to the ambivalence in a non-aligned country's attitude to a super power.

Indians are accustomed to thinking of the Soviet Union in the context of the friendly and cheerful encounter of Nehru and Krushchev. Whenever difficulties appear in Indo-Soviet relations

diplomatic quarters in New Delhi express nostalgia for the old days. The Krushchev period saw the conduct of operations by the Soviets with an excess of enthusiasm which followed the striking demonstration of their nuclear and missile achievements. The Soviet popularity in India was the result of the then current doctrine of a "zone of peace". The Indo-Soviet dialogue in the Krushchev period was not essentially in terms of strategic doctrine or military realism. The main areas of Indo-Soviet concern, therefore, tended to generate policies of restraint on either side and particularly the Indian diplomatic attitude to the Soviet Union took on a pronouncedly idealistic character. The exit of Krushchev, the evolution of the deterrence strategies between the United States and Soviet Union, the exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the growing difficulties of the Soviets in Eastern Europe, have all worked to transform the Soviet politico-military standpoint in the world and particularly in Asia. What is really at stake now, and something which is still not realised sufficiently in the Indian External Affairs Ministry, is how to clarify the basis for a realistic structure of relations between India and the Soviet Union. If there were rational planning of foreign policy we would not feel that our expectations from the Soviet Union were let down. More specifically, the political effect of the much acclaimed Indo-Soviet treaty will not be enhanced by demagogical behaviour but through a clarification of intentions by which both India and the Soviet Union can cross the threshold of hyper-emotional involvement in Indo-Soviet ties (bequeathed by the Krushchev period) to a new mood of sober realism.

It is worth remembering the details of the Soviet action during the Indo-Pak hostilities of 1965 and during the events leading up to the Tashkent conference. Indian thinking does not seem to have grasped the importance of the steady movement towards economic and cultural cooperation between Pakistan and the Soviet Union from the beginning of 1965. From Pakistan's point of view the Soviets were beginning to make a useful distinction between their requirements of primary and secondary importance in the attitude of Pakistan still dominated by anti-Communist overtones. From a purely technical standpoint, Pakistan's performance was well timed to take advantage of the declining relevance of Indian non-alignment in the new psychological atmosphere. Prime Minister Shastri is no longer with us, but his advisers must be painfully aware of their failure to provide the Soviets with the accurate estimate of India's fears of a war of revenge by Pakistan in collusion with China. If India had insisted on including Kashmir in the official communiqué at the time of the Shastri visit, it would have unequivocally indicated our interest to discuss political problems while underlining our concern with military security. In the final phase of our confrontation with Pakistan still this question is crucial because any proposals for recasting our foreign policy towards the Soviet Union will lead to results more fictitious than real unless Indian

policy planners base their judgements on a sufficient understanding of the shifts in Russian policy on Kashmir. While being grateful for the Soviet help on Bangla Desh at the United Nations, India should in the post-Indo-Pak-war era impress firmly upon the minds of the Soviet leaders that she can no longer conceive of a future in which Kashmir is a subject for concession-making.

There is no reason why India should be reluctant to discuss the Soviet Union's relations with East Europe when the Soviet Union itself takes interest in India's relations with Pakistan. It is in our interest that the process of relaxation of monolithic control in East Europe should proceed steadily onwards and there is, in keeping with our well known attitudes on the basic rights and duties of all nations, a clear role for India to mediate between the Soviets and East Europeans to ensure that events like the Hungarian uprising of 1957 and the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact powers in 1968 are not repeated, and practical prospects for realisation of liberal trends are strengthened.

The Government of India was found poorly prepared for crisis-management following the Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia. The proper response for India could only be developed in the context of a full appreciation of the situation from the political and military point of view. It was a mistake to think that Soviet actions would be considered as anything short of intervention by the Czechoslovak people or by world opinion. Indian foreign policy must reflect fully our adherence to equal standards as far as our condemnation of actions against political independence and territorial integrity are concerned. It was, therefore, arbitrary for the Government of India to abstain on the resolution on the Czechoslovak situation in the Security Council. As the global system moves from an essentially bi-polar distribution of power to multi-polar relationships, the international community must insist that small powers should have the right to consolidate their progress towards independent participation in world affairs. In the Czechoslovak case, it was important for India to consider the alarming consequences of intervention by armed forces of the five Warsaw Treaty countries which was undertaken without even the semblance of a request by any Czechoslovak elements. The Czechoslovak state organs continued to non-cooperate in the face of overwhelming pressure. In the international field such actions undoubtedly created serious misgivings about Soviet intentions, and they also pointed to the existence of serious inner conflicts in the Soviet Government and Party leaders. The Czechoslovak crisis should make it clear to India that Soviet Party leaders can go to any length in escalating conflict and pressure in furtherance of what they believe to be their own interests. It has revealed that the two Super Powers do not disclose to the rest of the world their contingency plans in the foreign policy arena when serious

clash of interests is involved. The earlier view that India and some other countries could "trust" the Soviet Union as a Super Power interested in playing the role of a "policeman" in the world does not correspond to the facts as revealed in the Czechoslovak crisis. The existence of carefully regulated Soviet relations with Western Europe and Japan, shows that Soviet foreign policy is made up of diverse elements and if Indian national interest is to be protected, India must firmly reject the hegemonistic and backward-looking elements which still rear their head in the Soviet global outlook. It is this basic assessment that the Government of India is reluctant to make, and it should be underlined that India's efforts to merely appease the Soviet Union at any cost will only lead to our isolation from the new forces which are emerging in Eastern Europe and are also manifest in the struggle against the Stalinist legacy within the Soviet Union. India could play a significant role in Eastern Europe by affirming the principle of non-interference and by declaring herself in favour of meaningful negotiations. Our attitude towards Czechoslovakia and other related issues in Eastern Europe has very wide political ramifications and if India's actions are based only on blindly following Moscow's preferences then we can be sure that these will be largely self-defeating. The visible deterioration in Moscow's hold over Eastern Europe stems not only from the formal position of the Soviet Government in the Communist Movement, there are grounds for arguing that Soviet action in Czechoslovakia has alienated the Soviet Government from the attitude and spirit of the new generation in Eastern Europe. Whatever the short-term motivations of the established governing elites, changes in the social structure of Eastern Europe are paving the way for a political future which disfavours the retention of political power in monopolistic party bureaucracies.

India's relationship with the Soviet Union requires an adequate review which extends the possibilities for Indian policy to strive for legitimate support to the national objectives of the East European countries. At the same time, a new Indo-Soviet relationship will require the building of a political environment in which mutual confidence can be strengthened without jeopardising India's political evolution as a non-totalitarian Society.

The Asian Setting

The low priority which Indian foreign policy has accorded to our South East Asian neighbours is startling evidence of the neglect of far reaching economic and political changes and this is directly a consequence of non-alignment. If we have to restore the vitality of Indian foreign policy it will be necessary to demonstrate our readiness to involve ourselves in practical solutions of regional problems in place of repeating the sterile propositions of the Bandung days. Although India supported the decolonisation process in South East Asia, yet we became oblivious of the assumptions on which regional relationships are strengthened. Our cultural heritage, the prospects of economic development and common security interests should have helped India to evolve a political community in South East Asia. Technical devices like an Asian Parliament, or an ASIATOM would have had a stimulating effect in promoting inter-Asian unity. The striking failure of Indian policy followed from our putting the bipolar view ahead of our Regional view. The drift of thought in the Indian foreign policy establishment has been a captive of the global outlook by looking at the basic political and strategic issues of the region in the perceptual language of the Super powers. If this drift is to be changed political relationships with South East Asian countries should be seen not in terms of the conflicting interests of the big powers nor under conditions of Sino-Soviet ideological warfare. If India gives up its isolationist beliefs which have been bred by the various criteria of non-alignment, and focuses on the significant political developments which are internal to the nascent South East Asian community, our neighbours would have evidence of our diplomatic commitment. The chances for such a development of Indian diplomacy exist, provided India is prepared to commit men and resources to South East Asia for the purposes of international policing and peace observation. The Indian role would be enhanced if India gave up thinking in narrow terms of the political roles of the Super Powers. The Southeast Asian countries are equally deeply concerned about being dominated by the Soviet Union or the United States. Peking's relentless application of power and propaganda is a major cause of tension in the area but it has failed to overwhelm the dynamic force which Asian nationalism represents. The generalisations about Vietnam are more often than not dominated by the psychological and political needs of United States and Soviet policy makers. Looking at Vietnam as a policy-making case from the Indian point of view, it would not be a harsh indictment to conclude that "non-aligned" obfuscation prevented India from utilising her role as Chairman of the International Control Commission and her other diplomatic instrumentalities for promoting a detente. Indian diplomatic interest was un-fortunately concentrated more on events in the international environment than on effective action

for preventing conflict through regional constraints. There is good reason to think that outside powers are unable to accept the consequences of the consolidation of peace in a regional environment and will employ strategies to menace settlements which strengthen systemic characteristics promoting management of power. Big power pressures have undermined the regional system in South East Asia, and we can see that India's search for Asian peace and security has so far been in the periphery of the problem areas because she has failed to look for new types of solutions. The lesson this holds for India is threefold : First, India must anchor its diplomacy to the basic principle that political dislocation must be avoided in each local area within the South East Asian system ; second, India must overcome its self-doubt and organise opinion which can support negotiations in an exhaustively Asian setting; and third, India, must give priority to dealing with the Chinese threats and challenges in South-east Asia with creative planning instead of waiting in the wings to see the tug-of-war between the Soviets and the Chinese and the Americans and the Chinese.

New developments in Asia seem to have caught Indian foreign policy makers unawares. India's eyes have only rested on the Himalayan borders and she has been reluctant to make a serious effort to discover the implications of Communist Chinese strategy towards South-East Asian countries.

In the case of Vietnam, for example, India's politico-diplomatic power is not adequately expressed through the International Control Commission. India should take a more active interest in the Buddhist involvement in the- politics of South Vietnam and in that of other broad based nationalist forces. At the same time we must independently probe Hanoi for a possible settlement, on the clear understanding that our support depends on North Vietnamese efforts to free themselves from the tutelage of both Moscow and Peking.

India should concern itself with the whole problem of de-escalation in Vietnam in the context of an Asian perspective. The United States should have learnt by now a salutary lesson that the Asian world is no longer what it was before the Second World War, and it was futile for them to have thought in terms of involvement in ground warfare without the active cooperation of a sizeable Asian power. It is also clear that the Indian Government has been shirking its responsibilities in South East Asia. This is not to suggest that Indian troops should replace those of other powers in Vietnam, but it is tragic and absurd that India has so far failed to take diplomatic and political initiatives which would have resulted in ameliorating the military confrontation in an area of vital concern to us. The failure of the Government of

India to get New Delhi accepted as a site for peace talks on Vietnam merely symbolised our total diplomatic failure. We have ignored the fact that Vietnam is our neighbour and we have to bring a sense of intimacy in our dialogue with Hanoi and Saigon. In Hanoi our objective should be to encourage the development of National Communism on the pattern of the developments in Yugoslavia, and encourage the North Vietnamese to stand up even as a Communist State in much the same way as the Yugoslavs threw off the Stalinist Russian yoke. It is not in our interests that freedom and liberty should be undermined in South Vietnam and therefore we should use our influence to encourage reconciliation of the Buddhists and other social forces whose involvement in democratic politics could help to broad base the Saigon regime. In harmony with this attitude we should step up economic and technical cooperation with Saigon. While the talks in Paris are deadlocked the Government of India should take the political initiative to call a conference of Asian States to bring peace to Vietnam on the earlier model of the Conference which was held in Delhi for the Indonesian crisis.

The changing perspective of economic relationships in the South East Asian arena call for an active Indian initiative in promoting regional cooperation. India must develop industrial and economic collaboration with these countries. India and Japan must strive for a basic understanding of mutual objectives of economic development of Asia, and it is not merely in relation to commercial policy on a cash balance basis but rather in respect of industrial collaboration on a long term basis, that the two can fulfil their respective roles in Asia. The security interests of Japan deserve sympathetic interest from India who should seek to understand the efforts made by Japan to put its relations with the Soviet Union and the United States on the firm basis of national dignity and integrity. The resurgence of Buddhism in Japan as evidenced by the Soka Gokkai movement and other social developments merit careful study by India.

Nuclear Option

Nowhere has the state of drift of Indian foreign policy been more apparent and more marked by trivialities and clichés than in the pursuit of incompatible goals for our nuclear potential. A question which should have had priority has not been asked and a pivotal decision has been postponed. What has the Government of India done to relate the military, political, scientific, technological and economic needs of India and the basic orientation of Indian nuclear policy in order to create an effective National Security system? The non-use of nuclear power has become an end in itself in the metaphysic of Indian non-alignment, without considering relationally the pay-off in terms of Deterrence, Regional Defence, Avoidance of Nuclear Blackmail, Cooperation in Nuclear Science and Technology and Reduction of Conventional Forces and Armaments. Policymaking under Non-alignment identifies the following themes as relevant to defence policy and planning : (1) the defence structure is linked to specified antagonists and the question of capability against unspecified wrong-doers is simply postponed to the critical moment of physical aggression (2) the arguments in favour of accelerating defence technology are restrained by linking the military plans subserviently to the programmes developed by the Super Powers in terms of their own coherent strategic doctrines (3) the internal developments favouring modernisation which inevitably lead to nascent nuclearisation of military doctrine and policy are suppressed and the importance of the external environment is played up in which the dominant relationship is the stability of deterrence between the two Super Powers.

These notions have found expression in India's willingness to accept the Nuclear Status Quo sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union but apart from some nebulous statements no effort has been made to ascertain whether the community of interests between India and the Super Powers are served by undermining India's optimal nuclearisation. Progress towards a stable and enduring relationship between India and the Super Powers requires an answer to a crucial question. Can a mammoth near-nuclear power like India indefinitely bank on the reliability of Soviet and American nuclear support in a world environment where the leitmotif of Super Power diplomacy is detente with the resulting ambiguity of policy declarations? The Non-Proliferation Treaty is an attempt to sanctify the existence of Five Nuclear Powers by placing permanent technological barriers on Indian research. This is clearly unacceptable to the people of India. The so-called guarantees are of theoretical value and in practice would place Indian defence in serious jeopardy.

India must base her nuclear position on a sound appraisal of the Chinese nuclear threat to India. China became an atomic bomb power in 1964, a hydrogen bomb power in l967 and

now it is winning recognition as an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile power. These are ominous developments for India, but the Government of India's response is to do precious little to safeguard our national interest and security. Our opposition to the Non-proliferation Treaty so far is more sound than fury because there is a significant amount of evidence that India's position is being modified under pressure from the Super Powers. A realistic policy demands that we should immediately hold consultations with all those powers which opposed the Treaty in the United Nations or refused to sign it or are still reluctant to ratify the Treaty. We must seek to understand the position of all those who are "near nuclear powers" like ourselves and we must make every effort to explain our nuclear aspirations to them. We must refuse to be branded as a non-nuclear power. Our national interest demands that we should sponsor a Near-Nuclear Conference and utilise the opportunity to expose the hegemonistic designs of the present Nuclear Powers who want to make their own position secure at the cost of undermining the legitimate security interests of others. It is well known that both the Soviet Union and the United States are making invulnerable anti-missile systems (ABM) and as far as we are concerned neither of them is prepared to allow India a finger on their nuclear triggers against China. What both offer to India is a position of political supplication and their new-fangled doctrines of disarmament, arms-control and non-proliferation are one in envisaging a position of strategic inferiority and political servility for India in the Asian and world context. We must face the consequences of our vacillating policies and in response to the challenge we face, India should not hesitate to demonstrate her high level of nuclear technology by preparing at the earliest a peaceful explosion of what is called a "ploughshare" category. If the Government of India is serious about resisting outside pressures, then it must prepare to make manifest our intention by concrete developments in the nuclear field ; otherwise it is merely a matter of time when India will be whip-lashed into accepting the N.P.T. and we would have lost the opportunity to do so with grace.

The development of a nuclear deterrent by India keeping in view the remarkable political stability our country has shown in its adherence to a constitutional system, will enhance global management of nuclear power and also help India to take a meaningful part in disarmament discussions. As a responsible world power India can ill afford to be subjected to nuclear blackmail and therefore in solving its security problems it must take into account likely future developments such as the anti-ballistic missile system. The current governmental attitude on non-proliferation is therefore at best a one-sided approach to the arms control and disarmament problem and at worst a callous disregard of our strategic and security problems.

The advantages offered by the acquisition of nuclear weapons will remain Utopian objectives unless Indian nuclear commitments are determined in a wide spectrum to deal with the over-involvement of the Super Powers in the Asian region. The new relationship of Indian foreign policy and nuclear power will not be created at the preliminary stage of the fabrication of an Indian nuclear warhead. India must decide that the process of Nuclearisation, in the absence of a world-wide disarmament programme, is really made up of a series of significant strategic, technological and political decisions which will require us to work energetically to restructure our defence machinery. There are three distinct ways in which the concept of Nuclearisation can be discussed in the context of Indian defence policy. *The* first is essentially a response to the Sino-Indian conflict system and the preparatory process for the Indian production and deployment of nuclear weapons is limited to a withdrawal from the arms control measures sponsored by the Super powers. A comparatively limited redistribution of resources will thus enable India to gain strategic advantages by putting India in a bargaining relationship with the existing system of deterrence in the Asian context. A second view would propound Nuclearisation as a process of preparation in which the development of potential nuclear capability along with missile and satellite technology would become a symbol for strengthening the country's nuclear identity and enhancing its expectations from the nuclear powers. The spillover benefits of the technological revolution would produce tangible results and provide the necessary incentive to the nuclear powers to pay greater heed to Indian objectives. The third concept of Nuclearisation is from the vantage point of a broader strategic design which enlarges the minimum national security goal to include a technological-security system for the South East Asian region. The stress here is on joint effort, and the conflicting political goals of India and the Super powers are resolved through a technological programme which is sensitive to the nuclear concerns of powers like Japan, Australia and Indonesia. The credibility of the Indian nuclear deterrent would be enhanced because the Indo-Asian relationship would provide a rationale for the successful pursuit of peace-keeping methods over the Southeast Asian region.

LINKAGE BETWEEN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE COLD WAR

Criterion of Self-interest

There were four principal circumstances which enabled India to fulfil its self-interest in evolving a strategy of cooperation with the other new nations which were formed out of the former colonies. First, there was a clear interest in avoiding internal political conflict which would have been inextricably projected on to the domestic scene by transmitting tensions from the two power blocs. Secondly, India's environmental influence in Asia could plausibly help in widening the spectrum of political opportunities, while conflict and mistrust would be accentuated if erstwhile colonial powers consolidated their social, economic and psychological hold taking advantage of the cold war postures. Thirdly, the disproportionate consequences of the war effort, during the last global confrontation, which had exposed India to intolerable hazards like the Bengal Famine even though the country had been spared a shooting war, affected public opinion in India. The Indian approach to global peace and security questioned the motivations and interests of those who conducted crusades without reflecting on the deep disorders and malfunctioning they generated in the rest of humanity. Finally, the humanistic philosophical tradition of Gandhi, Tagore and Aurobindo provided an opportunity for a role-enactment by India of which a cardinal feature was the theme of a "moral consensus" which would sustain a programme for international cooperation by bridging over differences in ideologies.

In order to discover the proper sphere of Indian Foreign Policy after gaining our independence it was natural that Prime Minister Nehru's pronouncements should reject the political implications of the East-West division, which was sought to be dramatised as a large scale engagement on a global scale. The Americans and the Europeans were not able to discern the un-folding pattern of development initiated by India's emergence as an independent power although they repeated the truism that the colonial era was over. Thus the picture of India that existed in the minds of both Western and Russian statesmen lacked cohesion and for all practical purposes denied the future-oriented goals which were firmly grounded in India's nationalist ethos. If one may generalise, at this early stage of India's career as a free nation, the key ideas of Indian foreign policy began to reflect the historical task of the larger community of newly emancipated nations, and the need to enhance their collective capacity in politics and diplomacy.

The New Asian and African States

The Cold War was a challenge to the new Asian and African states as it threatened the positive steps towards the construction of diplomatic strategies and policies which had to be undertaken as forerunners of their internationalised socio-economic development. The focus of India's Afro-Asian policy gave priority to maximising the range of options, and the improvement of our relationship with the new nations was achieved within the framework of mutual protection of national freedom. The resistance to the cross pressures of the Super Powers by the new Asian and African states including India took six main forms of attitudes and opinions.

1. The struggle between the two sides was viewed by these states as being essentially one of moves on a chess-board rather than a struggle between two systems of social organisation dedicated primarily to moral and ideological considerations.

2. The memory of colonial rule ensured that these states supported international action against policies like racial discrimination which were the legacy of an imperialist era and sought initiatives to deny political roles to States which did not pursue the policy of anti-colonialism with vigour and fortitude.

3. These states sought to extend the scope of activity by the United Nations. They helped to evolve new ideas by which international institutions were revived to help maintain world peace and to promote economic and technical assistance and scientific and cultural cooperation.

4. The new members of the international community urged the importance and utility of new methods of negotiation in settling international issues.

5. Many of the new states sought to avoid military alliances and especially the setting up of permanent military bases which they believed did not enhance but reduced general security.

6. They welcomed economic and cultural cooperation with both the United States and the Soviet Union. An important assumption they made was that neither of these powers has the objective of world conquest. Although the United States and Soviet Union in their polemical exchanges accused each other of being Hitler's heir, the new Afro-Asian states believed that even at their worst both of these powers are fundamentally different from the model of Nazi Germany.

Interaction of Politics and Technological Developments

The principal political factor visible in a panoramic view of the confrontation of the two Super powers was their dynamic behaviour inextricably linked with the acceleration of technological change. The independence of other states was in the larger system of Super Power relationships assimilated to an unequal political relationship through three sources: military alliances, economic weaponry and mass media. The foreign policy of India should not have remained content with what had been achieved by bringing about a measure of communication between the new States. The technological dimension of world politics was being transformed in a dramatic manner which required an increasing acceptance of change for which it was necessary that foreign policy making should have been influenced by imaginative thinking. The facts, however, suggest that the Indian foreign policy establishment relied on a distinctive type of bureaucratic mind which translated Nehru's Afro-Asian thinking into concepts which fettered India's independent approach into shibboleths of which the fundamental feature was that a non-cold war approach meant that India should ratify decisions which were mechanically balanced between the United States and Soviet positions regardless of our own psychological, strategic or technological needs. Looking back over the fifties in which the flexibility and the regulatory capacity of Indian foreign policy deteriorated and disappeared, and rigidity and verbal excesses gained ascendancy, the hub of the problem appears to have been our remaining oversold to the invisible and natural identity of interests of the Afro-Asian world without taking into account the deeper and more widespread vulnerability of Afro-Asian unity to the conflicting interests and different combinations of interests produced by the technological environment. The problem for India, therefore, was to find practical ways for rejecting the hegemonial influence of the Super Powers through the development of functional and regional cooperation among the new nations. Indian thought and practice began especially after the Korean War to reflect in an increasing degree what was actually an ephemeral interest in mediation and failed to develop the concepts to regulate the pattern of politico-military relationships without which our perennial interest in resisting the messianism and coercive pressures of the Super Powers could not be realised. India's role as leader of Afro-Asian grouping became increasingly counter-productive because we talked of the cold war phenomenon without differentiating the motivations of the different parties in crisis-situations in terms of varying strategic aims. In conflict situations like those of Korea, Berlin, Congo, Cuba and Indo-China, there was a process of interaction between the Super Powers which released them from the rigid strategic perceptions which were in the beginning the hallmark of the Cold War confrontation. What was needed on India's part was a readiness to scrutinise these conflict

situations to assess the changing strategic relationships and if possible to anticipate the strategic perception of future conflict situations so that India's role outside the cold war would possess political realism and wield if possible greater leverage through coordination of regional security interests. The positive advantages of such an over-all view of defence and foreign policy planning were overlooked and the formal content of India's mediatory role was exaggerated.

KOREA

The crossing of the 38th parallel by the North Korean Army was a spectacular development which destroyed the modicum of cooperation in the cold war environment. The needs of communication increased the area of manoeuvrability enjoyed by India and one might look at India's efforts to link the Soviet Union and China on the one hand and the United States on the other, as indicative of a high degree of intuitive understanding about the function of mediation. India, however, failed to dovetail its role of third party between the two sides in the Cold War with independent strategic analysis and policy planning. The Korean war produced a whole new range of military-political problems to which first the American strategic thinkers and following them the Soviet analysts applied themselves and thus gradually evolved a common language of strategy and crisis-management. Our good offices in Korea undoubtedly brought us some dividends in the form of improved relations with the Soviet Union and closer contacts with Peking, but our rationale of mediation was not linked to the new technological political environment. The hope that Indian influence on East-West negotiations would be an enduring path for our diplomacy proved to be extravagant. Relatively exceptional circumstances had permitted India to fulfil an important international assignment, but not much was done to widen and deepen Indian understanding of a new range of conceptions like "limited war", and "deterrence" which focussed attention on those areas where costs and risks of confrontations could be reduced. It may have seemed reasonable for Indian policy makers to utilise the crucial interest of China in the Korean crisis to extend the sphere of India's cooperation with the Soviet bloc, but it was at best a short term policy. It was highly speculative to maintain that the military stalemate in Korea had demonstrated conclusively that the overriding consideration in the global strategic situation was for India to work for adjustment or postponement of every conflict between the two power blocs without a close analysis of the specific impact of the particular event on the following themes : extension or limitation of strategic commitments, development of new weapons technologies and the pursuit of revolutionary warfare. In consequence the great divergence and discontinuity between India's mediatory behaviour which sought to appease the Chinese and the Russians on the one hand, and the aggressive posturings of

China leading to the wholly new military situation in Tibet on the other, symbolised India's lagging behind in empirical study of strategic affairs and ultimately her deliberate neglect of national and regional security.

Berlin

Berlin has been the indicator of Europe's vulnerability to the disruptive tremors of the Cold War and still bears the scars of the disintegration of the continental structure. The Berlin blockade raised the question whether the powder keg would explode and exacerbate the risks of escalation. The Western powers acted to forestall more precipitous actions by the Air-Lift. Understandably when Krushchev conducted a policy threatening extreme measures a decade later, the United States was assured of strong psychological support from the West European countries. The real issue which Krushchev had to face was that the combination of the strategic superiority of the United States with this psychological support was significant enough to inhibit success. On the other side the United States interpretation of Soviet policy on Berlin was beginning to allow considerable diversity for possible solutions. The admissibility of the argument which assessed Krushchev's objective as essentially status quo minded was recognised. In place of the all out Russian challenge seen earlier as the focus of the Berlin dispute, the Soviet Union was now identified with a policy of sufficient tactical flexibility which was designed to insulate Eastern Europe against the pressure from West German rearmament and to put East Germany on the road to full diplomatic recognition. The choices worthy of serious consideration by India in dealing with the Berlin problem should have induced clearer perception of the problems of European security; Indian non-alignment, however, drew conclusions from the Berlin crisis which did not gain for us a perspective on the behavioural responses of the European and global powers to the military-political environment of Europe. India's broad generalisations about the U2 Flight and our strong condemnation did not help to make explicit the vital stakes or the psychological outlooks of the Super Powers. On the other hand our limited awareness of the basic expectations of East Europeans regarding European security and our conformity with the requirements of the Hallstein doctrine fettered India's perception of the new trends in the negotiating strategies and tactics over the German question.

Congo

The American-Soviet antagonism in Congo entailed the assumption of large scale responsibilities by the United Nations which was a burden difficult to endure. Indian policy was faced with three basic issues. First, India with memories of the British policy of divide et impera was resolutely opposed to the disintegration of Congo which would have been inevitable if the Katanga separatists had won the day with outside support. Second, India feared that American-Soviet rivalry in the Congo would transform itself into military encounters which would lead to the use of force elsewhere in a chain reaction. Third, India feared catastrophe would follow if the United Nations failed to consolidate the peace in Congo and if the United Nations was to develop into an effective peace-keeping organisation the Congo was both a challenge and an opportunity. India responded to Hammarskjöld's request and provided the major part of the United Nations contingent.

A chronological sequence of events would show that the United States and the Soviet Union altered their perception of the parties in the Congo whom each was supporting and both sides reassessed their interests and goals Each Super Power realised that it could not influence events in Africa to its liking and shrewd observation suggested new methods of holding the ring.

India's support to the peace-keeping role of the United Nations was appropriate to start with but India seems to have exhausted herself without deriving any long term advantage in the form of diplomatic influence with the regime she helped to bolster. The question is not whether India should have gone in to help save the Congo situation or not, but whether India's involvement in the Congo crisis could have been something more than a reaction to the fears inspired by American and Russian sabre-rattling. What does seem painfully clear is that in spite of the international recognition of the Indian role in the Congo the essential psychological factor in India's Congo policy or for that matter, in India's Africa policy was lacking, for India did not project herself as one of the multiple centres of power as China did, but was in most African eyes an armchair observer on behalf of the Super Powers.

Cuba

It seems useful to distinguish two aspects of the Cuban missile crisis. The first is that of the crisis calculations of the Americans and the Soviets; the second is that of the interrelationship between the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Indian Border war, which requires empirical examination to bring out the context in which the clash of Soviet and Chinese interests towards India were made explicit.

The United States was determined that Soviet missiles which were being installed in Cuba should not become operational, and was prepared to challenge the Soviet Union directly. The application of the Flexible Response doctrine to the crisis involved a series of communications between the two Super Powers, and the Cuban government of Fidel Castro was hardly in the picture. Kennedy conveyed to Krushchev his determination to use United States conventional forces in the Caribbean while at the same time announcing global alert measures by United States strategic nuclear forces. The Russians had decided to deploy strategic weaponry in the Western hemisphere in a bid to counteract the then existing margin of Soviet nuclear strategic inferiority and were utilising the political opportunities provided by the ill-fated Bay of Pigs affair which had enhanced their influence in Cuba. In developing its response the United States did not consult any of its allies. This aspect served to focus attention on the grave danger to European countries that could arise from initiatives taken by a Super Power without the possibility of participating actively in reaching decisions with implications of nuclear deployment. Krushchev's communication that he was prepared to withdraw the Soviet missiles and the American assurance that it would not invade Cuba ended the 'eye-ball to eye-ball' confrontation, but in the process it had underlined the community of interest of the two Super Powers in controlling international crises and in avoiding becoming targets of nuclear destruction. It became a good deal clearer to the French on the one side and to the Chinese on the other that the Cuban confrontation and its resolution had opened the way to politico-military collaboration between the Super Powers. As far as France was concerned, a French nuclear force was to become the firm base for an independent French policy and for reducing American influence in Western Europe. The Chinese launched a bitter attack on Krushchev for his "appeasement" of the Americans.

Another important characteristic of the Chinese response to the Cuban crisis was their effort to assert their political weight against the Soviet Union by the effective timing of their conflict with India. While accomplishing their limited objectives against India the Chinese discovered a new

function of political extortion against the Soviets by their polemic about the fickleness of Soviet policy.

Indo-China

The attempted return of western colonialism to Indo-China in the unsettled aftermath of the Japanese surrender was a development which was not in conformation with the trend in the rest of Asia. The failure of the French to concede nationalist demands and to undertake requisite negotiations with the unequivocal intention of transferring power provided the basis for the potency of the Viet Minh movement. Vietnam became a central theme in the Cold War when the United States, after the defeat of the French in 1954, stepped in with aid and advisers. The experience of the Vietnam War has crystallised the attitudes of the Americans, the Russians and the Chinese, which have continued to involve Southeast Asia in grave danger. The commitment of half a million American personnel on Asian territory underlined the urgency of finding solutions which will lead to the construction of a new framework of peace. The Soviet Union, which along with Britain was the Co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, has a point when it claims to have been in favour of a negotiated settlement, but the Chinese who kept themselves carefully uninvolved in the escalation of United States bombing, have successfully compelled the Russians to adopt an inflexible attitude which impedes an overall political settlement.

From the standpoint of India, the main purpose of the acceptance of the Chairmanship of the International Control Commission was to mitigate the position of military and paramilitary confrontation and to develop alternatives to military solutions.
India's failure to assume an active role in South East Asian regional politics, however, and her general reluctance to take the political initiative is reflected in the policy vacuum which compels her to cling to the hope that a practical solution will emerge from the Paris discussions which started in 1968.

India should have declared her readiness to support new structures to promote regional and functional activities among the new nations. Attempts to provide utilitarian grounds for Soviet-American rapprochement in the supposedly beneficial accretion of material resources to the third world did not constitute serious policy guidelines. The available evidence does not suggest that Indian policy makers ever drew up a blueprint for significant innovations in our foreign relations through institutions which would widen the scope for autonomous action by non-bloc nations. What is curious about our Bandung days is the lack of any performance criteria which would have

assisted the establishment of an institutionalised structure for the Afro-Asian area. For India, the overriding political motivation in exploring the dimensions of what came to be called afterwards the North-South problem, was to proselytise the new nations into accepting India's moral leadership rather than to take measures towards increased integration and thereby pave the way for creating an alternative structure. If India had worked on ideas of partnership with the new nations, we would have found in time that technical devices for coordination of military and political action would have become subjects of constructive dialogue in our foreign policy. One does not need to endorse the pattern of thinking of those who formulated SEATO or of those who have now devised the outlines of Soviet sponsored Asian collective security proposals in order to realise that there was a really good case for regional cooperation in Asia.

Dysfunctions of India's Commonwealth Membership

India's continuing to remain a member of the Commonwealth and the assumption of the role of architect of the new edifice of Britain's imperial politics by Nehru was not the result of a rational calculus. India's decision was in fact the concatenation of a rather curious mixture of transitional phenomena in India's new external relationship with Britain. Nehru doubtless held the belief that the Commonwealth link strengthened the foundation of India's peace policy through the more sober appreciation of the international situation. The framework of coordination and cooperation of Indo-British relations permitted a good deal more of pragmatism in India's policy towards the Western world than would have been the case if India had to attune itself slowly to the sharply defined cold war nexus of American political power. But all this entailed increasingly an Indian acceptance of the static policy pursued by the British who refused to see the relevance of the structuring of a new order in Europe and the advancement of European Unity for paving the way to the elimination of the East-West conflict. The Commonwealth involvement came in the way of the creation of a political, economic and psychological basis for a realistic Indian attitude to the problems of Europe's partition. In fact India's attention was distracted from Europe and from the political constellations which provided the context for the diplomacies of the embattled Super Powers.

India's concern about the division of Europe was expressed in vague terms and did not penetrate to the core of the political and military problems that underlay the cold war schism, for example the post war German situation. The Indian acceptance of Britain as a vantage point for looking at Europe's problems gave an air of unreality to Indian pronouncements and removed India from

participation in the decisive phases of control and resolution of conflict in the continent whose political fate is still decisive for questions of global peace and war.

The thinking of some of Nehru's advisers, notably Krishna Menon was that if the Commonwealth structure had been totally dismantled India would have appeared in the eyes of the world helplessly dependent on United States aid and, therefore, the Commonwealth was a useful means of covering our weakness, which thereby helped to support our mediating role.

In fact, however, the concept of Commonwealth membership reduced India's appeal in Europe as well as Russia. It was not only Pravda and Izvestia which interpreted the Commonwealth membership as India's acceptance of a subordinate role when the decision of the Indian Constituent Assembly became known; the suspicion lurked in many European minds that India's dependence on Britain was the basic reason for India's adherence to the Commonwealth.

India's Commonwealth oriented policy tended to obliterate the new elements making for individuality and self-determination which appeared in embryonic form, as Britain's special relationship with the United States precluded it from drawing the correct lessons from the approaching transformation of the Bipolar environment. Indian policy makers did not make efforts to discover the deeper origins of the profound influence of Gaullism in European affairs. Nor were Indian political judgements particularly illuminating on the subject of East European Communist polycentricism. Having built up a framework of certain positions about Soviet-American confrontation, India held on to them rigidly even when it became clear that "peaceful coexistence of the superpowers" as a political conception had translated itself into the political reality of "the predominance of the super powers." The voices of dissent in the two alliance systems were not heard by India or at any rate did not become the serious concern of Indian foreign policy. De Gaulle and Ceausescu who took the lead in formulating new initiatives for reducing super power dominance in Europe did not receive special attention from India. What is at issue is whether India recognises the political importance of the resurgence of the European Idea in both Western and Eastern Europe. Reference only to measures taken by the United States or the Soviet Union to adjust the use of their enormous military power in Europe does not bring out the logic of the protest against the American and Soviet military presence which underlay the Gaullist challenge nor does it explain the contradictions revealed in the Soviet bloc relations with Rumania and Czechoslovakia. The profoundly disturbing events in Czechoslovakia have not changed the long term prospect that explosive situations will be recreated in Eastern Europe and forcible solutions will only pile up political burdens for future Soviet decision-makers.

Peaceful Coexistence

It was only natural for India to consecrate the idea of world peace at the start of its career as a free nation, for Gandhism as a political phenomenon claimed the Indian freedom struggle to be the commencement of a worldwide renunciation of physical force in human relations. The first steps towards spelling out the aims of Indian foreign policy at the United Nations or at the reconstituted Commonwealth reflected two basic issues relating to the role which Indian leaders wished to play in the sphere of world politics. First, in what way free India should ensure that Imperialism did not return onto the Asian scene and threaten India's newly won independence. Second, what were the chances that India's economic development would create expectations which would be immune to the tensions of the cold war?

The thermonuclear stalemate between the Soviet Union and the United States points to an important conclusion with respect to the dimensions of their "peaceful" co-existence. It was evident in the highly visible political acceptance of the Warsaw pact action in Czechoslovakia by the United States. The super powers view their operational functions of peaceful coexistence in the context of their historic experience of the preservation of their exclusive areas of interest. The United States domination over Latin America is generally admitted, and the Alliance for progress was supposed to convert this relationship into one of cooperation. A number of specific reasons can be advanced to explain American attitudes to its neighbours in the South but one can only with difficulty retain faith in American affirmations that its grand design for its hemispheric partners is to foster political and economic cooperation without undermining national independence. America's enemies have of course, attacked America's policies as imperialistic and United States apologists are often at a disadvantage in answering these charges since sophisticated arguments are often not taken into account by United States agencies who have been accustomed to an interventionist role in Latin America.

It was since de Gaulle challenged American hegemonial influence in the European continent that American commitments have started appearing in an unfavourable light on the European scene where formerly it was held that American honour and prestige derived from an unselfish assumption of onerous responsibilities. It is doubtful whether the United States could ever claim that the basic objectives of its presence in Europe were evolved without reference to the primacy of American national interest. But the Gaullist attack on the American dominated structure of the Atlantic Alliance struck a balance in terms devoid of emotional excess. The view that de Gaulle

had broken the myth of Super Power benevolence was widely held throughout the world and earned the redoubtable French leader support and goodwill.

Even more significant is India's experience which practised Non-alignment to lay firm foundations for an independent foreign policy. The United States arm-twisting of India has been well managed with panoply of sophisticated economic, sociological and political theories. The American impact on India's decision to devalue her currency was seen in India as a humiliation and considered almost exclusively as a formal endorsement of United States dictation. For the Indian public the United States is identified with an attitude which ignores India's legitimate security requirements and dictates its own assessments. There is deep-rooted Indian anxiety that Americans look upon Indian territorial integrity, especially in the context of Kashmir as an ingredient in American manoeuvres. Indians are also unimpressed by the American policy of singling out India for Nuclear Non-proliferation when demand for acquisition of nuclear weapons is supported by a strong current of Indian public opinion. The crudeness of the United States behaviour in the Bangla Desh crisis and during the Indo-Pak war has in fact outraged the feelings of the entire Indian people.

The other Super Power, the Soviet Union has also time and again thrown her weight about in India in ways which have aroused widespread misgivings and fears. There is little doubt that Krushchevian assessments of natural identity of interests between the Soviets and Indians have turned out to be exaggerated. But must change involve complete modification of style inducing the Soviets to treat India in a cavalier fashion? An unwelcome element in Indo-Soviet relations has been introduced by pressure techniques such as attacks on Indian personalities in Soviet media, Moscow Radio broadcasts promoting conflict and struggle on the Indian political scene, and the peculiar practice of cartographical misrepresentation of Indian territory. Bitter feelings have been created by the domineering attitude of the Soviets and the various financial and technological hitches which frustrated national aspirations in the case of the Bokaro Project. Given the context of the Indo-Soviet Treaty and the Soviet backing to India in the Indo-Pak war, the prospects for articulating common policies are brighter. It would, however, be an over-simplification to say that all the problems India faces in dealing with the Soviet colossus are now solved. India will have to strive hard to preserve its independence against Soviet hegemonial claims, which may arise in the future.

Years of mediation and other diplomatic activity by India for bringing about peaceful existence have not enabled India to establish a relationship with the two Super Powers where Indian values and goals are immune from their hegemonial pressures. The power games played by both the

Soviets and the Americans appear not seldom to be more up to date versions of those with which Imperialism left its marks of antagonism and ruthlessness on Indian and Asian minds.

Empirical evidence also suggests that the earlier presumption that development aid from the two Super Powers would create a community of interests free from serious tensions has proved to be misplaced. The economic orientation of both the Super powers after they have achieved "peaceful coexistence" has not hastened the appearance of *Wirtschaftwunder* for India. The economic effect of the political stalemate between the Super Powers is painfully visible in the reduced dynamism in bridging the gap between the poorer and the more affluent by international action.

The "peaceful coexistence" which was worshipped at the shrine of Non-alignment has manifested itself as a deity which demands political and economic dependence and is counter-productive of a vision of harmony and goodwill.

The conclusion to be drawn from the behaviour of the United States during the Bangla Desh crisis and the Indo-Pakistan war, is that the Americans considered coercion against India as a feasible alternative to disorient India from a principled approach to the Bangla Desh movement. The other Super Power, the Soviet Union, was able to maintain and strengthen its political dialogue with India but its support to the idea of a political solution within the framework of Pakistan, attested to the existence of an opportunistic factor dictated by the Soviet Super Power interests. To be sure, it was India's public opinion which expressed itself wholeheartedly on the side of the struggle of the Bangla Desh freedom fighters and brought about a marked change in the pattern for a compromise settlement for which the Soviet tacticians were working since March 1971. By its firm action India created a favourable historical opportunity for a consistent application of Indian policy to the settlement of urgent questions of peace and security. India should in no way throw away this chance for a breakthrough by "capitulation" which a return to orthodox non-alignment would entail. The decisive factor in securing Soviet cooperation was the close alliance of the Indian political parties and groups and the Indian public generally, which was not prepared to allow the errors and shortcomings of the Tashkent diplomacy to be repeated.

NUCLEARISATION AND INDIAN FOREIQN POLICY

World Nuclear Situation

In the last decade it has become increasingly clear that world politics is being rewritten in the language of complex nuclear relationships. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the political and military environment at the end of World War II is now of historical interest only. The late forties and the fifties still bore the traumatic impact of the Hitler war and the malign conflict process of the Cold War. Although the world had been talking of nuclear weapons since the A Bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6th and 9th of August, 1945, yet for a fairly long period there was hardly any understanding of the world nuclear situation as a generalised politico-military phenomenon with its political, strategic and moral rationales. Conflict Management in this period was almost a hit and miss affair since the conflict processes were still generally comprehended in terms of the artefacts of conventional warfare, although international interdependence in matters relating to war and peace had realistically speaking already taken on a predominantly nuclear dimension. In the sixties a number of causes contributed towards revealing the full matrix of nuclear world politics.

Events like the Sino-Soviet dispute and the dissidence of Gaullist France within the Atlantic alliance helped to remove the overlying encrustations and helped to form more sophisticated images of the nuclear factors in politico-military affairs. The main way towards an understanding of the transformation of world politics was, however, opened through general theoretical contributions employing the use of game theory, and methodological aids like scenario-writing and simulation techniques. The repertoire of strategic concepts now available have helped in refining the assumptions for building models of international stability. The official statements of important policymakers show the influence of sophisticated strategic theorising. It is also immediately apparent that a number of important developments are under way and therefore earlier attempts at providing general theories of nuclear strategy will have to be supplemented or even radically altered to extend strategic rationality to a still wider range of problems.

The relative appropriateness of different factors for determining the feasibility of first or second strike and of counter-force or counter-city strategies have given rise to different varieties of strategic thought. The adoption by the USA of the doctrine of massive retaliation when the USSR was unable to provide nuclear retaliation gave impetus to the facile view that increase in the means of destruction automatically secured greater stability. But with the development of Soviet means of delivery it was clear that the ‘first strike’ basis of massive retaliation was undermined. A new phase in strategic thinking was marked by the concern with the possibilities of inflicting damage to the

reprisal-forces. This led to the consideration of the conditions of invulnerability through mobility and dispersion of missiles. Also inhibition against striking first was recognised, and a stable deterrent was understood to imply nuclear responses in which pre-emption was ruled out. The concern with the stability of the military environment shifted attention to the widening of choices by relating nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities and led to the emergence of the McNamara doctrine in the United States. The United States had long retained an evangelical fervour in identifying itself with a unique nuclear destiny, and the curious melange of accusation and counter accusations which characterised the "missile gap" controversy graphically portrayed the dangers of focussing on exaggerated estimates of capabilities, leading to negative political repercussions. Broadly speaking, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has consistently held to any one view concerning the level of strategic nuclear forces. During the 1960s with the high level of United States strategic nuclear forces it was difficult to discover whether Soviet intentions corresponded to minimal deterrence. Looked at in terms of the Berlin and Cuba crises, Soviet behaviour was viewed with growing uneasiness and raised doubts in many minds as to whether they were aware of the costs of pursuit of a maximum deterrent.

Soviet perceptions of the American counterforce doctrine raised crucial questions which have been at issue in Soviet American nuclear relations and it is interesting to observe that the Soviets found the initial American view of the hazards of the nuclear-missile age conditions lacking in validity and altogether too simplistic. Elements of a bipolar strategic stability programme re-emerged as each of the Super Powers recognised the need for effective integration of tacit restraints into its deterrent planning. The developments in hardening and concealing the long range missiles on the American side were followed by the Soviets substantially augmenting their similarly hardened and concealed strategic delivery vehicles. The transformation of the strategic relationship between the Super Powers has left behind the stage when the USA enjoyed strategic superiority over the Soviet Union which was estimated 3 or 4 to 1. The substantive questions of this relationship arose in a dramatic manner in the Cuban crisis. Although it was apparent that all out nuclear war should enable the Soviets to inflict large scale damage on the United States, yet the Cuba confrontation indicated to the Soviet Union the risks inherent in the existing situation in which the United States was able to decisively utilise its nuclear superiority to exploit the dangerous phase of escalation up to the nuclear threshold. Thus the Soviet Union could not properly speaking ignore the "realities of power" and regard the situation as representing a nuclear stalemate. The mix of incentives influencing the Soviet backing down at Cuba included presumably the cognizance of the point made by Pierre Gallois that "between the US forces operating almost in inland waters and the

Soviet forces intervening from thousands of miles away, the odds were too uneven to encourage the Soviets to venture upon a conventional confrontation which would have been the first step up the ladder."

The increase in I.C.B.M. production by the Soviet Union and the evolution of joint efforts leading to the Test Ban Treaty and the Hot Line between Washington and Moscow, and other measures for stability in the nuclear equation have opened a new perspective of mutual responsibility of the Super Powers. It is not necessary to contest the fact that the new Super Power strategic doctrine incorporated in Assured Destruction reduces conflict of interests and promises reciprocity and equity in the future strategic relationship of the most powerful nations. A further consequence of the political decisions aiming at a new structure of Super Power security is inevitably to endorse Super Power military presence including nuclear presence and to lend further momentum to Super Power nuclear proliferation by canvassing world wide sanction in favour of more symmetrical relations between the Super Powers. Other states are increasingly obliged to accept the equivalence between the Americans and the Soviets as a permanent objective and are persuaded to give up scrutiny of the offensive systems of the Super Powers and the manipulative purposes for which they are used leading to international coercion and violence.

The question of use of tactical nuclear weapons was considered in the European context and developed into a theory of limited war. As an indication of the American convictions, Henry Kissinger's thinking at one time was strongly in favour of employment of tactical forces equipped with small atomic weapons but in 1961 he changed his position. American theorists generally came to feel that escalation from tactical nuclear weapons would be unpredictable. Among theorists it is writers like General Pierre Gallois of France who stress the importance of the technical condition of nuclear continuity. The point made by Gallois is that the Americans are for special reasons suggesting artificial discontinuity between nuclear and conventional systems which simply does not exist any longer on account of the existence of low yield nuclear devices of less than 100 tons TNT equivalence.

French strategic thought by and large espoused the cause of European nuclear independence as the strategic solution to the overwhelming complexity of the European nuclear situation created by the construction of invulnerable striking forces in the United States and the Soviet Union. European reservations with regard to American claims in favour of the status quo in the management of nuclear force in the Western Alliance strategy came to the fore when the Cuba confrontation showed that the nuclear stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union had altogether

politically intolerable consequences for Europe, To American ears French fears appeared exaggerated and even unreal. For example, they dismissed much of French strategic doctrine propounded by General Ailleret and others as merely an effort to hold them hamstrung to the politico-military thinking of massive retaliation which would only lead to strategic instability under the new conditions It is not surprising the Americans are motivated by the alarming view of risks to the territory of the United States and take comfort in the fact that both they and the Russians now possess second strike systems which are practically invulnerable. The French drew opposite conclusions from the lessons taught by the American theorists. It is understandable that the French did not regard the American doctrine of flexible response as the answer to the new strategic conditions in which Western Europe found itself. To quote General Gallois: "The anxiety expressed by the European allies resulted from the way Washington interpreted the danger of escalation. Seen from America, a conflict in which American forces would be involved if the enemy has nuclear weapons, could be neither a "limited" nor a "localised" one. In order for it to be limited, one would have to accept defeat rather than employ the weapons necessary for success. To use these weapons would invite the enemy to do the same. And since ballistic missiles have eliminated distances, the fight would not be limited, nor could it be 'localised'." The analysis of the strategic organisation of the French national nuclear force presented by strategists like Gallois is useful if for no other reason than that its challenge to some of the extravagant arguments used in spelling out the rationale for a perpetual two-power nuclear game between the United States and the Soviet Union. A national nuclear force can evidently demonstrate its preparedness to escalate to the nuclear strategic threshold, especially since the potential aggressor is unlikely to find nuclear destruction of a minimal nature acceptable for the purpose of vanquishing a middle power like France.

The model of nuclear conflict considered as realistic by thinkers like Gallois poses a serious challenge to the rationale of alliances. To quote his words "a small number of bombs and a small number of carriers suffice for a threatened power to protect itself against atomic destruction." The American strategists, on the other hand, approach the problem from the perspective established by a consideration of the precariousness of the balance of terror. Raymond Aron is right in regarding the Wohlstetter article in the Foreign Affairs issue of 1959 January, as having "played a vitally important role in shaping the strategic theory." The conceptual framework of the Wohlstetter article, however, may now have little to offer by way of explaining the strategic logic in a world situation where alliance strategies are crumbling in spite of proclaimed long-range political commitments. On the other hand, the strategic reasoning of Gallois and others seems to apply

fairly well when new problem areas such as Asia are considered. In the circumstances it is difficult to understand Wohlstetter's objection to the Gallois thesis. The Wohlstetter paradigm is attractive if Soviet-American bipolarity is raised to an eternal political phenomenon, which has to be established without reference to concrete conflict situations in the world. The well known French strategist General Beaufre distinguishes the conditions under which the deterrence stalemate conforms to the world environment in the following terms:" it has become obvious that the hypothesis of the threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe has now, to all intents and purposes, lost any validity. This development has, of course, been brought in large part by the value of NATO as a deterrent but it has also been due to the political and psychological evolution within the USSR. In any case, the fact is that not only does such an invasion now seem improbable, but the hypothesis of a nuclear war has become unthinkable because a nuclear war would certainly entail reciprocal destruction of such proportions that no political objective could justify it. In modern strategic jargon, 'bilateral deterrence' of both sides is '*bistable absolue*."

It would not be unfair to suggest that with the general acceptance of the preponderance of American strategic nuclear power, American theorists had a vested interest, as Beaufre rightly contends, in continuing the discussion in terms of filling the deterrent gap and in focussing the discussion on the stabilisation of the Nuclear threshold.

Non-proliferation, National Politics and Foreign Policy

Non-proliferation as it is presented in the "Nth country problem" literature does not often come to grips with the problems of the present phase of the global nuclear situation. Sufficient effort has not been made to trace the likely effects of the acquisition of nuclear weapons in a world where there is no evidence that anyone is actually playing "nuclear blind man's buff". In a theoretical study entitled "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability" Deutsch and Singer demonstrated by using the L.R. Richardson model that rapid escalation of United States-Soviet Union arms competition can be prevented by a shift towards a multipolar world. Their conclusion on the diffusion of nuclear weapons, however, illustrates the curious tendency to plump for any argument to prevent other powers from joining the nuclear club. The authors are caught in some ritual whose aim is to preserve the mystique of the nuclear great powerhood, when they discount their own analytic reasons and insistently demand a cordon sanitaire between the "haves" and the "have-nots." They are preoccupied with a bipolar view which leads them to sweeping judgements, "Each of the present major nuclear powers—the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union—has been politically stable, in the

sense that each has retained its particular type of government for over forty years. None of these three countries has been notable for initiating large and reckless military enterprises. Among the middle-level and smaller powers most likely to press for nuclear weapons during the next decade—which include France, Germany, Japan, Mainland China, Nationalist China, and perhaps Egypt and others—there were several whose recent history lacks any comparable evidence of stability in domestic institutions and caution in international affairs. If this stage should be followed by the dissemination of nuclear weapons among a still larger number of countries, including inevitably at least some with still less stable domestic regimes and less cautious military policies, the instability of the international system would be still more dangerous." The authors clearly have not even bothered to take up the task of finding the core of politico-military problems in the case of each of the states who are potentially nuclear, to arrive at an integrative understanding of the conditions for stability in the world. Another perplexing conclusion in the present debate on the "Nth country problem" is concerned with "chain-reaction." It is clear that the crucial question of the relevance of strategic nuclear ideas to the multi-polar world is not considered with scientific adequacy. Since the nuclear armouries of the United States and the Soviet Union were developed in a particular sequence, there is a tendency to regard that perspective of development as unalterable. An illustration of this tendency is found in the views on Chinese nuclear developments which have been composed by exaggerating Maoist "revelations" on strategy and conflict which are divorced from the present-day realities of the world nuclear situation. M. Halperin's study of China and the Bomb helped to counter the impression that the Chinese are deliberately thinking in terms of nuclear war as a political objective. The Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons and their development of means of delivery indeed pose serious political and military problems for India. But it does not help in developing a suitable response to raise "Non-proliferation" into an absolute principle of nuclear politics. Indian fears of "Chinese nuclear blackmail" may be justified but such a view discounts unnecessarily the possibility of working out new configurations of the regional or global nuclear situation. There is no justification for believing *a priori* that the Chinese will continue to adhere to premises concerning nuclear threats and nuclear threshold which they might have inherited as one time members of the Soviet alliance system. There is no reason to suppose that the Chinese have not increased their understanding of the strategic nuclear situation to develop realistic strategic concepts. India's adherence to the "non-proliferation" strategy in fact prevents India and China sharing a common framework and creates a dangerous situation in which there already exists a realistic nuclear

dialogue between China and the nuclear powers, while India is constantly interpreting Chinese objectives without regard to the restraints of the world nuclear situation.

The two Super Powers are at great pains to emphasise that they are not in collusion with each other to establish a joint hegemony by demarcating spheres of influence, but the emerging strategic parity between the super powers in the Seventies has in fact created a "special relationship." Nothing would be more misleading than the assumption by Indian policy makers that the Soviet-American strategic bilateralism manifested in the SALT approach will produce only isolated solutions for coping with ABM and MIRV systems. Three basic considerations point towards the possible deterioration of the international political climate so far as India is concerned as organisational arrangements for translating the doctrinal aspects of the SALT ideology get under way : (1) The increasing unwillingness of the Super Powers to think about the need for accommodation between their strategic thinking and the objectives defined by national security policies of countries like India which could strengthen local defence through the acquisition of an independent nuclear armoury, would seriously impede the task of opening new perspectives for achieving peace-keeping and checking expansionism in present and future regional situations. The pressure of the Super Powers would ultimately lead to an incredible abuse of power in the next crucial decade with a country like India enmeshed in the unbalanced obligations flowing from the exclusive diplomatic dialogue for achieving balanced arrangements for arms limitation. (2) The emerging strategic parity of the Super Powers has produced a vision of International Security which accepts acute tension as normal outside the sanctuaries of the nuclear weapons states. Minor frontier disputes are aggravated in the political conditions generated by Super Power commitments since a high degree of instability has been legitimised in the world order prompted by tacit Soviet-American understandings.(3)The potential Communist Chinese nuclear threat against Soviet and American interests operates as a powerful motivation to solve short-run problems by building protection against a Chinese attack without adversely affecting the community of strategic interests which form the substance of the dialogue of arms limitation between the Super Powers. This short-run strategy towards China ignores the complex relationships which work to aggravate the conflicts of China with her Asian neighbours and public opinion in these countries questions the utility of the security measures adopted by the Super Powers against China. Even more important, the political and psychological effects of posing as protector nations against Chinese nuclear offensiveness without shared strategic goals and purposes are a grave impediment to the fulfilment of basic national defence needs of countries like India. The process of detente in Asia has not even

started because a rational and coherent formulation of defence strategy requires, in the context of the nuclearised environment, a feasibility analysis by each major national actor, of the steps necessary to neutralise the nuclear advantage of Communist China. The Super Powers misunderstand the nature of the problem by insisting on the guardian role which tries to deny the opportunity to any of the Asian nations to deter the Chinese nuclear threat either by acting alone or in concert with others.

The concept of the ‘‘Nth country problem,” is still being used in contexts which are no longer relevant to the world nuclear situation. Efforts are sometimes made by theorists to buttress strategic choices made by super powers by presenting them as unique solutions to the problems of nuclear control and conflict management. The most interesting political problems are posed for a fairly well defined group of potential nuclear powers which includes India. It is important that whether or not the choice to “go nuclear” by test explosions is exercised these powers should develop sophistication in the use of strategic ideas and theories. Since they are affected by the world nuclear situation in ways which are similar in important respects, it is in their own interest and in the interest of world stability that they discuss strategic nuclear choices among themselves rather than pretend a common ideological ‘interest in “non-proliferation.”

In 1970 during a visit to Peking the French Planning Minister Andre Bettencourt was told by Mao-tse Tung himself that he viewed China’s nuclear bomb as another “paper tiger.” Mao said that China’s advancement towards great powerhood was not due to its achievement in satellite and nuclear developments. The Chinese nuclear threat is, however, not removed for India even if Communist China’s nuclear ambitions are formulated in terms more reassuring to diplomatists and academicians. The present nuclear superiority of Communist China over India gives a blank cheque to the nuclear powers for working up pressures against India during an unanticipated crisis situation involving India and China. The record of Chinese actions against India makes it uncomfortably clear that Chinese nuclear blackmail against India might be crucial to the pattern of Chinese involvement as long as it persists in its view of India as a stalking horse for American and Soviet plans in Asia. A Chinese demand for concessions by India accompanied by the specific actions to emphasise its nuclear presence and capabilities is likely to witness political developments emphasising maximum restraint on the part of a non-nuclear India. The Chinese leverage would be enhanced because the actual use of the Chinese bomb against India would seem quite credible to an Indian Government face to face with Chinese militarism and also to the two Super Powers who while donning the protectors’ role for India would discredit India further by ‘helping’

India, in terms of their own perceptual concepts to recognise the danger signals in a conflict situation between a nuclear and a non-nuclear state. The nuclear superiority of China vis-à-vis India would thus increase its capabilities in three ways: (a) Implicitly the United States and the Soviet Union would agree to political extortion by China in a crisis situation. In spite of present obstacles China is seen by the Super Powers as a precursor of "responsible" nuclear behaviour. It is accepted as axiomatic that a new structure of Chinese Foreign and Defence Policy systems will emerge which will acknowledge the realities of the common international environment in which stabilisation will be a key goal, (b) India's national security could be buttressed by establishing India's identity and status as firmly non-nuclear and within this context the United States and Soviet Union would encourage an overall arrangement for negotiations without involving the nuclear powers. India's civilian nuclear technology would encourage hostile reactions from non-nuclear states who would most likely accuse India of initiating diversion of resources to produce nuclear weapons. These apprehensions would play upon the minds of worried Indian decision-makers in a crisis-situation as there would be demands for imposition of rigorous controls on Indian nuclear development, (c) The failure to undertake any important diplomatic initiative in such a crisis situation would make Indian policy less credible in the post-crisis period and lead inevitably to the freezing of a status quo which would undermine further Indian strategic interests.

The Soviet Union and the United States can by ignoring vital Indian interests develop arms control measures which can be envisioned as legitimate political demands on India in the interests of world order. But the high cost of sacrifice of her interests may be quite unacceptable to India because of the imbalance that would be generated in the regional perspective.

By opting out of the technological improvement of her weaponry India has so far failed to transform her defence system in line with fundamental concepts for the nuclear age. The changed approach to military organisation would involve a deliberate refusal to create and deploy armaments which fortify the defensive strength of India purely in narrow bilateral situations, while reducing drastically the overall defence policy options. The creation of a credible military deterrent would help to identify the ingredients of strategic planning, and establish significant defence policy goals.

In national politics the attention of the Government and the Opposition parties in India, has been so consumed by the debate on the merits and demerits of signing the Non Proliferation Treaty, that our decision-makers have tended to forget that Indian nuclear capability alone can produce a basic revision of assumptions concerning Super Power intentions to divide Asian countries into spheres

of influence. The situation arising out of President Nixon's diplomacy during the Bangla Desh crisis and the Indo-Pak war should help to overcome some misconceptions about the utility of a non-nuclear status. After the recognition of Bangla Desh India stands at the parting of the ways. Whether India finds the road to new opportunities for constructive relations with the United States or continues to be pitted against an American policy geared to wringing unilateral concessions from India, will depend on the actual achievements of India in asserting its nuclear independence. The action in Bangla Desh in the teeth of United States opposition is when all is said, the first hesitant step by India towards developing into a challenger of the nascent United States-Communist China axis. Without an immediate decision to go nuclear there is little possibility of halting the trend towards heightened mutual antagonism between the United States and India. Indeed it can be fairly said that, after the liberation of Bangla Desh, the United States may join with China to make Islamabad's military junta a greater menace to India's security than it was in the past. The easy answer is to say that Islamabad will be faced with such enormous economic burdens that it will be unable to support a large war machine. It seems more reasonable to predict that having given up the dogmas of non-alignment, Indian policy makers will be more responsive to the nuclear realities of the world than they have been in the past. A nuclear India can achieve harmonious relationships with Washington, Peking and Islamabad. Nuclearisation is not something utopian but a stark necessity for India in the context of the historic opportunity presented by the military success of India in Bangla Desh.

India's conduct as a Nuclear Power—A Scenario

India's conduct as a nuclear power would involve resistance to the joint or separate pressure by the Super Powers. Indian deterrence would be aimed chiefly at Communist China, but al! evidence seems to indicate that the Indian deterrent would do much to remove the incentives for political deals undermining the basic Indian objective of resisting formal and informal recognition of territorial claims. Against Indian counterclaims the longer-range expectations have worked a psychological disadvantage against India in the perception of the Super Powers who see an ever widening gap between India and China in the scientific and technological fields and India's retreat from advanced military technology. The Indian deterrent would vitalise claims like those of the Tibetans and as a sequence the perspective of getting blank cheques from India would be replaced by a right sense of proportion.

India's interest in peace in Asia goes without saying but there has been no success in overcoming the strategic constraints which come in the way of an Indian leverage in South East Asia. India clearly does not have the resources to enlarge its conventional forces to develop a political-military presence in Asia. But significant chances for developing viable options cannot be ruled out in the Asian context once India acquires and contributes to nuclear deterrence. The military posture of a nuclear India would encourage policy pronouncements on disarmament and regional security by Indian policy makers which would bear specifically on Asian stability in several possible ways: (1) Long range policy planning of countries in South East Asia and the Far East, excluding Communist China, would recognise the introduction of Indian deterrence with the accompanying gain in Indian flexibility as an important factor influencing the regional balance of power. (2) Indian proposals for arms control and nuclear free zones would acquire a wider significance and would help to create a climate of confidence in the region. (3) In place of externally inspired plans of Asian security which fail to meet the political needs of the region, the Indian deterrent would promote the development of exploratory conversations among South East Asian powers leading to new perspectives on an Asian peace order.

India cannot look with indifference on the unshakeable self-righteousness with which Super Powers support their own nuclear interests. The trustworthiness of the Super Powers attitude to Communist China's emergence as a nuclear space power is seriously affected by the periodic brandishing of the "China threat" to the balance of power in Asia while rejecting the right of India to an independent and viable nuclear deterrent. A perusal of the Atomic Energy and Space Research Profile for the decade 1970-80 produced by the Atomic Energy Commission of the Government of India points towards the interconnections and optimum requirements of a credible programme for a national capability, but also exposes the dilemma confronting Indian nuclear policy. The scientific-technical viability of India in the nuclear-space dimension is surrounded with considerable ambiguities and the profile for the decade gravely limits India's freedom to develop an adequate nuclear response which the long range goal of Asian security may require. The political implications of an Indian nuclear capacity should be objectively studied in the context of likely Indian initiatives to organise a political settlement in South East Asia without the artificial obstacles which the obduracy of the Super Powers has created. A nuclear India can deliberately devise a change in relationships in South East Asia which can lead to the consolidation of confidence in the future. The structure of political commitment by a nuclear India will most likely foster developments in which resistance to outside pressures by the South East-Asian countries will develop and the "neutralising" of South East Asia will not merely proceed from the

accommodation between the hegemonistic designs of the Super Powers and Communist China, but will have a positive significance in development of strategic arrangements in the area. The question still remains whether India can make its voice heard with a modest nuclear capacity and whether it will make any dent on the development of the strategic thinking of the Super Powers. It is difficult to believe that the Americans and the Russians will "withdraw" from South East Asia and the Indian Ocean in the foreseeable future. The exaggeration of their respective strategic roles in Asia is deeply rooted in the minds of decision makers in Moscow and Washington. Indian foreign policy must provide a new dimension of stabilisation and generate an influence peculiar to its own geographic and political position in Asia. India is not a member of a formal military alliance and does not subscribe to an ideology which manifests itself in promotion of insurgency and people's wars. India's nuclear approach can constructively help a political settlement in South East Asia by breaking down the traditional isolation of the South East Asian countries in their security arrangements. A typical field for Indian activity would be to organise consultative machinery with the South East Asian states for evolving criteria for exercise of the military option by potential nuclear powers, specifically in the South East Asian context. Joint studies of Asian security requirements by a nuclear India in association with other countries of the region will, even if it does not lead to a joint policy, promote in the mind of Communist China just that degree of "uncertainty" which incites prudence, in place of self-fulfilling prophecies of hazardous actions. The political orientation of an India which links its nuclear policy with the security of South East Asia will from the outset have to reckon with the short term prospects which are far from promising. It is difficult to conceive of any scheme which will persuade the Americans to clarify their intentions fully during the final stages of their promised withdrawal from Indo-China. Similarly any proposal for reduced involvement of Russian naval ships in the Indian Ocean is not designed to appeal to the Soviets for whom these commitments are now a form of higher collaborative effect for fulfilling the Soviet Union's international role. The aim of Indian nuclear policy in the South East Asian context should, therefore, be three-fold: (1) Establishment of a *modus vivendi* among the South East Asian states through the instrumentality of an Asian security conference ; (2) Improvement of relations of the area with the Super Powers with the objective of genuine global partnership but firmly rejecting the strategic and political protection offered through the doctrinaire Guarantees which will drastically reduce the chances of *detente* in Asia ; (3) Promotion of reconciliation and cooperation of the South East Asian region to help develop the basis for an Asian security structure. A broad approach is needed to prevent miscalculations which are bred by policy makers who extol the triangular

nuclear balance between the Super Powers and Communist China as the key- stone of a world directorate, and promote policies contrary to long-term Asian interests.

Can Indian decision-makers move speedily in the direction of developing a nuclear policy viable in the Asian context? A serious obstacle is the lack of any initiative to create a harmonious partnership among South East Asian countries for fear of violating the political position of one or the other of the Super Powers. An Asian Common Market or an ASIATOM are difficult to maintain in the context of the dogma of non-alignment. India has not concentrated her efforts on the economic and political integration of South East Asia and has not engaged the Super Powers constructively to compel them to reduce their military risks in the region. A nuclear India will undoubtedly recover independence in its Asian policy but it must reject views which are occasionally heard in the context of the nuclear debate, of exclusive preoccupation with its national security while depreciating the security of the South East Asian region. India must realise clearly that the two sets of problems cannot be separated in watertight compartments. A new peace order in South East Asia is an exciting and urgent challenge in contemporary world politics and India has a crucial role to play in this task. The attempt to achieve an isolated solution of India's nuclear problem vis-à-vis China or Pakistan will prejudice the creation of a new framework of Asian security.

The principal issues involved for India's role as a responsible nuclear power are:

1. Development of integrated policies by India and the South East Asian countries through consultations on the techniques and strategies relating to nuclear weapons and evolving of new concepts of nuclear sharing appropriate to the regional context.

2. The maintaining of an independent Indian nuclear deterrent as an instrument of regional security.

3. Exploration of disarmament arrangements in the region.

4. Integration of Asian Nuclear Space Technological efforts. India's opportunities for close regional cooperation in these four areas are evident, and an extended debate on these questions will lend solid substance to the foreign and defence policies of India and the South East Asian countries and also of Japan and Australia. The experience of a non-nuclear India has been that it has not been able to modify the anti-detente attitude of

Communist China and has had to concede legitimacy to general Super Power interference in the South East Asian region. Nuclearisation should, therefore, be a priority item on the agenda of a new Indian approach for creating a peace zone in Asia.

PERCEPTION, POLICY AND NATIONAL IMAGE – SOME CASE STUDIES IN THE EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT

India and the European Idea

The values reflected in and fostered by Non-alignment have not proved to be wholly adequate for the task of development of Indo-European relations in the context of the growing dynamism and complexity of modern European political societies, West European and East European alike.

A rapid glance at the events in Indian diplomatic relations with Europe since Indian Independence will bring out these considerations which seem to be anchored to a pessimistic view of Europe's destiny:

1. Indian foreign policy has been accustomed to the idea that only a Soviet-American coordinated attack on European problems will develop a progressive approach to the attainment of the goal of a European peace order. Indian policy makers have failed to inject into their thinking the necessity of a historical view of the close interrelationships between the political societies on either side of the dividing line in Europe. Indian policy has still to develop a future-creative outlook on the problems of Europe and to emphasise their autonomous character outside the Super Power framework. In spite of ideological compulsions, technological, strategic and political implications of the European environment continuously suggest to East and West European elites the necessity of joint initiatives and cooperative enterprises.

2. It has been illusory for Indian Non-alignment to hope that the Soviet Union by some "right" mechanism will reach an agreement with the East Europeans by which authoritarian solutions will yield place to benign coordination of goals and policies within the Soviet East European framework. Indian policy makers with their eyes riveted on Moscow have lacked sufficient understanding of East European attitudes which in spite of Soviet military and political control have a persistent inclination to focus on a societal transformation moving away from Soviet bloc parochialism.

3. The acceleration of political and economic integration in the European Economic Community has raised a number of questions for Indian foreign policy which must be answered through frank discussions. The E.E.C. is a political and economic reality in its own right and if India clings to ideas that belong to the past when Atlanticism was belligerently advocated, we will not be able to reach pertinent decisions and will remain tied up with matters of trivial importance in our negotiations with the E.E.C. A constructive dialogue between India and the enlarged E.E.C. of the future would require a new

approach. An Indian attitude which is sympathetic to the ideological and organisational processes of the E.E.C. will retain a greater range of options for the future. Indian foreign policy can move ahead with long term planning steering clear of the Russian and American formulas to enhance Indian influence in the E.E.C.

4. In the circumstances of American-Soviet bilateralism the projects sponsored by the Super Powers for European Unity tend to produce no more than sterile formulas. The Indian point of view so far has been essentially that of the status quo which precludes re-examination of the American and Russian presence in Europe. An Indian policy which was "European" rather than "Super Power" oriented would aim at strengthening the opportunities for cross fertilisation between Eastern and Western Europe, both oriented to maximising their autonomous and innovative political strength and free from the compulsive inspiration generating from Moscow and Washington.

5. While India has been given to speculating on the advantages of a European detente, we have been passive in our attitude towards political strategies initiated by European powers, to remove major obstacles in the path of East-West European reconciliation. India remained alienated from the priorities and guidelines of de Gaulle's European strategy and today we have a hazy perspective of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik.

6. India has isolated herself from European Security problems, although it is an area where a modest effort will have important consequences. Indian proposals at a European Security Conference would represent in tangible form our commitment to the peaceful solution of the German problem and other outstanding issues. It is not so much in the adoption of a Grand Design that India can help, it is rather in working out the perspectives of the problems of European security that an Indian negotiating presence can ensure that political and military benefits are not claimed by a closed club to further hegemonial designs.

Yugoslavia

An exploration of Yugoslavia's foreign policy focussing on the appropriate responses to the coercive attempts (to enforce demands against ideological dissidents) will also help to assess the different premises and assumptions on which India's doctrinaire Nonalignment and Yugoslavia's more flexible and non-deterministic use of the Non-alignment relationship are based. General studies of Non-alignment often emphasise the political convergence between Yugoslavia and India, but analysis of this sort can only deal with similarity of general orientation or political style which may lead to expansion of political opportunities between the two countries. These general characteristics do not fully determine the intensity and range of impact on foreign policy perspectives, which depend finally on the degree to which such opportunities are actually utilised to maintain stable patterns of political and economic interaction. The techniques and regulations of the traditional Indian non-alignment model have not focussed on some of the salient features that distinguish Yugoslav behavioural responses within the European framework. First, there is the question of the specific objectives of Yugoslavia in modifying the Communist state systems in Eastern Europe. Indian diplomacy has hardly weighed the relative significance of different Yugoslav attitudes based on the assessment of pluralistic pressures in Eastern Europe. Second, there is the question of Yugoslav interest in European organisations whose positive influence in favour of functional cooperation in Europe is highly significant. Yugoslavia recognises the partition of Europe, but is constantly seeking a strategic perspective relevant to its future needs as the forces of re-integration gather strength. The third consideration is the extent to which the "nationality" problem conditions the foreign policy actions of Yugoslavia in defining common aims and in protecting the interests of important ethnic groups in the Yugoslav federation. The fourth consideration takes us to the dynamic context in which Yugoslav policy functions : it is that Yugoslav decision-makers have an overruling purpose of maintaining the legitimacy of the Titoist regime with a many-faceted creative diplomacy of which the Non-alignment element is one unit in a multiple structure, chiefly the functional equivalent of a national conviction and constant preparedness to check and repulse all attempts to "turn the clock back" with regard to Yugoslavia's rejection of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe.

A study of the developmental pattern of Yugoslav foreign policy shows the Yugoslavs to have frequently employed Non-alignment as a tool for enhancing their independent decision-making role but equally clearly it becomes evident that Non-alignment has never been the

ultimate ideal in their conceptual thinking requiring formalisation of diplomatic rules and routinisation of political behaviour. India's obsession with the orthodox Non-alignment model has prevented her decision-makers from seeing the Yugoslav regime as the product of a non-bloc Communist state system. Indian observations on Yugoslavia have not been stimulated by the fascinating aspect of Yugoslav experience which lies in the demonstration effect of its decentralised communist political structure with important consequences for East European environmental change. In examining Yugoslavia's strategy of foreign relations I attempt to distinguish four salient norms of the Yugoslav foreign policy system : (1) the Commitment to Independence; (2) the Perception of Regional criteria (3) Mobilisation of support against hegemonial pressures (4) Use of Non-alignment for enhancing Political Legitimacy.

The Commitment to Independence

The Southern Slavs—Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—occupy a geographical area which through history has been of unique strategic importance for Europe's destiny. The political history of the Balkans has been shaped largely by the numerous problems created by the conflict of interests in the area by great power rivalry and by the several issues raised by ethnic complexities. In the interwar period the Yugoslav state suffered from serious dissensions of which one of the most unfortunate was that between the Croats and the Serbs. Hitler in his aggressive designs in the Balkans took full advantage of the disruptive forces which contributed to the weakness of Yugoslavia and other East European states. The proclamation of the independent state of Croatia, the outright annexation of Slovenian territories by the Axis powers, the parcelling out of territories to Hungary and Bulgaria and the disposal of Dalmatia and Montenegro to Fascist Italy, all brought home the difficulties and hazards of national survival in a region which has so often served as Europe's battleground.

The profound changes at the end of World War II saw the seizure of power by Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The Tito regime in Yugoslavia, although a member of the Soviet communist bloc of countries, yet differed in position from the other East European regimes in that its strength was based not on Soviet military power, but on its partisan force, which had formed the backbone of the resistance to the German occupation. Tito as an old Comintern functionary completely shared the revolutionary aims of international communism. If anything, in his zeal, he was ahead of Stalin in his willingness to adopt postures of militancy. At the end of the war, he was left with two territorial disputes: over Trieste with Italy and over Carinthia with Austria. Also he wished to take an active part in extending Communist influence over Greece. He expected that Stalin would share

his enthusiasm in taking up these issues in earnest and never expected that the Soviets would hedge because of their calculation regarding their own exclusive bargaining position with the Western powers.

What were the considerations prompting Tito to take up extreme positions which were incompatible with Soviet aims? How far was he influenced by strategic considerations for expanding Communist influence? According to some analysts Tito's motivations have always been those of a Communist ideologist. Others have pointed to his concern for the national interests of a Balkan power. A central fact is that Tito has always shaped his foreign policy to further his freedom to manoeuvre in the geographical area in which his country is located. He has taken consistent interest in the possibility of political and economic integration in the Balkans area, and his interest in working out new alignments has compelled him to speak and act under different guises. At first the Soviets encouraged both Tito and Dimitrov of Bulgaria to think in terms of a Balkans Union, but by 1948, the Soviets found it necessary to control the ambition of the Yugoslavs, and they disowned the proposed project and snubbed both the leaders.

The decline in cordial and trustworthy relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia continued. Djilas and Kardelj went to the Soviet Union and complained that they had been treated in a manner which presaged an inevitable parting of the ways. The negative impact of joint Soviet-Yugoslav companies resulted in worsening the Soviet image in Yugoslavia. These companies had been established jointly by the Soviets who wanted the Yugoslavs to play the minor role, and indeed they simply wished to use these organisations as a means of obtaining the raw materials required for their own industry, and this was incompatible with Yugoslavia's aspirations to become an industrial power in her own right. Later Tito was to write that the Soviets had wanted not Communist rule but Russian hegemony in the Balkans.

The Soviet bloc policy began to harden. They drew up plans for the Cominform and located it in Belgrade, in actuality to keep a watch on the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslavs responded favourably to the new organisation especially for the tactical initiatives that it promised. They decided, however, to step up efforts to safeguard their national security. The Yugoslavs detected and resented the interference by the Soviets in their internal affairs, and when they passed a government order forbidding Yugoslav civil servants from passing information to foreigners, this proved to be the last straw. The Yugoslavs were expelled by the Cominform. In expelling Yugoslavia Stalin had never expected the Tito regime to survive but had presumed that elements loyal to the Soviets would topple Tito from power and bring back a suppliant Yugoslavia

to the Soviet bloc. But as it turned out, Tito's position was firmly grounded in the support of the party and the people of his country. A commitment to Independence has remained a constant in Yugoslavia's foreign policy and Tito has not hesitated to pull the mark of legitimacy from the face of proposals which would place real constraints on Yugoslavia's foreign relations.

Perception of Regional Criteria

During the early fifties it was inevitable that Yugoslavia should be concerned with maintaining her security against possible Soviet pressure. And naturally her diplomatic initiatives were taken primarily to secure the maximum assurances from the United States as the leader of the western coalition. After leaving the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia was faced with an economic boycott from all those countries with whom previously she had close economic and trading relationships and had stood in danger of economic collapse. Moreover, she had felt threatened by the possibility of military intervention by the Soviet Union through one of her East European neighbours. It is hardly surprising that the United States watched the situation with interest and began to offer economic and military assistance. In 1951 the two countries signed an agreement relating to a mutual defence system. This was followed in 1952 by an agreement for economic cooperation. The strategy of the United States clearly was to include Yugoslavia in the general pattern of military integration being developed in Western Europe. Although driven to the verge of seeking the protection of the western military umbrella, Yugoslavia found it unacceptable to take up any position within the NATO type alliance framework. In 1954, the Americans tried to draw in the Yugoslavs again by the Balkan Pact between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. However, divergent interests were at stake; the United States thought it would get support for NATO, but the Yugoslavs saw this mainly as an opportunity to move closer to Greece and Turkey. In fact Yugoslavia's purpose was not to further American efforts to achieve a hard defence line as it would inevitably perpetuate the political division of Europe.

Moreover, the dramatic reversal of Soviet policy after the death of Stalin brought the Soviets in as a meaningful factor also opposed to the Balkans Pact. The new Moscow regime's initiatives gave evidence of their wish to repair the damaged relations with Yugoslavia. A significant step away from the diplomatic ostracism hitherto practised by the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia was the Soviet endorsement of the Yugoslav-Italian agreement over Trieste. The tactical adjustments of Yugoslav policy on the Trieste issue had earlier shown their ability to neutralise pressure against them by political manoeuvre and blandishment of force in defence of their rights. The exchange of

visits between Tito and Krushchev and the resultant improvement in the atmosphere between the two countries raised the key question whether the Soviet Union, by resuming its ties with Yugoslavia, was prepared to tolerate the consequences of the renewed opportunities for foreign political initiatives in the East European countries by Yugoslavia.

Mobilisation of support against Hegemonial Pressures

The dominant impression of the Yugoslavs in the years between 1948 and the mid-fifties was an agreeable surprise over the pragmatic approval of specific programmes advanced by them by their non-communist neighbours. With the wholly subsidiary role played by them under the tutelage of Stalin, they were earlier in no position to exercise the sort of restraint which recommends itself to decision makers conducting international relations in a multilateral context. The novelty of the post-Cominform Yugoslav foreign policy from the point of view of their security interests resided not so much in the evolution of a military understanding with the United States, but in bolstering confidence between themselves and their European neighbours like Italy, Greece, Austria and Turkey. This is not to say that tension was always non-existent, for instance during the time the chauvinistic regime of Guiseppe Pella was in power in Italy, relations deteriorated alarmingly. The essential distinction of the new Yugoslav strategy was that extension of conflicts in the European area did not appear as the inevitable legacy of the breakdown of the wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union. There was some evidence that after the foreign policy of Yugoslavia ceased to be simply the specific expression of Soviet politics in Soviet Eastern Europe, mutual concessions were possible in her relations with her neighbours without losing political effectiveness in promoting national interests.

Yugoslavia's attitude to the United States stemmed from her recognition of the American presence on the European mainland. The goal of her long term policy towards the United States saw past the peculiar circumstances in which a disturbed equilibrium in Europe after the Second World War had ranged the Americans and the Russians as antagonists on the Continent. There has been a clear divergence between the two on the important issue of the permanence of the American connection with Europe and explains Yugoslav refusal to be drawn into any Atlanticist-oriented United States policies. Again, while desiring radical changes in the Communist regimes of East Europe, the Yugoslavs could not countenance the American obsession of "rolling back" communism.

Western analysts have often misinterpreted Yugoslavia's attitude towards the Soviet Union, especially in relation to the Moscow-Belgrade rapprochement. They saw this as an indication of

Tito's propensity to scamper back to the Soviet fold whenever opportunity presented itself. However, the essential concern of Yugoslav policies derives from their regional view in which the most important element is to identify themselves with aspirations for autonomy in the East European countries. The strategy to accomplish this inevitably entails detailed exploration of the feasibility of the Soviets accepting a shift in bloc policy. It is, however, clear that Yugoslav decision making does not fail to take into account surviving Soviet hegemonial ambitions.

In spite of their resentment against Soviet attitudes, the Yugoslavs have been quite explicitly concerned with their ideological commitments as communists in the belief that they alone have "scientifically" elaborated Communist theory to parallel the technological developments and social and political changes in the world environment. They interpreted Leninism to remove obstacles in the way of a minimum dialogue between Yugoslav communists and Western social democrats. Even though their claim to be recognised as "good" communists created ambiguity in western minds, their developing relations with European social democracy committed important pressure groups to work in favour of Titoist Yugoslavia.

What emerges from this analysis is the fact that Yugoslav attitudes reflected the fear of isolation which was inherent in the logic of a Communist country forcibly ejected from the Communist bloc and limited by her slender resources from adopting an overt leadership strategy in her region. Belgrade has, therefore, made every effort to increase confidence-building diplomacy to check any sudden deterioration in her power position. The special attention devoted to European Neutrals and non-aligned Asia and Africa is an index of the seriousness of Yugoslav interest. It would be unrealistic, however, to forget that the roots of the Yugoslav strategy lie in the European and more particularly, the Balkans environment, and expectations of a tenacious adherence to Afro-Asian non-alignment on the part of Yugoslavia appear to be over-optimistic.

What was Yugoslavia's reaction to the vulnerable position in which she found herself during the peak period of the Cold War between the two world blocs? The key elements in the United States-Soviet conflict comprise messianic ideological programmes, provocatively competitive military alliance systems and the denigration of United Nations diplomacy. The danger of the Cold War in Europe was clear to the Yugoslavs and it was of practical importance in terms of their evolving strategy in international relations for them to directly involve themselves in efforts to lessen tensions in the world. As the ideological conflict mounted voices were being raised for an all out confrontation between rival world powers. The very nature of Titoist Communism demanded revision of some of the views which are

based on the absolute cohesion of world communism. Once the feasibility of non-messianic national communism was demonstrated by the Yugoslav example, there was greater incentive for planning possible avenues for East-West dialogue, at least in the hope that the situation in the Soviet bloc was not frozen for all time to come. The Yugoslavs translated their opposition to the two-bloc view of the world by rejecting integration in a military arrangement as a result of which they were able to throw in their weight with the non-aligned nations, who were on the way to becoming an important element at the United Nations. Yugoslavia's strong advocacy of the United Nations as a means of accomplishing her global outlook also helped her to establish conditions in which in a contingency she could turn to the United Nations to ensure support for her own comparatively weak and exposed international position.

Yugoslavia's conception of her role at the United Nations evolved from her generally reserved comments at the time of the Korean crisis to the energetic steps she took in the international organisation when it was seized of the Suez issue. Yugoslav diplomacy concentrated in the latter case on canvassing positive support for the unusual convergence of American and Russian attitudes. The general forward position adopted by the Yugoslavs had its roots in their understanding of the organizational competency of the world organization consequent to the widening of its political base which accompanied the decolonisation process. The United Nations policy initiatives were obfuscated by the tendency to link them inevitably to the political gamesmanship of the two major protagonists in the Cold War. The Soviet Union in particular was sluggish in amending its uncompromising conviction in a restrictive interpretation of United Nations authority. By contrast Yugoslavia so increased its leverage inside the United Nations that by the time the organisation was faced with the Congo crisis the primary effort of non-aligned countries including Yugoslavia was to assert to the maximum United Nations leadership through the Secretary-General irrespective of the political strains of the Cold War. By joint effort with the non-aligned countries Yugoslavia played a leading role in evolving a consensus to adequately answer the Soviet troika proposals which constituted an unmitigated attack on the constructive advances made in the United Nations operational system. The Hungarian events came as a big shock to the Yugoslavs for whom it became a major obstacle to accommodate the untoward happening with their foreign policy posture. They came in for crossfire from both the Western powers and the Soviets. Tito's speech at Pula on November 11th, 1956, expressed the indignation of a National communist whose basic confidence in the course of liberalisation of bloc politics had been challenged. He was also adamantly opposed to the wild hopes which had been expressed for a Westernised Hungary. The Yugoslavs had to pay dearly for not taking into account the arbitrary

limits placed by surviving Stalinist elements on the possibilities of genuine transformation. They now realised that it was necessary to restrain their own reactions against provocative attacks by the Soviets and other East Europeans who found it useful to make a scapegoat of the Yugoslavs. It took several polemical, albeit comparatively muted exchanges, before confidence could be restored. The Soviet and Yugoslav leaders at their Bucharest meeting seemed to draw fairly near and the Yugoslavs were invited to the 12 ruling Communist parties meeting. However, Yugoslavia was unprepared to pay the price of joining the Bloc and refused to sign the Declaration. The publication of the 1958 Yugoslav Programme emphasised the radical difference of their position on the Cold War from that of the Soviet bloc.

The political intention of Yugoslav efforts on the problems of Decolonization, Disarmament and United Nations peacekeeping was primarily to take advantage of a growing international force which found it irrelevant to choose between the rigid stances of the Soviets and the Americans. Yugoslavia made skilful use of the ideological reasonableness inherent in the 1958 Programme to win adherents for non-aligned diplomacy through international conferences, The Belgrade and Cairo Conferences reflected the success of the Yugoslavs in stabilising their international relationships which were complicated not only by the East-West Cold War but also by the lengthening shadow of the Peking-Moscow Cold War.

In sum, in Yugoslav terms, the world situation permitted them to actively involve themselves in ideological and political initiatives for changing the status quo in Europe, while reinsuring themselves against hostile attitudes by developing loyalties among states who shared similar attitudes towards the abnormal East-West confrontation.

It was this quest for re-insurance that took the Yugoslavs to Asia and Africa, and although the Soviets soon followed suit, they were separated by widely differing objectives. The Soviet pursuit in the Third World was that of the leader of the Communist bloc who had certain definite goals to achieve. The Chinese were rapidly expanding their influence in some of the strategic parts of this area and the Soviets found it necessary to meet the Chinese in Asia to checkmate the political ambitions of this restive ally. The Yugoslavs were engaged in no such resistance to China, with whom any ideological quarrel was not sustained by any genuine cleavage of national interests. The Soviet Union and China on the other hand were neighbours sharing a “disputed” boundary and they were soon to develop an ideological dispute with “racial” overtones. The Chinese on their side rejected the bipolar approach to international relations and set out to develop not merely a Chinese road to socialism, in the Yugoslav sense, by delicately balancing between the two world blocs, but

by developing a power centre of their own defiantly independent of both the blocs. This consideration coloured the Chinese diplomatic and military manoeuvres in Asia and brought in the Soviets to counterbalance them.

With regard to the Sino-Soviet rift, Yugoslavia became embroiled in a conflict with China in direct contrast to the flexible and sophisticated policy pursued by her in the East-West Cold War. Indeed, her engagement with China was not adroitly handled, and Yugoslavia suffered from her inability to adequately assess Chinese motivations and objectives. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, while working for the cessation of the Cold War, had provoked the start of the second Cold War with China's challenge to their fundamental concepts of conflict resolution. Yugoslavia's interest in a Soviet alliance on a non-bloc basis remained consistent, but her assessment of Sino-Soviet relations was distorted by the urgency of her own short-term objectives and resulted in her adopting extreme positions where an indirect approach might have served her interest better. Even Kardelj, in his 'Socialism and War' openly attacked the Chinese for their radical views on revolution and international relations, and finally the Yugoslav position became so exposed that there was no room left for strategic withdrawal or manoeuvre, and it was Rumania who was able to come to the fore to play the mediator's role in the Sino-Soviet dispute. A significant act of Yugoslav diplomacy in relation to China was to dissuade Krushchev from having a complete break with Peking. In the aftermath of the Warsaw Pact action in Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslavs have undertaken a comprehensive effort to close the existing gap between themselves and the Communist Chinese. This adjustment in Yugoslavia's China policy has coincided with heightened flexibility in Peking.

Use of Non-alignment for enhancing Political Legitimacy

The abnormal polarisation that had occurred between the American and the Soviet blocs after the Second World War was not recognised as final by Yugoslavia which could not accept the artificial frontiers bifurcating Europe as a permanent division. Her foreign policy was, however, subjected to two conflicting pulls : to work for a detente on the one hand, and to preserve some distance between the blocs on the other, as what gave Yugoslavia importance in the international field was the actual process of working for a detente.

How was the detente achieved? What were the factors operating to bring it about? In essence, in spite of the severity of the Cold War positions at the time, Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Soviet bloc was itself a portent of the *detente* to come, in so far as it created a dent in the

polarisation between the Western and Eastern blocs, and permitted the evolution of a 'third' alternative. Non-alignment again, paved the way for the growth of actual alternative power centres. China defied the Soviet Union and in the West de Gaulle challenged the leadership of the United States, so that Europe could move towards a more independent position. In her diplomacy towards the non-aligned nations Yugoslavia worked for the institution of a dialogue between America and Russia, and sought to achieve this through channelisation of effort in certain strategic areas, e.g. by actively pursuing the debate on disarmament proposals. Again whenever opportunity presented itself of assisting in bringing together the converging interests of Russia and America, Yugoslavia's quiet diplomacy took important initiatives in bridging the distance between the hardened Cold War positions. The Geneva Conference was the first landmark in the history of the *detente;* but in terms of the *detente* not much more was achieved than the actual coming together of the heads of the confronting states. At Camp David again, what was hailed by the Yugoslavs was the spirit which Eisenhower and Krushchev had brought to bear in their talks with one another. The third meeting which was to have taken place in Paris between Eisenhower and Krushchev was wrecked by the U-2 incident, and it spoiled the atmosphere for some time. Yugoslavia was a keenly interested follower of this attempted rapprochement process, and persisted in re-commending renewal of efforts to break the deadlock. The air was finally cleared between 1962 and 1963; between the period following the Cuba confrontation and the signing of the Test Ban Treaty in the summer of 1963. There were several factors that went into the unfreezing of relations between the two sides, both social and political, but undoubtedly one of the precipitating factors was the sense of reality and confidence exuded in the aftermath of the Cuba affair, when America and Russia both had a more realistic assessment of the other's nuclear intentions. Another important factor was the fast worsening Sino-Soviet rift, which put the Soviet Union in a more vulnerable light, and encouraged the Western powers to hope for a Soviet-Western understanding against a rapidly expanding and threatening China.

What have been the effects of the detente on Yugoslavia? With the decline in importance of her uniquely strategic position as a via media between the two blocs, her international position has weakened to some degree. Her mediating role at the United Nations, at the disarmament committees is no longer so much in demand on the international stage.

Moreover the detente has had an unsettling effect on the national groups that constitute the Yugoslav nation. The Croatians and Slovenes lean more towards the West and the Serbs towards

the East. The lessening of bloc tension and the growth of multipolarity, with the increase in choices of alliances, has provoked these groups to articulate their preferences and thus create conflicting pressures on the foreign policy makers.

Thus with her changing international position, Yugoslav foreign policy has been faced with a critical situation. One of the most crucial changes has been the decline in the role of non-alignment in world affairs, flowing both from the detente and through the evolution of the present multipolar international system with its complex interaction. In the light of the new situation, there has been pressure in recent foreign policy debates in the Yugoslav Parliament to withdraw their strategic thinking from distant non-aligned areas like India and Africa, and consider more directly the implications of a European strategy. In a bipolar world Yugoslavia could profitably take up an independent position, and her diplomacy with the non-aligned nations in that period, had not committed her to the exigencies of membership of a bloc in any sense. In a multipolar world, however, it is disadvantageous for Yugoslavia to be isolated; as there are no longer any international compulsions to take so much interest in her unique position, and indeed Yugoslav foreign policy makers have shown awareness of this in negotiating with the Comecon for associate status for Yugoslavia. However Soviet efforts to establish the Comecon as the eastern counterpart to the Common Market have not achieved the goals with which the planners started, and the Common Market remains a source of attraction with its dynamic expansion. There is evidence, through the itinerary of the Yugoslav personages in Western Europe, and vice versa, of an active Yugoslav diplomacy in Europe. The central question here is that of the unification of Europe, and integral with that, is the subject of the unification of Germany. Yugoslavia has done some thinking on the German question, but has not been sufficiently articulate on this point, and we are in possession of no schemes and plans for the resolution of this problem which constitutes the main hurdle to European unity. At the height of their first rapprochement with the Soviet Union, the Yugoslavs had recognised East Germany, and thereby, with the logic of the Hallstein doctrine alienated themselves from the Bonn government.

In the course of protecting her strategic interests, Yugoslavia has consistently pursued, whenever possible, a policy of conciliation and friendship with her immediate neighbours and excepting the case of Albania, her efforts have paid reasonable dividends. After the initial dispute with Italy and Austria she has maintained good relations with both these powers. She has set up a diplomatic representative at the Vatican. Her record with Greece and Turkey has been one of co-operation, but over the Cyprus dispute, the Soviet Union tended to favour

Turkey's position and Yugoslavia that of Greece. With Rumania, Yugoslavia concluded the Iron Gates agreement, but with both Rumania and Bulgaria, despite the good relations, there is an undercurrent of tension relating to the national minorities overspilling the borders in each other's territories. The questions that arise are in what directions these discontents will go, and whether the government will be able to contain them, especially after the charismatic Tito is no longer leader of Yugoslavia. Tito's relationship with Hungary after the crucible of the Hungarian uprising, has settled down to amicable relations with Janos Kadar. Yugoslavia has moved to more normal relations with its difficult neighbour Albania.

In the context of the declining role of non-alignment in world affairs, it is interesting to note that Marshal Tito yet maintains fairly active relations with non-aligned countries, and participated in the Lusaka summit. It is possible that this is the result of the continuing dynamic of Yugoslavia's old policy of reinsuring her position in the East or with the non-aligned, while initiating changes on the European scene. However, indications are not that it will be possible for the non-aligned countries to continue with an active foreign policy on the old lines for significantly much longer.

Speculation in the West at one time was that Yugoslavia in the post-detente period was moving towards the Soviet bloc, and after Tito, the Stalinist elements would bring about a reintegration with the Soviet Union. However, major purges in the Yugoslav Communist Party pointed in the opposite direction, as they resulted in the fall of Rankovic, the leader of the opposition to Tito's new economic reforms, and the second most influential man in Yugoslavia after Tito. Therefore it is more probable that Yugoslavia's explorations with the West European countries will continue, even after Tito is no longer there.

Whether Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period could continue to attract world-wide attention as a focal point in European diplomacy depends upon her ability to make a contribution to the grand debate on the Unification of Europe. The confidence which the Gaullist leadership in France recovered and which even a narrowly based regime like Rumania's has come to possess suggests the broad truth that at this time there is on the European continent a cumulative reaction against the United States and Soviet presence. It is of course true that Yugoslavia has herself contributed to this "European revival" by initiating the ideological-political chain reaction which had disintegrated Stalin's empire in Europe. The factor most favourable to the extension of Yugoslav influence in Europe would be diplomacy for harmonising conflicting views on the German problem and evolving an integrated approach to the main issues of European security. There are favourable opportunities for Yugoslavia in Europe if it can project an image of cohesion between

its national groups and persevere in its programme of economic reform. Yugoslavia's economic needs require that it should strengthen its economic links with both Western Europe and Eastern Europe and avoid being squeezed out by the economic groupings. These questions relevant to the future of Yugoslav policy can only be answered with assurance if the transition to a new leadership takes place in an orderly manner and factional conflict is controlled.

Czechoslovakia

From the middle of 1964 till the Warsaw troops' intervention in 1968, the Czechoslovak political system demonstrated a high capacity to satisfy new aspirations of the population with the minimum of political violence. A series of remedial measures adopted by the Czechoslovak Communist Party ameliorated the harshness of control by a notoriously "monolithic party" and resulted finally in the adoption of a Programme of far-reaching political and socio-economic reform, with which Alexander Dubcek's name is inseparably associated.

Indian Non-alignment failed to respond to the vital requirements of the Czechoslovak situation on account of its anachronistic mentality towards the Soviet bloc structure in Eastern Europe. There were two chief directions which Indian foreign policy could have followed, and the choice which was exercised meant that Indian decision making was not prepared to use imagination and creative planning to develop a new posture which would encompass societal and political transformation in communist systems. The choice made in favour of the dogmatic, conservative and reactionary forces in the Soviet Union was not based on any effort to blueprint the future of the Soviet system. Indian diplomacy neglected to explore avenues leading to positive objectives in the direction of Pluralisation in Eastern Europe. In more general terms our perfunctory response to the Czechoslovak crisis highlighted a failure to structure political relationships with the Soviet Union such as would project our national motivations through formal negotiating positions. An objective diagnosis would have shown that it was as logical for India to define political standards and policy aims in the Czechoslovak crisis as it had been for the Soviet leadership to define basic priorities in the Tashkent Agreement. However, the grave confusion engendered by a policy of rigid Non-alignment prevented India from advancing practical proposals for a peaceful solution of the Czechoslovak crisis which would have developed a constructive Indian relationship with the forces which are seeking to drastically modify Eastern Europe's political dependence on the Soviet Union.

The tragic events in Czechoslovakia involved the positive judgement of the Indian masses who hailed the Czechoslovak developments as a revolutionary breakthrough, and Indian public opinion was exceptionally sensitive to the antagonistic posture of the Warsaw Pact countries. The lack of initiative by the Indian Government and the relative indifference of its spokesmen and particularly the ambivalence at the United Nations revealed a chasm in basic values between those widely held in the Indian political environment and those serving as the basis of the institutional and operational aspects of the Indian foreign policy system.

The public discussion in India on Czechoslovakia's ideological objectives reflected correct conclusions about the dynamic forces of change in communist political systems in Eastern Europe. In practical terms, Indian political and diplomatic pressure if exerted in favour of Czechoslovakia's independence from Super Power domination in political, economic and ideological spheres would have constituted a new approach by which India would have demanded a spirit of goodwill on the part of the Soviet Union in applying the principles of detente in the process of pluralisation in the Soviet bloc. The strong support from Indian public opinion would have helped in taking the initiative with the Soviets, but unfortunately the Indian Government lacked the means to cope with the situation for which not even preliminary studies of Czechoslovakia's ideological challenge had been initiated, although the metamorphosis of Czechoslovak communism had started four years earlier.

In spite of the Soviet conviction that the "reactionary forces" were conspiring to absorb the Czechoslovak polity into the Western sphere, there is abundant evidence to prove that the Czechoslovak developments had a solid foundation in a new philosophy of East Europe's salvation through self-adjustment. The rapprochement sought with the West by the Czechoslovaks was based upon an objective interest in a European detente. The perspective of German policy held by the Czechoslovak leaders did not seek even remotely to jeopardise their own national security interest or that of other East European countries. The Czechoslovak communists, however, had come to realise the negative features of a rigid bloc policy which sought to contain the dangers of German militarism by promoting a traditional imperial Russian presence in East Europe. In order to take a more intimate interest in European security problems Indian policy makers should have studied the Czechoslovak model for its possibilities of initiating a process of Soviet "decolonisation" and the evolution of a natural cohesiveness amongst the East European countries. If India is prepared to see the starting point of the resolution of European conflicts in the perspective of the withdrawal of both the Super Powers from Western and Eastern Europe, then

India's political-diplomatic influence should reinforce the intrinsic merit of a Bi-focal European order in which East European unification would be the principal means of fostering a relaxation of tensions through bilateral relations with the West European Community and thereby opening up the possibility for substantially reducing the involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in the European security arrangements.

The experience of Czechoslovakia has opened up a perspective with which to re-examine the political realities underlying the political crises in the Soviet bloc and to understand the dynamic context of the re-emergence of Eastern Europe. The transitional phases through which the popular hopes and intellectual attitudes in Czechoslovakia have passed in the course of their inward swing towards a central relationship with their local political and cultural traditions, lays bare the anatomy of the national cohesive aspects of the polycentric process within the Communist world. This yields an analytic approach which sees a relationship on the following pattern : first, rejection at the focal points of Soviet pressure ; second the adoption of fundamental national aspirations and third the development of an experimental spirit leading to the adaptation of the ideal aspects of their political folk-lore to the exigencies of modern times. The Czechoslovak transformation was a deeply disturbing trauma for the Soviet conservatives because it was not only anchored to serious initiatives against Communist monolithicism but sought to open wide horizons to the East Europeans which presaged political, economic and social modernisation. The dynamics of Czechoslovak polycentricism rendered superfluous any "counter-revolutionary" programme of replacing Communism by assimilation with the Capitalist West.

In Czechoslovakia, the remembrance of democratic political traditions and the first signs of the possibilities of a neo-Masarykism encouraged the belief that the dynamism of polycentricism could achieve not merely expedient objectives of rising political elites, but also, what is more important, act as a catalyst for setting in motion an integrative process towards widening the base of political participation. Therefore it was hardly surprising if the process of achieving a new Eastern Europe attuned to the new technological age was foreshadowed in the new pattern of relations for an advanced scientific-technological culture which the Czechoslovak Communists sought to create and which was unprecedented in any Communist state.

Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, founder of the Czechoslovak democracy in the second decade of this century, wrote in those days that 'Marxist ideology is not a super-structure, but a substructure and an ante-room'. In thus refusing to accept Marxist ideology for transforming politico-social

conditions of mankind, Masaryk anticipated the intellectual developments which have deeply influenced the contemporary climate of Europe. If he were living today, he would not be surprised at the sharp internecine dissent in the Communist world and the dramatic disintegration of the unified strategy of the Communist world movement or at the rapid undermining of the Marxist legitimacy in his own country since 1963.

In the East European context the instability of Monolithic Communism was earlier demonstrated by the refusal of the Yugoslavs and later the Poles and the Hungarians to accept the hegemony of the Soviet Union. Some observers, however, came to believe that the decline of Soviet influence and Communist power in Eastern Europe would to a considerable degree depend upon international circumstances and tended to conceptually rule out swift changes in the political attitudes of different East European peoples. Often advice was offered to the people of Czechoslovakia in a 'holier than thou' tone, for it was believed that the Czechoslovaks were in a state of frozen status quo, on account of some historic conditioning and their relatively prosperous economic position.

A constructive East European design could not hope to survive a cold war strategy of "rolling back" Communism, and Western policy makers who adopted the forward strategy for liberation of East Europe were in fact in grave confusion for their prescriptology was fully compatible with Stalinist ideals and objectives.

The Czechoslovak developments since 1963 were a challenge to both the Stalinist legacy in Moscow and to the obsolete-minded East European specialists in the Western establishments. The momentous implications of Czechoslovak events are now visible, but it is difficult to exaggerate the prejudices and preconceptions of the framework within which changes in Eastern Europe had been considered by Western scholars till the other day. The present writer was struck by the difference in the views of several important participants in the ferment in Prague and Bratislava with whom he had discussions in 1963 from those of Western political analysts, who grossly underestimated the autonomous and innovative dynamism of the new Czechoslovak political culture. The political experience of Czechoslovakia can be characterised as follows:

In spite of points of contact with 'revisionists' in other East European countries, the dissenters among the Czechs and Slovaks were quietly ignoring the opportunities for the sort of tug-of-war with the pundits of orthodoxy in which, for example the Poles have spent so much of their energy. I think one can trace this attitude to Masaryk's advice: "As a philosopher, Marx has been

superseded, and revisionism has made no new contribution in this domain. The Marxists, the orthodox Marxists, that is to say, are accustomed to conduct their apologetics in a purely scholastic manner. Scholasticism arises everywhere and always when reputedly absolute concepts and absolute truths have to be maintained and restated in opposition to the progress of thought. For the orthodox Marxists, however, it remains a scandal that the so-called orthodox revisionism should continue to find a place within the party, should be tolerated there, and should be enabled to maintain its place with the assistance of scholastic and ambiguous resolutions passed at party Congresses." In the Masaryk tradition, the ferment in Prague and Bratislava was free of scholasticism. The leaders of the Czechoslovak ferment were less concerned with scandalising the orthodox communists than with the establishment of a framework for the future progress of thought. The search for new possibilities of political action had not been in the single dimension of revising Marxist theory. Characteristic of Czech pragmatism was an effort to identify and remove polarities in social economic and political life, which were such a depressing feature of the Communist horizon in Stalinist Czechoslovakia, and to adopt radical measures to enhance the economic, scientific and technological resources of Czechoslovakia.

Despite charges by some of the diehard Soviet party leaders against particular Czechoslovak intellectuals that they were advocating usurpation of the political role of the party by intellectual groups, the Czech and Slovak dissent deliberately avoided the conception of intellectual elitism. This prevented any opportunistic diversion of popular support to self-appointed defenders of the security of the 'new' social order, who might threaten to restore the old political atmosphere. Profiting from their earlier unfortunate experience in 1956-57 the practice of propounding self-evident truths was avoided and political attitudes were mainly expressed as judgments on the conditions of technological progress.

The Czechoslovak innovators, in fact, capitalised on the developments which had led the Soviet leaders to counsel rapprochement with their Cold War antagonists. They did not waste efforts in making an issue of national honour versus the Soviet Union. Until the actual Warsaw forces intervention, the weakening of the monolithic Soviet influence had proceeded without any encouragement of anti-Russian feelings. Although Czechoslovak ideological pronouncements increasingly became anathema to Soviet ears, yet there was hardly any tension stemming from Moscow's fears of anti-Russianism which had been a complicating factor elsewhere in Eastern Europe, for example in Poland.

The pattern of typical Czech restraint in dealing with ideological heterogeneity through pragmatic suggestions for restructuring economic planning, provided a first glimpse of a style in politics which could conceivably introduce a large measure of structural variety leading eventually to a pluralistic environment in the whole of Eastern Europe.

The Soviets did not take long to realise that Czechoslovakia's political developments would have a more pronounced effect on the collective future of other East European countries as it became clear that obstructions to political modernisation erected by Stalinism could be removed by specific piecemeal recommendations. Czechoslovakia having been provoked to make a diagnosis of opportunities for change by the stringencies of her own experience, and not as part of a chain reaction from outside, became a test case of the politics of self-generating changes in Communist rule states in Eastern Europe.

The Soviet evaluation of the Czechoslovak reforms erroneously conceived these as a catastrophe for the construction of socialism in Eastern Europe. In fact, those who spearheaded the Czechoslovak developments were quite articulate in welcoming the disintegration of the international Communist monolith, but they were equally convinced that the basic priorities for the whole of Eastern Europe underlined the need to achieve the rapid growth of a 'decentralised socialism' operating in most of these countries. Czech economic reform recognised the extra-ordinary opportunities for innovating "free-enterprise" type decision-making in organising economic relations of East European socialist countries. Clearly, in spite of their acute dissatisfaction with orthodox socialist economics, they still regarded Eastern Europe as a potentially going concern, and sought to strengthen it in a future oriented socialist perspective.

In spite of the drastic political and military action taken by the Soviet Union aimed at arresting the process of change in Czechoslovakia, the most likely perspective remains that the destiny of Eastern Europe is to move away from both Russia and from assimilation in the West. The central problem to which Indian policy makers should address themselves is the failure of the Soviet Union to find a basis of political integration of Eastern Europe with itself which can be visualised by the East Europeans as a programme of Modernisation. The East Europeans must ask whether the Soviet concern for preserving the gains of socialist construction is a new variant of the classic stance of imperialist powers to maintain closed systems of political and economic power. The Czechoslovak politics under the Husak regime is not a unilinear reproduction of the Novotny regime. There are gains of relative importance which the Czechs and Slovaks still preserve. Although the political will of the Czechs and Slovaks is absorbed in pragmatic tasks, yet the

memory of public participation in translating an Ideology of Modernisation has given a new and modern form to Czechoslovak nationalism which even the super control of the Soviets finds irreversible.

The “1968 Action Programme” evoked a response not only from the Czechoslovaks but affected the interests and opinions of diverse groups throughout Eastern Europe and in Soviet Russia itself. The saga of Czechoslovak resistance to the Warsaw troops' intervention reminiscent of the Gandhian struggle in India affected the complex reality of the Communist individuals and parties throughout the world.

The fact that the United States gave some form of consent to the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia has resulted in blurring the difference between the approaches of the two Super Powers to political pluralisation where characteristics of Super Power collusion appear to dominate the international political system.

What is at issue for Indian diplomacy however, is the feasibility of a new perspective in which India can exercise heavy diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union by supporting measures like the “1968 Action Programme” as an expression of the real interests of the East European states, and by identifying itself with the long term policy of political and social reform in communist political systems, develop channels of communication to the growing progressive and innovative forces in the Soviet Union itself.

With regard to Czechoslovakia itself, India’s historical relationship has been maintained with the new leadership under Gustav Husak. What are the prospects for the future? It seems that Husak, a one time victim of Stalinist purges like Janos Kadar of Hungary, has been able to fulfil within limits national aspirations by raising questions about the economic and political future of Czechoslovakia in pragmatic terms. Husak has not defied Soviet wishes but he has developed a set of national priorities which have recreated faith in the capacity of the Czechs and Slovaks for autonomous planning and management of domestic and foreign policies. His *modus vivendi* with Moscow has retained more flexibility than was expected in the beginning and should be recognised as an important step forward. This should hearten Indians and Czechoslovaks who seek to strengthen mutual relations beyond the pale of dogmatic ideologies.

India's Image in Eastern Europe

India is a newly independent country and a newcomer in diplomacy. But there is a profound difference which sets us apart from other Afro-Asian countries which have joined the comity of nations in recent years and with which we have close inter-dependence. If we have to develop an adequate machinery for international relations, we cannot ignore the fact that the moral, political and cultural consciousness of the world outside in respect of India is influenced to a far greater extent by the transmission of intellectual attitudes and emotional predilections which have crystallised over generations than is the case with other new countries.

On the international scene, nowhere is this more evident than in Eastern Europe. From the beginning of the 19th century many creative individuals in Eastern Europe who were employing their talents to achieve a cultural renaissance in their own countries turned to India for inspiration, to the Sanskrit language and to India's traditional philosophies. The famous Czech philologist and scholar of history Dobrovsky who may well be regarded as the father of modern education in Czechoslovakia was greatly attracted to Sanskrit. In Poland, Karpinsky was already lecturing in Sanskrit, at the University of Warsaw, and Mayewski had published his 'Grammar of Sanskrit.' But it is important to emphasise that it was not merely comparative philology which attracted the East European to India. India in the East European imagination of those days provided common ground for new political conceptions which would contribute vitally to ending the old era of imperial domination and cultural enslavement.

The cruel domination of the Hapsburgs and the Ottomans and Imperial Russia and Germany called forth a spirit of resurgent nationalism which psychologically conditioned many East Europeans to challenge the distorted version presented about India's life and culture by the British rulers. Many intellectuals inveighed against the hypocritical thesis of the white man's burden. This objective tendency in East European thought is crystallised in examples such as the Bulgarian writer, Rakowsky who hailed the events of 1857 and understood their significance as a war of independence. On the literary side one can see plainly the effective influence of Indian thought on creative writers of this period. The intellectual appeal of India to the great representative poet of 19th century Czech literature Vrchlicky is evident from the testimony which his works provide for his acquaintance with Vedantic and Buddhist literature. Needless to say, there was a positive intellectual appraisal of India in other East European countries as well—particularly in Hungary.

The political upheaval at the time of the 1st World War brought in its wake national emancipation for the East European countries. But the suffering and privation which accompanied the movement of their armies undermined Europe's moral fibre. The message of India which Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore carried to Europe was of direct relevance to the needs of the people in those countries. His poetic genius captivated the people and it is said that his poems were often on the lips of war weary soldiers. His social thought furnished a source of humanistic values which embraced the chief expectations of East Europeans for a new world order. In his political writings Tagore appeared to demonstrate the potentialities of India's involvement in world affairs which would be qualitatively different from the provincialism and narrow mindedness which was responsible for Europe's malaise.

After the catastrophe of 1918, democratic forces made headway in Eastern Europe and there were several outstanding politicians who tried to create a framework of democracy. The ideals of these leaders led them in directions which converged with those towards which the nationalist leaders were advancing. It was not just fancy which led the Czechoslovak scholar Lesny to point out the similarity in the ideological attitude of Tagore and Masaryk as elaborated in the latter's classic work, "The Making of a State." In Yugoslavia, Radic who was the most popular leader among the peasants turned to Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy of rural development and greatly helped in the development of popular consciousness in favour of the earlier Gandhian experiments. In the process he succeeded in creating a vast reservoir of good will for the Indian National Movement.

Yet the democratic elements were not able to consolidate themselves in Eastern Europe in the inter-war period except in Czechoslovakia. The rise of Hitlerism gave free reign to the imperialist ambitions of Germany and the Western powers failed to take adequate measures to protect collective security. By signing the Munich pact they actually condoned Nazi expansionism. It was at this crucial juncture that the Indian National Congress raised its voice against the notorious appeasement policy. Gurudev Tagore and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on behalf of Nationalist India deplored the betrayal of Czechoslovak democracy. This action won India the respect not only of the Czechoslovaks but also of the democrats all over Eastern Europe.

In the struggle against the onslaught of Nazism and Fascism East Europeans had to make enormous sacrifices. When the conflict ended in 1945, war-devastated Europe looked forward to Great Power cooperation in the United Nations to rebuild Europe. In place of the war time friendship, there developed however, intense hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union. Wartime assurances mattered little and Stalin was determined to enforce his hegemony of

Eastern Europe. The new Communist-led regimes in Eastern Europe were treated like puppets to serve Stalin's political ambitions. The proud Yugoslavs under Tito refused to accept the intolerable situation and in the face of grave danger they were able to assert their independence. The Yugoslav challenge to the Stalinist monolith foreshadowed large-scale changes in the whole East European area in the course of time for it showed that nationalist stirrings were irrepressible.

At this time we in India were preoccupied with the problems arising out of the transfer of power from Britain and our concern was by and large with British policies. With our appearance as a free country we found ourselves in the rapidly worsening situation of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union which engaged our close attention. There was little time or effort which India could spare for the East European countries except to set up the machinery for diplomatic relations with them.

Consistent with the philosophy of the Indian National movement it was inevitable that India should make every effort to resist the pressures generated by the bipolar conflict between the super powers. Since the threat of a conflagration engulfing Eastern Europe was very real, Indian attitudes and policies were largely judged in this area in terms of our broad purpose to prevent a head-on collision between the United States and the Soviet Union. India's assiduous efforts to influence American and Russian attitudes in favour of peaceful co-existence were welcomed generally in Eastern Europe and enhanced our existing favourable image. India's attempt to invite serious discussion on disarmament was appreciated and created a high expectation that Indian policies would be able to provide a rallying point for all efforts to prevent a nuclear holocaust. A leading member of the Polish Government once said that nuclear war would mean the annihilation of Eastern Europe in less than six hours and therefore they looked upon India's efforts for international accord as a direct contribution to their own national security.

An adverse psychological impression was created by accrediting our diplomatic representative in Moscow concurrently to Budapest and Warsaw instead of appointing separate heads of mission to such important capitals. Such clumsy diplomatic procedures often created the impression that India was relatively indifferent to the national objectives of those countries on a regional basis and was more interested in global diplomacy.

The lessons of history have made East Europeans into realists above all and they look at security problems with close scrutiny. Many of these countries had been impressed by the efforts Communist China was making to increase its offensive capabilities and although before the Sino-

Soviet split came out in the open they were reticent in expressing themselves, yet at an informal level they expressed concern for the implications this had for India. Indian diplomacy which was deeply committed to the task of lowering international tension tended to underplay the importance of security considerations as it was thought that India's peaceful intentions would be generally reciprocated. A certain impression grew that India was not properly coordinating its defence and foreign policies. It was altogether unfortunate that India did not appoint military attaches in its embassies in these countries who could have explained the Indian viewpoint on our national security preparations and at the same time have tried to understand the security requirements of these countries.

The task of building our economy rapidly has compelled India to obtain foreign aid. Many dogmatists in East Europe believed that Communism alone has the magic formula for rapid economic development. Fortunately, such views are now on the decline and most East Europeans have given up the sermonising attitude that was developed during the Stalinist era. Yet even now they do not always understand our justification for the scale of foreign assistance that we are getting. They sometimes speak of India's mendicant mentality which they feel should give way to more emphasis on self reliance. Here is a clear need to explain the nature and scope of our commitments in foreign economic collaboration to make it well known that India will in no case mortgage its economic future and is currently making all efforts to mobilise its internal resources to the maximum extent.

It is in India's interest that in the sphere of economic relations the larger degree of autonomy since Stalinist times enjoyed by East European countries should lead to substantial improvement in trading arrangements with these countries. Unfortunately there is a discouraging trend which is again the result of the dependence on the Soviet model with the loss of intimate business contacts and the increase of bureaucratic dependency. Even with Yugoslavia, which is anxious to overcome the impediments of the Soviet type state-monopolistic practices, India's developing trade arrangements have not transcended the restrictive practices of bilateral economic arrangements of closed trading blocs. India's economic image in the East European countries is so far not that of a trading nation which places an affirmative value on a freer flow of trade. It is clear that a more modern and broader economic approach in Indo-East European economic relations is needed if trade relations are to shift in the right direction. With all the political "contradictions" in their relations with West Germany, the East European countries have reduced bureaucratic impediments to the vitality of economic relations, whereas no stimulating steps worth the name have been taken

to reduce the baneful influence of orthodox bureaucratic practices which are distorting India's export and import structure with East Europe, although we have enough stereotyped formulations of economic partnership between India and the East European countries in the several trade agreements. The facts point up to the negative economic consequences of the moribund outlook which India has developed by looking on East European trading problems as irrevocably subservient to Soviet economic interests and by our failure to constructively expand our economic relationships "through experimenting with greater flexibility in multilateral trade with East European countries.

The weakening of the dominant position of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe is essentially the result of nationalist pressures for realising common values and aspirations which are essential for the spread and utilisation of modern technology. The multiple impacts of the several challenges to the Soviet monolithic model in these countries have resulted in an increased sensitivity of these political communities to the role of their intellectual elites. Economists, political scientists, technological experts and men of letters whether belonging to the establishments or opposed to them have been formulating revaluations of perspectives on human living in the new scientific-technological age. Indian diplomacy has been shackled with an unusual degree of overemphasis on the effectiveness of Soviet politico-military domination of East European countries and has omitted to lay down guidelines for meaningful dialogue with East European intellectual elite groups. The aims of Indian cultural programmes in East European countries have been hampered by Soviet ideological constraints and have been isolated from the academic or intellectual communities which have a profound influence on the East European world. A Kolakowski or an Ota Sik or a Lukacs has not represented the new directions for Indo-East European dialogue, but the passive acceptance of the veto of Soviet influence in cultural and social programmes of cooperation has resulted in "organisation men" who are anathema to all those who are in the front line of scientific research and intellectual development, monopolising cultural cooperation between those countries and India.

Cultural cooperation is very much conditioned by the quality of individuals who are interested in the development of those relations. India's contribution has sometimes suffered on account of the fact that many Indian officials who were sent out to take up the responsibilities of developing cultural and information bureaus did not have adequate background and training in Indian culture and sociology. It was somewhat dismaying for East European admirers of Sanskrit and Indian civilisation, to find that Indian representatives sometimes knew more about the most obscure

English poets and writers and were ignorant about Sanskrit classics and works of modern creative geniuses like Tagore.

Speaking generally, while these countries now reject Stalinist monolithic supra nationalism, they do not want to be submerged under Westernisation either. They want physical communication and trade and cultural relations with all countries and Indian initiative can provide a large area for dialogue with these countries on political and social ideas linking them to our own democratic nation-building experience. The elite in these countries are moving towards thinking which is equally removed from the extremes of dogmatic socialism and unrestrained capitalism and in this respect the underlying trends in Indian experience and in the experience of these countries are closer than we may ordinarily imagine. Our information media should put across more effectively those aspects of our policies which have a bearing on emerging trends of technological and social innovation in these countries.

The Indian image in Eastern Europe in broad terms will be strengthened not by pretending that India is a political-cum-ideological bridge between the Soviet Union and the West, but by a frank and unequivocal identification with East European expectations of their ability to control and adapt their technological, social and cultural environment with the eventual withdrawal of what in spite of Soviet moral posturing appears to them as an obsolescent imperialism.

France, West Germany and European Perspectives

The long term possibilities of cooperation between India and Western Europe are immense and if Indian policy-makers had any orientation for systematic "forecasting," they would have found it more realistic to give priority to the development of coherent future goals in the context of the economic and social integration of Western Europe rather than to have remained riveted in a conceptual outlook which looked "backwards" to the nostalgia of Britain and the Commonwealth.

1. The political and psychological factors which have thwarted the evolution of a West European policy by India can be subsumed under four basic tenets of Indian diplomatic outlook. Political and economic convergence in any region through institutional unity is inconsistent with orthodox nonalignment. In order to keep the Super Powers appeased any steps which might lead to creating tension with any one of them are ruled out as unrealistic exercises. This tenet did not encourage India to develop a frame of mind which could sympathise with the strategy of "organised rebuttal of hegemony" which the European Economic Community has followed in pursuit of European integration. The Soviet viewpoints on the Common Market which ranged from denouncing it as "an association of the financial oligarchy" and a "new form of colonialism" to partial recognition that it was an instrument of accelerated economic growth seemed to lend strength to Indian reluctance to open a political dialogue with the decision-makers guiding West European integration.

2. India's acceptance of the legitimacy of the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe was counter-balanced by the acceptance— occasional outbursts notwithstanding—of the United States rationale of its military and political presence in Western Europe. This tenet prevented India from improving relations with de Gaulle's France by outspokenly supporting France in the challenge to United States political, economic, scientific and technological hegemony over Western Europe. The psychological dimensions of the French desire for Nuclear Independence and of French resistance to American "economic imperialism" were never major factors in the evolution of any new Indian point of view on the political goals of West Europeans.

3. India took a purely bi-polar view of the German problem. In practice, this has meant that Indian diplomacy did not look for means to promote German unification on the basis of our own ideas of political rationality but was geared to the establishment of an ambiguous degree of non-alignment between the Soviet and the United States ambitions. This attitude

has precluded India from thinking realistically on the national security interests of West Germany giving the impression that India is not seriously interested in a European security system except to the extent that it is an important theme in the Soviet Union's policy discussions and propaganda.

4. India's self image as an integral part of the non-aligned group of nations has been responsible for her conducting her diplomatic relations with West European countries with a heavy emphasis on anti-westernism. India has not been able to explore the convergence of Indian and West European policies of development of Science and Technology to jointly resist technological domination by the Super Powers. India's adherence to the anti-Westernism of the Non-aligned group has been at the expense of the development of a scientific-technological partnership that could conceivably be organised between India and Western Europe if Indian achievement in advanced science were projected directly, without the culturally disruptive impact of the rest of the non-aligned states in most of which academic freedom is non-existent and scientific-technical advance is a distant dream. Doubtless the Indian nuclear energy programme is known to West Europeans as an index of India's advanced scientific knowledge, but India has done little to enhance her technical and scientific independence and is increasing her dependence on the United States and the Soviet Union.

The restoration of French prestige under General de Gaulle can best be understood by the obsolescence of certain themes which were used to create a political culture in Western Europe whose fundamental component was the omnicompetence of the United States in the fields of political, economic, scientific and military affairs. The redefinition of the Franco-United States relationship which with some bitterness de Gaulle projected as the termination of Anglo-Saxon hegemony over Europe, opened the way for an organised and far-reaching West European collaboration for reduction of dependence on the United States. There was no lack of American political jargon about the Atlantic Community which was skilfully used by United States diplomacy to justify domination, but the policy of disengagement from the United States announced by de Gaulle marked a new phase in which West Europeans began to offer psychological resistance to the privileged position of the United States from which it was reaping substantial political and economic benefits in Europe. It would be a complete misreading of de Gaulle's challenge to United States over-involvement in Europe to see in his policies of Veto of British entry into the Common Market of *Europe des Patries* and *Force de Frappe*, frantic efforts

for achieving France's grandeur, rather than a balanced appraisal of the disadvantages of domination by a Super Power, although expressed in bold metaphor. De Gaulle's political contribution was unfortunately not regarded as important by India's non-aligned policy makers, and his diplomacy was seen by them only in the narrow context of French nationalism, rather than the work of a far-seeing European statesman who demonstrated that the economic and political advantages of European unity could only be consolidated if the component nations would break the grip of American homogeneity.

It would have been of great significance for India's West European policy if we had placed an affirmative value on the transformation of the relationship between Germany and France which resulted from the de Gaulle-Adenauer understanding. A more positive approach would lie in foreseeing the wide range of favourable consequences in West European politics for a viable strategy of West European "desatellisation" from American hegemony by the dramatic and dynamic growth of French influence in the de Gaulle era. It is not just that the specific bilateral agreements of the two historic West European enemies, such as the Franco-German treaty of 1963, prescribe a line of action for controlling Germany's dormant nationalism; more important is the manifestation of the will to seek a purposeful expansion of West Europe's political influence in the world. Opinions may vary concerning the political identity of post de Gaulle French leadership. What is crucial is the enduring effect of Gaullist political decisions on West European psycho-political behaviour. The Americans can no longer project their foreign policy of continuing their past practice of regarding West European strategic and economic issues as peripheral to American vital interests. India cannot build up a relationship with West Europe merely by signing agreements for economic and technical aid with individual West European Governments. India must take into account those aspects which determine the political climate of Western Europe and our policy makers must have clear ideas about the growing influence of Western Europe and the independent political role of West Europeans. Indian foreign policy has led itself into costly errors by generally ignoring or underestimating the political and economic advantages of European unity. It is axiomatic that if India is to have a successful West European foreign policy, there must be a reappraisal of the European revival and of the mission of Gaullism in foreign affairs. The chaotic situation of the parliamentary regimes during the Fourth Republic had inhibited concerted forward-looking experiments embracing independent diplomatic and treaty relations by France outside the network of American diplomatic structures. The success of de Gaulle's management of foreign affairs and particularly his self-reliant and fundamental premise of "Europe to the Urals" directed attention to the underlying dynamics of political change not only in France but in other West

European countries as well. This Gaullist legacy in European politics is still an indispensable element for understanding of West European policies and objectives and for projecting future developments.

Indian official opinion tends to forget that even East European communist elites were fascinated by de Gaulle's approach to continental unity. Indeed after the passing away of the General and the removal of his dominant personality from the European scene, the distinctive features of the European Idea have gained a primacy on both sides of the partition line in Europe. It is unfortunate that Indian diplomacy under the barrage of propaganda by the dogmatists in the communist movements, has accepted the platitude that the European partition is essential for preserving the gains of the socialist system, at a time when there is striking evidence that even Soviet official policy has taken a positive turn towards the conception of a cooperative political arrangement in intra-European affairs instead of harping continuously on the resurgence of German militarism.

As seen from India, the new European order will not be the same as was stated in the respective claims of the two sides in the Cold War. The notions of total westernisation or total communisation of Europe are altogether irrelevant to the contemporary world situation and we need not take them seriously any longer. We have to recognise that many of the barriers which were believed to be insuperable have in fact been overcome by the development of new approaches to intra-European economic and political problems. In these circumstances it is unlikely that the political status quo in Europe will remain frozen. Europe a decade from now may, therefore, well be in possession of a framework of cooperation enhancing its capacity to oppose American and Soviet interventionism. The 'European Europe' will culturally and economically overcome the inhibitions generated by the Cold War, but political-security needs will ensure a "bi-polar" European system. India can make a contribution to the quest for stability in the larger European society and thus extend its influence in both Western and Eastern Europe. But if India continues to share the outmoded Soviet outlook sanctioning the partition of Europe as irreversible, her voice will not be effective in Western European capitals and will be heard with increasing scepticism. An articulate Indian public opinion in favour of European Unity in the Gaullist sense can help to create a true stimulus for shaping common aspirations. There would be thus a close convergence between the anti-hegemonial role of Europe and a foreign policy posture seeking to free India from its dependence on the Soviet Union and the United States.

The problem of developing an active role in the context of the Americanisation of Western Europe prompted Gaullist France to develop a policy of Technological Independence with the aim of

elaborating specific answers to the "technology gap" which has led to the increasingly assertive domination of the United States in nuclear science and electronics and the simultaneous intensification of the aggressive advance of the American controlled multinational companies. While it is true that there are serious difficulties which continue to plague scientific and technical research programmes which are not organised on the scale which the two Super Powers have achieved in aerospace and other advanced technologies, there is no doubt that the French effort has profoundly altered European views and has brought to an end the phase when the growth of American-European cooperation in science, technology and industry met with uncritical acceptance. Europeans have increasingly taken exception to the lopsided developments in technological-scientific relations with the United States. The privileged position of United States firms in Western Europe has been subjected to close analysis and advocates of economic Atlanticism are clearly on the defensive. There are a number of advantages which would accrue to India if it developed greater sophistication in preparing and implementing a National Scientific policy which would restructure Indian scientific and technological relations towards greater independence and would eschew outright the humiliating subsidiary role which follows from accepting the technological umbrella of one or the other of the two Super Powers. An active Indian scientific stance towards Western Europe would help to reform scientific and technical education by focussing attention on the appropriate relationship between science and literary culture. It will be increasingly difficult to secure cooperation from the United States or the Soviet Union in the areas of advanced technologies since neither of them is sympathetic to India's emergence as a nuclear or space power. If India is to avoid this discouraging prospect ahead her science policy should be founded on a fundamental research programme which should have the objective of self-sufficiency. Since the scientific problems confronting France and other European countries are being solved by attempting to create independent capabilities, the prospect of intimate scientific relations on a long term basis with India are favourable and should enhance freedom of action on both sides.

The question of freeing Europe from the hegemonial influence of the Super Powers has drawn pessimistic answers with respect to the situation in Germany. Since the formation of the Federal German Government, the Soviet attitude has been actively hostile leaving the West German Government no alternative but to maintain a defence and foreign policy posture of dependence on the United States. In 1970, however, Willy Brandt's Government demonstrated its ability to structure a new relationship with the Soviet Union and despite all the shortcomings of his Ostpolitik, the West German Chancellor has accomplished a major diplomatic breakthrough and

narrowed the scope of the working of the United States-Soviet Union axis. India appears to have turned its back on the German problem although she has paid lip service to the cause of German rapprochement. It is indispensable for the future of Indo-West German relations that the short-sighted policy of our looking upon Bonn as a centre of de-politicised economic power be jettisoned. The widening political perspective of the Federal German Government can make for a more effective Indian influence in Europe provided our foreign policy stance moves towards categorically rejecting anti-detente ideologies like those of the Brezhnev doctrine and the orthodoxies expressed by Pankow. It would be an error to imagine that India's passive acceptance of the Hallstein doctrine has automatically produced overall political accommodation between New Delhi and Bonn. India has still opportunities to help the two Germanys to work out an arrangement so that a pattern of collaboration will emerge. The positive potential of a new Indian policy towards Germany would lie in the design of our diplomacy to support the democratic rights of the German people and to oppose the efforts of the American and the Russians to keep them in their respective spheres of influence.

It is a hopeful sign that a new orientation on security problems is evident in Europe. India's perspective on European security, however, reveals a dangerous gap. Although India's attitudes coincide in several respects on questions like troop withdrawals with those of European countries, yet hardly any efforts have been made through diplomatic communications, to reveal Indian policy. There are grounds for supposing that the Soviet call for a European Security Conference is closely connected with Soviet thinking on the likelihood of military engagement on the Soviet-Chinese border. For India it is not irrelevant that Communist Chinese pressure is compelling the Russians to seek an accommodation in Europe. It is important for India to seek a continuous clarification of the strategic relationship on the Eastern and Western flanks of the Soviet Union in order to evaluate the concrete advantages from the Soviet "protection" offered to India. Indian suggestions can be brought to bear specifically on the agenda of the proposed European Security Conference by raising our voice for the removal of both Soviet and American troops from Europe. A further consequence of this theme would be for India to support the political and military integration of Western Europe without the Americans and of Eastern Europe without the Russians. Americans and Soviet disengagement from the whole of Europe would be the new reality which would provide an important element in the framework of European Security.

From a contemporary West European stand-point, the future in Asia often seems to belong more to Communist China than to India, and Peking's military and diplomatic position appears to be

determining the basic political pattern for the future in European eyes. To be sure, knowledge about Communist China is severely limited while India is an open book and there is enough on the Indian domestic political scene to baffle Europeans who interpret the revolutionary process historically in terms of "mass coercion" which is not part of the methodology adopted by India's modernisers. Much of Europe's "China thinking" is clearly pseudo-scientific and shows that many leaders of political opinion who outline an exaggerated role for Communist China are victims of old phantoms, and have thus set up obstacles to the expansion of West Europe's links with India. India herself contributed to the image of her vulnerability to Communist China's might by an unjustified preoccupation with the "Chinese threat" after 1962 and by her search for Super Power protection. This precluded a constructive response by India of exploring a wide range of options which would have been available if the parochialism of non-alignment had not stood in the way. The overt dependence on the Soviet Union by India and the increasing tendency to eschew criticism of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, discouraged intimate political dialogue between India and West Europe. Chinese ideological propaganda against the Soviets and the emergency of a Chinese challenge to the legitimacy of the Soviet control over Eastern Europe have provided a psychological basis for a closer West European – Communist Chinese relationship. An important step in the direction of reshaping the Indian image in West Europe should be to emphasise the meaningful goals which are needed to give the European peoples new horizons which are denied by both the Super Powers and to which the positive support of Communist China is uncertain. Indeed in building up a European peace order extending beyond military security arrangements, the political, cultural and literary affinities of India and Europe will tend to promote a relationship which will be responsive to the needs of a world system of autonomous political entities. A socio-cultural conception of Indo-Europe could inspire diplomatic activity through which India and Europe would contribute to the building of a new structure of the international system unencumbered by the ill effects of the Soviet-American bilateralism.

PEACE ORDER IN ASIA

The Communist Chinese Paradox in its multidimensionality

The swing of political relations between New Delhi and Peking from friendly companionship to violent antagonism brought to the surface the ambiguity and weakness of Non-alignment. When large scale hostilities broke out between the Indian forces and the Peoples' Liberation Army, the official Indian judgement was that a solid phalanx of support from other non-aligned countries would be available for India. Indian diplomacy on grounds of principle and conviction perceived the Communist Chinese military involvement as essentially "an assault on the principles of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence." The official Indian reaction was a peculiar blend of self-righteous confidence and exaggerated insecurity and did not make for recognition of the international political process which was hierarchically pressing upon and frustrating the foreign policy objectives of the Peking regime. As a sweeping generalisation the following observation by an official Indian spokesman provides an example of the naive response of Indian non-alignment to an overwhelmingly complex international perspective: "the only country posing a real threat to international peace in the foreseeable future is China. Despite what militant and doctrinaire Communists may say, the threat does not come from the United States and despite what equally militant and doctrinaire anti-communists might say, it does not come from the Soviet Union." Indian officials tried in vain to present the prospect of Peking's globalism as a catastrophic one: "Since the invasion of 1962, China has manifested its global ambitions more clearly. Militarily it threatens India, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and South East Asia. Ideologically, it confronts the Soviet Union. Politically, it battles the United States in Asia and Africa and foments subversion and its own brand of 'revolution'. Diplomatically, it flirts with different degrees of intimacy with Pakistan, Indonesia and various other countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America." It is doubtful whether this bitter criticism mobilised support from any of the countries in conflict with Peking or earned respect for India as a basic source of information on Communist China's political behaviour. The issue of "Communist China's attack on non-alignment" was pathetically inadequate for identifying the salient features of Peking's challenge to India and post-1970 developments have provided conclusive evidence that there was something immature about the cliché-ridden Indian formulations for forging a United States-Soviet Union-India political pattern to overcome India's own lack of cohesion towards the viable settlement of political issues with Peking.

The problems of Sino-Indian relations cannot be resolved satisfactorily in the absence of objective criteria for evaluating Peking's politico-ideological, and strategic goals, and a

broader political outlook is necessary to understand the variety of dogmas, objectives and policies which have been manifested at the different levels of international involvement of the Communist Chinese than that reflected in the abstract generalisations of Non-alignment. India's China policy will remain a pawn in the hands of either the United States or the Soviet Union as long as Indian policy makers do not examine the consequences of Indian *immobilisme* which has rejected imaginative suggestions based on the realities of international and regional power relationships. There are several aspects of New Delhi's involvement with Peking which to be sure were related to short-sighted wisdom, but jeopardised the essential and constructive clarification of hopeful alternatives since the invasion of Tibet by the Peoples' Liberation Army: first, Nehru and his advisers rigidly clung to the political choice of a Communist Chinese "Final solution" to the Tibetan problem. The dubious proposition which guided Indian policy makers when they were confronted with the provocation of Communist China was that India could either preserve British imperialist rationalisations on Tibet or accept unconditionally Peking's ideological prejudice in favour of a "revolution-oriented" future for Tibet. A policy choice based on political freedom for the Tibetans interwoven with adequate security proposals to ensure a long-term strategic Himalayan balance acceptable to India and China would have extricated India from the policy alternative imposed by Peking's posture that its grand design for Tibet was synonymous with Asian anti-imperialism. The stringent limitations on Peking's military and diplomatic policies at the initial period of her confrontation with Tibet and India would most probably have deterred her from risking a militarily hazardous course. A further consequence of dealing with the problem in the context of Tibetan freedom would have been that at the diplomatic level India would have made it unequivocally clear that Communist China's actions were a contradiction of Asian Nationalism as far as Tibet was concerned. India's attempt to raise the Tibet issue without any clear concept of "Tibetan freedom" resulted in sowing the seeds of antagonism with Peking without achieving the constructive purpose of stabilising the security situation in the Himalayas.

Second, the Indian preoccupation with the treaties and conventions signed by the British gave Indian diplomacy a restrictive circumstance in negotiating with Peking after the folly of accepting an incontrovertible Communist Chinese colonial presence in Tibet. The frame of value reference on the Indian side in considering questions relating to Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim was conditioned by an ideological vacuum and depended increasingly for formulation on the doctrines of the "imperialist past" while Communist China made gains through its harangues on the total process of its thrust against the obstructionism of the imperialist oriented international system.

Third, Indian policy makers accentuated a pattern of evangelism of Chinese Communism and refused to analyse the dangers which might arise for an Asian peace order through the xenophobia of the Peking regime. The snobbish attitude towards the Nationalist Government in Taipeh demonstrated the kind of obstacles that Indian diplomacy created through indiscriminate use of a simplistic model of power relationships. The distinction between the modernising goals of Sun Yat Sen which included a careful security and accommodation with the common humanistic cultural traditions of the Chinese, and the dynamic dogmatism and the offensive cultural mood of Mao Tse-tung's ideological system is too real to be ignored. The deeper problems of the Sinic world and especially the divergent relationship of the Maoist value system from Sun Yat Sen's doctrine of *San Min Chu I* were reflected in the two antagonistic political systems and regimes located in Peking and Taipeh. A broader political basis for extending Indian influence in the Sinic world could have been found through a political pragmatism towards both Peking and Taipeh, instead of the spectacular demonstration of New Delhi's New China-politik, which failed to provide the basis for reciprocity, and merely accustomed Communist China to India's appeasement orientation.

Fourth, in the context of the hostilities regarding the border question India failed to develop concepts and approaches through which she could realise constructive possibilities for consolidating political and military (including para-military) strength. There was no basis for the working hypothesis of Indian policy makers that Communist China aimed at physical expansion to gain control of India. The defeat of the Indian army in 1962 necessitated urgent steps to remove Indian vulnerability and India turned to the Super Powers to provide the sinews of additional strength. But the articulation of Indian defensive interests did not require that India should extend the logic of its limited struggle with Peking to a political anachronism which compared Peking's offensive objectives to those of Hitlerite Germany. A rigid policy of total lack of response to Peking's gestures was adopted ignoring the international realities which made large scale territorial and political manoeuvres against India, except in terms of propaganda, impractical for Communist China.

Fifth, the chief hope for a viable foundation for Indian security after Communist China became a nuclear power was seen by the Indian government in the strengthening of Soviet-American nuclear hegemony. India's "righteous indignation" at Communist China's nuclear developments was a pathetically inadequate basis for political action on nuclear issues, since in the essential areas of nuclear politics a communications breakthrough is reflected in the behavioural change in favour of the pursuit of a modus vivendi with the new entrant into the nuclear club. The Indian expectation of

a consensus of conscience of the nations of the world against the Communist Chinese nuclear challenge had to suffer disappointment and for Indian national feeling the ominous silence of the nonaligned nations intensified the political trauma of the defeat of 1962.

Finally, the narrowing of contact with Peking and the concentration of efforts to win the Soviet Union's patronage in dealing with Communist China resulted in India loyally echoing the Russian expositions of the ideological quarrel with China, which created sharp cleavages in her internal politics, and the rise of groups which were manipulated and controlled by Communist China and Russia. Peking's reappraisal of Pakistan's political status stiffened Islamabad's provocative attitude against India and gave it an enhanced bargaining power with the Soviet Union as well as with the United States. The political dilemma that arose for India was the repercussion of the entrenched refusal to conduct a direct political dialogue with Peking and a sense of "loyalty" to the Soviet Union to politically coordinate an anti-Peking front with the latter. In fact India tended to foreclose new avenues of approach for a New Delhi-Peking detente by stressing the congruency of border issues facing the Soviet Union and India vis-à-vis Communist China. The political ramification of the Chinese position on the "Unequal Treaties with Russia" were far beyond anything implied in Peking's posture against India. There was little psychological or political wisdom in cultivating a cohesiveness with the Russians against whom Chinese hostility was massive and spontaneous and based on historical factors By seeking to identify Indian experience of China with that of the Russians, the Indian foreign policy makers unfortunately deprived themselves of the opportunity for a balanced appraisal of the advantages and disadvantages of specific measures of accommodation with Peking.

The chief disadvantage of India's fixation on outmoded ideas of Peking's physical expansionism was that it led India to ignore the crucial importance of Communist China's rebellion against the international status quo. India's concentration on the Himalayan perspective increasingly developed a paranoia which was a detriment to the realistic assessment of the possibilities of new patterns of international and regional relations.

The thaw in Sino-American relations in 1971 has triggered off a national debate in India regarding the coincidence of interests between India and Communist China. Some have pointed to a natural identity of interests between the two Asian states and have blamed the Government of India for its rigidity in not getting a great deal out of "ping pong diplomacy". Others have described the new Chinese and American moves as being ultimately a menace to India's security. Both these views

are over-simplified and ignore the firm basis that exists for India to show initiatives without running the risk of alternating between appeasement and intransigence.

It should be recognised once and for all that Indians and Chinese are confronted with a set of problems from the primary standpoint of shaping an Asian response to the world political situation. It will be sterile to attempt to solve these problems in a manner which depends exclusively on third party reactions and opinions. The problem of greatest seriousness between India and Communist China is still the future of Tibetan nationalism and the role of Tibet in the security context of both India and China. Listening to the advice of the Soviet Union or the United States can only create further distortions in Sino-Indian relations. New Delhi and Peking are politically not so far apart as they seem. If both accept the dominant criteria of Asian security, fresh negotiations on Tibet can add up to a whole new outlook on international affairs in the 1970s.

Tibet: Priority for Indian Foreign Policy

The difficulties involved in developing a course of rapprochement between New Delhi and Peking cannot be overcome without attenuating the final character of Peking's colonialist power position in Tibet. The geographical realities of Tibet's situation make it India's principal problem for any serious re-examination of foreign policy towards China. India's obligations and responsibilities towards the Tibetan nation against the background of the 1959 Uprising and the Dalai Lama's asylum in India, need not be looked upon as formidable barriers to fresh efforts to build bridges with the Sinic world. What is actually at issue is the possibility of developing a new perspective in which Tibet is no longer regarded as an integral part of the Chinese community but a resurgent Asian nationalism whose destiny lies in common understanding and association with both India and China. The legal interpretations of the Chinese, Tibetan and Indian Governments on the international status of Tibet are hardly decisive under conditions where basic factors in relationship between Tibet and India and China demand deeper and far-reaching political action, to develop a stable peace order in Central Asia.

Indian sponsorship of Tibet cause does not entail a journey on a way which is irretrievably blocked and would be unpalatable to Peking under all circumstances. What should be the framework within which a variety of points of view relating to the strategic and political calculations of the Chinese and the Indians can be considered to promote the growth of a consensus on the future of Tibet? The historical experience beginning with the 1951 Agreement between Lhasa and Peking strongly indicates that Communist China has only had an ambiguous assurance that it has bridged the gap between the Chinese and the Tibetans. The Sino-Indian agreement of 1954 was intended on Peking's side to remove the underlying instability of the position of Tibet. The Chinese Communists did not gauge the danger of the acute tensions generated by the dogmatic and propagandist moves to weaken Tibetan autonomy. The resulting situation produced an escalation in Tibetan resistance and its culmination in the events of 1959. The long smouldering resentment of the mass of the Tibetan people found expression in the revolutionary mission of the Tibetan freedom fighters who adopted the same guerrilla tactics which were preached by the Maoists to the world at large. Peking's leaders who boast of a vast experience of revolutionary activity found themselves cast in a counter-revolutionary role in Tibet. To understand the present situation in Tibet it is essential not to be misled by "the inflated claims of the Chinese communists; there remains in full view for the discerning observer the political vulnerability of Peking and the stubborn fact of the resilience of the revolutionary Tibetan forces.

The spectrum of a new Indian posture on Tibet cannot exclude the themes which relate to Communist Chinese responsibility for the deteriorating relations between the Chinese and the Tibetans. Indian policy should, however, aspire to generate an atmosphere of detente by attempting to conduct its pressure on the vulnerable points of Peking's position with a readiness to reach practical solutions. Progress in India's Tibet policy will depend entirely on the ability of the Indian Government to avoid both "adventurism" and "capitulationism." While India may have to offer sanctuaries to the Tibetan guerrillas and alter the magnitude and character of Indian sympathy for the aims of the Tibetan freedom fighters, Indian diplomacy must lay the groundwork for a moderate and reasonable settlement which will lead to stabilisation of the internal politics and external relations of Tibet.

A dynamic Indian Tibet policy must have three inter-related purposes: First, although the Communist Chinese do not wish to acknowledge their responsibility for their genocidal actions in Tibet, India must not allow Peking to extricate itself from the burden of moral and political guilt. This question must remain on the agenda of bilateral negotiations with Peking and should also be underscored and assigned high priority after the initiation of the Chinese Communists in the United Nations system. Second, a substantive element of constructive negotiations must be the recognition of the Dalai Lama's right to speak for his own people whose interests should not be sacrificed in the interests of a new Sino-Indian understanding. Finally, India must reaffirm with firmness and strength her conviction that the area of Tibet should not be used for creating a hostile military presence and she should seek an explicit recognition of her interest in the demilitarised orientation of Tibet.

The crux of the matter is that it is impossible for India to divorce her National Security Policy from its intricate connection with the politico-military order in Tibet. In a very real sense, from October 1950 to September 1951, India would not have found it difficult to exert her influence on behalf of a policy of military restraint by Peking if she had organised a deterrence posture based on the supply of conventional arms to the Tibetans and strengthened their bargaining power with the Chinese communists. India's commitment to a peaceful solution was not strengthened by curtailing the right of the Tibetans to improve their military posture. India also failed to offer a meaningful alternative when the matter was raised in the United Nations and the Indian representative's approach lacked any sophistication and a total unawareness of the complexity of the military situation in Tibet. The ambivalence of the Indian position on a major foreign policy issue was naive and maladroit and this contributed to seriously upsetting the balance of power between India

and Communist China. There is little doubt that in the early 1950s an Indian policy which took into account the stringent military limitations of Peking would have accomplished a political dialogue leading to a political settlement acknowledging the defence interests of India and Tibet and accommodating the security concerns of Peking.

The Dalai Lama's aspirations to the restoration of Tibetan freedom are an important psychological asset for India, and for the purposes of constructing a new approach to Peking it would be indispensable for the Government of India to be favourably disposed towards the functioning of the Tibet Government-in-exile. This government should draw up disengagement and demilitarisation plans and adopt a foreign policy programme based on a future consensus between New Delhi, Peking and Lhasa. While working at the political level for Indian-Tibetan-Chinese reconcilation, at the military level the Tibetan government-in-exile would be free to coordinate aid programmes for the Tibetan resistance movement.

The choices confronting India in a new Tibet policy, in the context of disengagement and demilitarisation, will be, it is obvious, also of interest to the Soviet Union. India will have to study carefully the repercussions of its own actions on Soviet policy towards Tibet and Communist China, and India should be free to hold exploratory discussions with the Soviets. The success of India's Tibet policy will, however, become manifest in a wholly new arrangement for tripartite diplomacy through the legitimization of the Dalai Lama's government and dismantling the inadequate system created by the 1954 Agreement. India's foreign policy programme would have to project Tibet as a live political issue, direct the main thrust of the Tibetan resistance lo a fundamental change in the environmental conditions, and with energy and diplomatic skill create a new structure of security compatible with the political interests of India, China and Tibet.

India, United States and "Vietnamisation"

The importance of the role of India in the International Control Commissions (ICC) for each of the three countries, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia called for comprehensive effort to evolve a strategy of peace, but it was an ironic fact that the trend towards greater public manifestation of Indian interest in Indochina bore no direct relation to the dynamic development of the functions of Indian diplomacy to serve as counterweight to the interventionist power of the United States, Communist China or the Soviet Union.

Jawaharlal Nehru's six proposals for an Indochinese peace settlement which were endorsed by the Colombo powers were the expression of India's preoccupation with a mediatory role between the two Super Powers. The political geography of Indian relations with the Indochina States was not taken into account to develop maximum political solidarity with the basic concern of championing an independent Asian policy of detente. In the determination of Indian policy effective regionalism was a low priority and the actual record of Indian diplomacy when it is fully available is likely to reveal the deleterious influence of the global pattern of forces which deflected policy planning for stability in the post-Geneva period. India's informal presence at Geneva may have resulted in the solution of specific issues, but Krishna Menon's pragmatism soon became a handicap because India got over-engaged in tactical matters and failed to give convincing proof of being a cornerstone of regional opposition to hegemonial interests. Following the Geneva settlement, India set its sights so low as to deflect attention away from the real dimensions of the framework within which the political requisites for stability in Indochina could be forged. The exaggerated importance of its non-aligned role meant a constant adjustment of India's perspectives and priorities in a world-wide context at the cost of fulfilling the central function of creating an Asian equilibrium.

It is true that the United States had explicitly refused to subscribe to the Geneva agreements (agreeing only to "refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb them") and its general posture was in favour of introducing a United States-sponsored alliance system in the region, yet Indian action to strengthen the machinery of supervision and control could have changed the situation dramatically and made the Geneva arrangement more acceptable to the United States. Faced with growing disorder and instability the International Control Commission remained nailed in the prisoner's dock and could not sustain support for measures which would reduce the level of violence to tolerable dimensions. The ICC Report of 2nd June 1962 furnished proof of the acute crisis which was developing, but India's reluctance to transfer its attention from the totally in-adequate balancing process between the two sides resulted in undermining the foundation of the international action to aver the impending disaster. In the perspective of the history of the escalation of the Vietnam War, India's role will be seen as lacking in coherence in relation to the tragic course of developments. An assessment of the Indian role should take into account the following considerations:

First, the divergent approaches of the Polish and Canadian members deprived the ICC of its internal cohesion and it could not function as an instrument for working out a grand strategy for

peace in Indochina. There are grounds to believe that a more stable arrangement for tackling the exacting political tasks would have evolved if structural changes in the machinery for control and supervision had been effected. An Indian bid to break the *immobilisme* would not have ended in deadlock if India had used its pivotal position as a regional power to advance concrete proposals for practical and constructive regionalism in peacekeeping operations. Unfortunately India was more involved in the maintenance of the existing arrangement and contented itself with minor improvisations. This led to a process of disenchantment with the role of the ICC. India as Chairman of the supervisory and control organisation suffered in prestige and was unable to play a dynamic role in determining the future of Indochina.

Secondly, strategic considerations were generally not taken into account by the ICC when providing prescriptions for controlling the hostility of the two sides. Indeed, India's behaviour as Chairman did not reflect serious intellectual effort to analyse the purpose behind the military and paramilitary preparations which generated the crisis atmosphere. India kept standing pat on the concept of the middle way between the two power blocs and apart from reiterating lofty prononcimentos did little to eradicate the mutual fears and suspicions which led eventually to a massive American military presence on the one hand and provoked large scale assistance from the Soviet Union and China to help the "national-liberation" struggle on the other.

Thirdly, instead of seeking greater autonomy of action in the task of supervision and control, India remained over-anxious and solicitous of the joint approval of the two Co-Chairmen, Soviet Union and Britain, of every conceivable measure. It was erroneous for India to assume that the two powers would preserve the harmonious postures they had adopted at the time of the Geneva meeting. India could have used its bargaining power with the Co-Chairmen to utilise a wider range of choice to promote the development of peaceful relationships in Indochina and foster the coexistence of different social systems. Instead of kowtowing to the Soviets and the British, India should have raised its voice for positive steps to remove the antagonism between the different political societies in Indochina. In the deteriorating situation Indian judgement was sacrificed by a policy of subservience to a hypothetical Soviet-British convergence.

Fourthly, the whole spectrum of political aims endorsed by ICC members generally and India in particular were designed to transform on a short term basis the environment in Indochina to remove dangers of escalation between the two Super Powers. Indian diplomacy failed to raise the practical question whether the Geneva framework had been developed merely with the intention of

transferring the cold war from a European context to a new Asian context. India's naiveté in ignoring the prospects for long range transformation of the Indochinese edifice made India lose a historic opportunity which had presented itself when it assumed Chairmanship of the ICC.

The experience of India in Indochina indicates that structural changes must take place in the peacekeeping machinery if there is to be an improvement in the relations between the antagonists. The problems are not going to be solved simply by the Americans going over to the new strategy of Vietnamisation because the continuing military confrontation will have negative consequences for the kind of regional cohesion that is necessary if chaos is to be avoided after two decades of war in Indochina. The simple fact is that the failure to keep the big powers out of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia has inhibited the liberty of action of the political actors in the region. The Indian involvement created an illusion of efforts for stability but could not contribute constructively to a new peace order. India has a great deal of work ahead of it if its mediating and peacekeeping role in the future is not to be frustrated. While the United States extricates itself from the involvement in the Vietnam war, the Soviet Union and China are discovering potential strategic opportunities in Indochina as they engage in their direct competition, Although grave doubts still exist about a total United States withdrawal from Indochina, the process of normalisation of relations with Communist China points irresistibly to the conclusion that the United States will give a continuing priority to the pullout of its combat troops from Vietnam. India must closely examine the likely consequences of a Sino-Russian confrontation in Indochina in the period after the United States withdrawal. It cannot be convincingly argued that Soviet and Communist Chinese interference will be more acceptable to the Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians than the hegemonial presence of the Americans proved to be. It seems therefore reasonable that Indian policy makers should be wary of the pressures from the Russians or the Communist Chinese designed to obstruct a constructive dialogue between India and the different political societies in Indochina. India can reinvigorate its ties with the area only if its future policy articulates the following purposes:—

1. To maintain the existing relationships with all the main actors in the region and not to develop political relations in a uni-directional manner. The penchant of the Indian communists for breaking off relations with the Saigon government is an example of extreme rigidity which would rudely disturb the process of a negotiated compromise in which India could play a leading role keeping in view its formal and informal contacts with different political forces in South Vietnam.

2. To establish regional solidarity for a major Asian participation in a forthcoming international conference for solving the problems of security of the Indochinese region. It is essential to bear in mind that the so-called triangular relationship between United States, Communist China and Soviet Union has an interventionist dimension which is particularly relevant to Indochina. India's purpose is to strengthen the political independence and coexistence of North and South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, and this means clearly that India must challenge the "categorical imperatives" of their global relationship which create regional instability.

3. To embark on a fresh attempt to find a sound basis for the national security of Laos and Cambodia in order that these two nations should be able to cope with the pressures which for historical and social reasons have threatened their survival as political entities. India must not hesitate to take the initiative as far as Laos and Cambodia are concerned because the consolidation of peace will ultimately depend upon the accommodation of interests between different ethnic and national groups in Indochina. India has an indispensable role to play in the creation of a *modus vivendi* provided it does not only engage in political tight rope walking but is prepared to resolutely stand up for the defence of the rights of small nations.

4. To encourage the development of multi-national projects in Indochina for a prosperous future. It would be opportune for India to step up its participation in the Mekong development programme. India should go ahead with technical preparations for its contribution to the rehabilitation of war-weary Indochina. Indian scientists, technicians and engineers should be earmarked for rehabilitation projects in North and South Vietnam, in Cambodia and in Laos.

India's experience in Indochina places it in a unique position to offer its expertise for efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement acceptable to the people of Indochina. But it would be a major mistake for India to identify itself closely with the interests of either of the Super Powers or resign itself to accept the preponderance of Communist Chinese or Japanese influence in any of these countries in the future. There can be no doubt that it is in India's interests to strengthen its relations with Hanoi, Saigon, Vientiane and Phnom Penh. India should work patiently to develop processes of consultations between the various conflicting groups and factions and encourage the consolidation of nationalism in each country. It would prove a major stumbling block in India's

peace-keeping role if as a result of the Indo-Soviet Treaty New Delhi's policies became subject to the political calculations of Moscow, or if an impression was created that India was averse to improving relations with regimes in Indochina which did not win Moscow's favour. India can only function as a stabilising factor in the aftermath of United States withdrawal if it desists from any measures which would unsettle existing relationships. India should not bow down to the propaganda requirements of the United States, Soviet Union, Communist China or Japan while declaring her readiness to cooperate with any of these powers which is prepared to preserve the interests of small powers. India's political strategy for peace in Indochina must be firmly grounded in a regional approach and not be compromised by the machinations of global powers who wish to use ideological bridgeheads for political and economic domination.

The Asian Dimension of Bangla Desh

The disappearance of the Pakistani military presence from the Bay of Bengal region and the refusal of the people of Bangla Desh to look to Islamabad for guidance, have opened up opportunities for a new approach to South and South East Asian problems. The likelihood of internal upheavals in Pakistan after ''the loss of the Eastern Wing" reduces the danger that the new state of Bangla Desh faces in its period of consolidation, the demagogic outpourings of President Bhutto notwithstanding. The basic characteristics of Bangla Desh's regional role will derive from its concern of safeguarding peace and security and fulfilling its aspiration for a higher level of economic development, which was denied to it by its colonialist rulers for two decades and more. Dacca's regional relations will undoubtedly have several guidelines which will reflect the circumstances and conditions under which it emerged as an independent centre of foreign policy-making. The efforts of Islamabad to embroil the people of Bangla Desh in its manoeuvres to posture as a Middle Eastern power was counter-productive and led to disenchantment of the millions who had to suffer frustration, sacrilege and genocide. One thing is now certain: the Bangla Desh decision-makers will manifest the psychology and expectations of a new identity totally rooted in their South and South East Asian environment. The display of *schadenfreude* by the Muslim states of the Middle East at Islamabad's efforts to liquidate the liberation struggle with blood baths has implacably ranged Bangla Desh against a Middle East oriented political grouping. Dacca will seek multilateral relations primarily among countries around the Bay of Bengal: India, Burma, Ceylon, Thailand and countries further south which would include Malaysia, Singapore, the Indochinese states and Indonesia.

The rationale for India's Bangla Desh policy should be rooted in Conflict Avoidance and limited to specific forms of collaboration which unostentatiously create a closer political and economic association of states in the region on a multilateral basis.

The melancholy memory of political domination by Islamabad and of retarded economic development may create reservations, open or implied, in the spheres of both official decision-making and public opinion in Bangla Desh and thus devalue India's substantial achievements. India's "preventive diplomacy" should, therefore, emanate from regional trends and movements in which Bangla Desh can forcefully assert itself in pursuit of its own national and regional interests. A serious weakness in Indo-Bangla Desh relations may originate if from the dizzy heights of victory both countries lend exaggerated emphasis to exclusive and grandiose schemes of collaboration. India would do well to subordinate its own interests to those it shares with the nascent community of South and South East Asian states which the reconstruction of Bangla Desh may if sensibly handled, bring to a higher level of effectiveness.

The impact of the Indo-Pak war on India's neighbouring countries should be analysed by Indian decision-makers in a sober and comprehensive manner. New Delhi's policy should not be based on the assumption that Asian countries, having failed to help Bangla Desh at a critical juncture, will allow the gap to become wider still. On the crucial issue of recognition, the practice of Asian states is to a great extent circumscribed by their reluctance to encourage malcontents against their own regimes. The Indian military presence in an internal Asian perspective will appear to most Asians henceforth in the context of Indian self-restraint, and this should deal a blow to the illusions of those who have been hoping for gains through blandishments against India. From the Indian point of view, it would be necessary to emphasise New Delhi's determination to protect regional interests and India's commitment to resist blackmail of the type attempted by the Seventh Fleet of the United States should be stated in terms of a well-defined position of rejecting each and every diktat. Indian distaste for the Super Power hegemonial fabric of President Nixon's actions should find reflection in basic ideas of Indian policy and should not be whittled away by regarding the Nixon-Kissinger antics during the Indo-Pak war as rare exceptions. To pave the way for widespread recognition of India as a challenger to hegemonial motives, New Delhi should not hesitate to emphasise military realities while expressing readiness for diplomatic action to defuse

threatening situations. The United States in its anxiety to confer superpowerhood on Communist China wishes to negate India's flexibility by the clever device of pushing India willy-nilly under the Soviet umbrella. If India became a Soviet satellite it would make things simpler for Henry Kissinger's computerized thinking! It is in India's interest to extend the range of interactions on the Asian scene by rejecting the State Department's scenarios for a triangular dialogue between Washington, Peking and Moscow.

Communist China's attitude to the emergence of Bangla Desh has not been supported by the logic of Peking's regional Asian interests and has led it to adopt a rigid stand in favour of Islamabad's misjudgements. There are, however, some signs that Peking could move out to a new position if at some future time it is propitious for the Communist Chinese to achieve a rapprochement with Bangla Desh and remonstrate against Super Power interventionism. Peking's opposition to Soviet inclinations was to be expected. It would, however, be incorrect to adhere to the impression that Peking has irrevocably committed itself against Dacca. It is in Indian interest to make every effort to avoid the encapsulation of Dacca in a Soviet or Indian framework in opposition to Communist China. The changing priorities in Peking's foreign policy may result in a switch in Peking's policy towards Bangla Desh sooner than is expected.

India and Japan : Towards A Constructive Dialogue

In the years following the end of World War II until the need arose to formulate India's views in the context of the 1951 San Francisco Japanese Peace Treaty, Japan never significantly figured in the framework of Nehru's foreign policy. India tended to forget that both the United States and the Soviet Union were continuously engaged in the assessment of the political and strategic potentialities of Japan and, however remotely they were able to conceive future Japanese resurgence, both the powers coveted a "special relationship" with Japan. The Americans sought to transform Japanese attitudes with a conciliatory approach focussed on de-ideologisation of the militarism which had prevailed since the Meiji Restoration. The Soviets being unable to impose their political decisions on the Japanese, called for remodelling the political-ideological system through the overthrow of the "American imperialists" and the "Japanese reactionaries" and rejected outright the "democratisation" of the political system while challenging the socio-economic improvements effected by the Occupation regime as hypocritical ventures. India's own perception of the important issues in future bilateral relations was reflected in the 1952 treaty but the posture

India was adopting towards the Cold War in the light of the "bipolar" considerations prevented India from developing systematically "active" relations with Japan. To look at Japan in terms of the Cold War did not, however, take into account the possibility of slow and steady advancement by Japanese decision-makers towards great power status through the utilisation of tactical advantages. In all issues of foreign policy towards Japan, India's theory and practice, although allowing scope for economic and cultural ties, has viewed the Japanese political system as essentially conforming to the foreign policy pattern of the United States.

If we review what happened after India's refusal to sign the San Francisco Treaty, there is evidence that opportunities for the pursuit of Indo-Japanese collaboration in a larger frame-work were not realised on account of three considerations which impeded political dialogue between the two governments : First, India's Japan policy was significantly affected by the extraneous factor of political tension between Soviet Union and Japan and the hard line taken by the Soviet Union on the several problems relating to Japanese foreign policy issues: recovery of Japan's northern islands, repatriation of Japanese prisoners, and United Nations Membership for Japan. India's expression of support to Japan on these questions accepted stringent limitations imposed by an attitude of appeasement to Soviet interests. Secondly, although Indian public opinion looked upon the Japanese collaboration with the Azad Hind Government of Subhas Chandra Bose as symbolic of Asian proximity, the Indian government succumbed to the Sino-Soviet propaganda campaign calling for the "neutralisation" of Japan and till then relegating it to the pariah position of an "ex-enemy" state. Thirdly, in the eyes of many of India's socialist planners, Japanese outdated "capitalism" signified a passing phenomenon which would not survive the challenge of the powerful left-wing groups. This lack of sympathy for Japanese "big business" led New Delhi to pursue a somewhat paternalis-tic and over-bureaucratic economic policy towards Japan which lacked psychological insight into the main moving forces of Japanese scientific, technological and commercial resurgence.

Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's visit to India in 1957 ushered in a new phase in Japan's attitude towards India in the direction of exploring the possibilities of broadening economic and industrial relations. The discussions held between Nehru and Kishi at the time and during Nehru's visit to Tokyo, however, did not go beyond an exchange of political opinions. Kishi's "Asia centred diplomacy" as far as India was concerned was coloured more by wishful thinking and lacked a solid foundation in political, economic and social values in terms of which India was seeking to operate in the international environment. The lack of

preparation by way of background work for both the visits restricted the discussions to abstract considerations of political relationships and did not improve the prospects for a more viable political structure supportive of dynamism and creative endeavour in the development of Indo-Japanese relations.

In the mid-sixties the early signs of a clearly defined Asian orientation of Japan's foreign political and economic policies became visible, and India was compelled to re-examine a number of dogmatic assumptions about Japan as an American "satellite." The greater range of freedom in pursuing its national objectives was evident from Japan's role in the Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of South East Asia and in the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC). It was, however, in the setting up of the Asian Development Bank that India discovered a common approach with Japan to economic development problems and recognised the importance of a dialogue with Japan about the inter-relationship of economic growth and political development in Asia. At the same time Indian decision-makers continued to be dogged by an ingrained negativism which jeopardised their freedom to bring up for discussion questions relating to long-term political aspirations and security interests. The obscurantism of Indian non-alignment relegated the consideration of the core of mutual interest of Japan and India in Asian stability to fairly low-level political decisions.

The Djakarta Conference in May 1970 marked an important step by Japan for better political coordination on a regional basis and but for India's inflexible doctrinaire and tactless attitude, the institutional framework of the Conference would have strengthened the political bonds between India and Japan significantly. While there can be little question that Indian rigidity was the result of the short-sighted policy of yielding to Soviet pressure, it would nonetheless be difficult to exonerate the sponsors of the Djakarta meeting of free-wheeling behaviour and ignoring a variety of operational diplomatic problems. There is no reason to suppose that India has negative reactions to Japan's emerging political role; innovative diplomacies which enhance the degree of consensus already existing between India and Japan will augment the political resources of both countries to withstand external pressures and to promote peaceful regional settlements.

The most important questions for close consultation between India and Japan are related to five main common purposes. First of all, both countries have expressed reservations about the Non-Proliferation Treaty which Soviet-American pressure seeks to impose on the two countries without any real quid pro quo. It is true that the strategic and technological

implications of nuclear policy are different for India and Japan and the psychological circumstances for Japan are related to strong popular attitudes, yet there is no doubt that active discussion by New Delhi and Japan will help both to pursue "independent" nuclear policies.

Second, although neither Japan nor India has committed itself to the task of policing the Indian Ocean, yet it is significant that both have been viewing the situation created by the British withdrawal with growing concern about the dangers associated with the Super Power rivalry. Although India is likely to continue to play down the provocativeness of the Soviet naval build up, at the same time Indian perceptions will increasingly create close interest in consultation and coordination in naval matters between India and Japan.

Third, in the context of American withdrawal from Vietnam, policies and processes of peace-keeping in Asia will compel countries like India and Japan to assume substantial responsibilities. While India has experience of the political difficulties of peacekeeping roles in Korea, Congo and Indo-China, for Japan the problem of developing a delicate balance in its relationship within the appropriate peacekeeping framework will open new perspectives. The demands of the post-Vietnam Asian situation are likely to influence Japan and India to structure their peace-keeping relationship through exchange of information and evaluation of alternatives to harmonise Asian attitudes in the transitional period. The outcome would be more hopeful to the extent that both countries adopt pragmatic approaches and do not forget regional priorities under the stress of Soviet or American posturing.

Fourth, in place of the naive American assumption of the Cold War days that a United States military presence was the sine qua non of Asian stability, the idea dominating Asian and international thinking is expressed in hopeful expectations of realising political consolidation through economic development. The American pendulum may, however, swing in the other extreme and equally mistaken direction of exaggerating the pressure of Communist Chinese interests on the smaller Asian states and changing United States diplomacy may seek to confer a *de facto* relationship of "Peking's vassals" as the price of Sino-American normalisation. Japan's policies and capabilities as the third largest industrial and economic power have, in spite of recurrent suspicions, evoked a wide response among Asian countries and have dramatically reduced the effectiveness of the shock waves from Peking. From India's point of view coordination of economic policy with Japan should not be aimed at taking sides in the Sino-Japanese competition, but at developing a higher sophistication of a new economic order in the Asian

world where Peking's interests are accommodated not through appeasement but through mutual safeguards and providing opportunities for Communist and Non-Communist Asian countries to develop economic and technological cooperation.

Finally, within the United Nations system India and Japan can help the process of detente in Asia and re-examine the role of the world organisation in helping to achieve the relaxation of tension among Asian nations. Permanent membership for India and Japan in the Security Council would stimulate greater political and psychological effectiveness of the United Nations as an effective forum for efforts to achieve peace and detente. The community of interest between India and Japan in the effective functioning of the United Nations system should be expressed through broad-based diplomatic negotiations which do not invite the political disapproval of other member-states. India and Japan can contribute towards fruitful coexistence chiefly through the psychological effect of two major Asian nations working for general relaxations of global and Asian tensions through the United Nations.

What are the prospects for Japan's Realpolitik in the political transition as it widens the range of options for both defence and detente? A factor of immense psychological importance which no Japanese Government can fail to bear in mind is the apprehension that Japan's Fourth Defence Build-up programme is a harking back to Japanese militarism. Complaints from Peking are likely to increase in shrillness and similar sentiments about the nature of Japan's military role will apparently be echoed by militant leftist forces in other countries. This type of propaganda could of course present serious problems for Japan by activating diplomatic pressures with a destabilising effect on Japan's political ties. In these circumstances India could instil greater awareness of realistic propositions about Asian security requirements by appraising accurately the aims and priorities of Japan's foreign and defence policies.

Finally it is important to emphasise that the genuine development of an Indo-Japanese dialogue will require a willingness to make compromises where value assessments differ. There are reasons to assume that the Japanese have difficulties coping with the nuances of India's "socialist-planning" environment, while the Indians have misapprehensions about the over-competitive motivations in Japan's actions. Both countries, however, cannot afford the mistake of categorical judgements; an essential prerequisite for political cooperation between India and Japan is to avoid loose thinking and grandiose verbiage.

The Indo-Soviet Treaty and the Future

The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of 1971 provides striking and important evidence that Indian foreign policy is at the crossroads as it confronts the range of "global" interests of the Super Powers. The motivations, judgements and guidelines in terms of which Indian capabilities will be demonstrated in the new situation with regard to Indo-Soviet relations can be closely examined if the following three points are kept in mind: First, it is an indispensable element of the structural formation of this bilateral relationship that joint interests are not interpreted in ideological terms. Second, the security equation in the treaty provides an opening to the future without iron imperatives characteristic of Soviet relationship with the Socialist nations. Third, the freedom of decision after consultation must be understood from the angle of exercise of Indian parliamentarianism and the non-authoritarian institutional strength of the Indian political system.

The basic anxieties that arise in the context of the consideration of India's national interest in the new relationship with the Soviet Union are in the background of the sharp collision course of Sino-Soviet attitudes and the "isolation" which the Soviet Union has begun to feel as the United States and Communist China move towards progress in "normalisation" of their relations. The power constellation which the Soviets view as the context of the Treaty does not provide in their interpretation an Indian role of leadership, and therefore the increase in Soviet involvement in Asia remains a Soviet political credo rather than a new concept of adherence to Asian regionalism. The structure of Soviet foreign policy as visible in the Treaty still conforms to an orientation in which five basic Soviet priorities exclude a great power role for India : First, Moscow has for some time looked forward with great expectation to the acceptance of a general security and foreign policy line symbolised by the Brezhnev Collective Security proposals. India and other countries in Asia had so far failed to conform to the Brezhnev model. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned it appears to be adhering to the intentions and purposes of the Brezhnev plan although Indian policy makers have been plagued by serious apprehensions on the whole subject. In the circumstances the Indo-Soviet Treaty has a certain unfortunate psychological effect as a dramatic attempt by the Soviets to take the first step towards setting up a tight organisation whose instrumental effect on India would be to reduce opportunities for improving relations outside the framework of the Soviet treaty system.

Second, the Soviet Union as an active sponsor of the Non Proliferation Treaty has not been able to reconcile itself to the Indian view that the nuclear option contributes to the improvement of security. The attempt to reach a substantial agreement with Moscow should have been utilised by New Delhi to confront the Russians with the requirements of Indian national interest in the context of the nuclear competition in the world. Here once again the Indo-Soviet Treaty is a demonstration of the Soviet success in undercutting the Indian belief in the utility of going nuclear. It would appear to be a requirement of Soviet policy that the substantial influence of the nuclear lobby in India should be eroded and the Government of India finally committed to the 'beneficial influence" of the Non Proliferation Treaty.

Third, it is naive to expect that after the emergence of Bangla Desh, the geopolitical standpoint of the Soviet Union in relation to the area of West Pakistan will be completely revised. The instability which has plagued relations between Islamabad and New Delhi will be assessed by Moscow in the terms in which it perceives the geo-political logic of West Pakistan and India. It should be remembered that the Indo-Soviet Treaty does not compel the Soviet Union to sacrifice opportunities in Islamabad which are related to its long term expectations. The Kremlin will continue to play a complex game with New Delhi and Islamabad.

Fourth, when all has been said about the seriousness of the Sino-Soviet antagonism, it must be noted that the Soviet interest in the Indo-Soviet Treaty in an improved climate of relations with Communist China in accord with the exigencies of the time could be reshaped and could upset Indian political expectations in the course of the next two decades. The enhanced self-confidence of the Soviets after the Indo-Soviet Treaty can conceivably be translated into a practical programme of negotiations with Communist China, while Indian foreign policy remains the captive of sweeping suppositions about Maoist behaviour.

Finally, the discipline of the Indo-Soviet Treaty characterised by "neighbourliness" with the Soviet Union, is not likely to provide relevant clues to the problems of regional cooperation in the wider context of the technological and psychological conditions in South East Asia. It is interesting that India's participation in a wider regionalism which could give rise to a new and powerful dynamic for Indian foreign policy in the foreseeable future—till the end of the century—is excluded in the "political realities" of both the Super Powers. The Indo-Soviet Treaty does not introduce any qualitative difference to the rigidity of the Soviet attitude which sees India as a key element of structural formation in the "South Asian" political order but

excludes it from the full dimensions of an objective factor in the strategic and political aspects of a new Asian power balance. The Soviet Union sees itself as the prime mover in this context while India's hands are fettered by its South Asian commitments.

The signing of the Treaty raised hopes that Moscow's strategic and political aims towards India are now structured to eliminate risks through a more consistent and long term programme. Indian negotiators regrettably failed to place the main emphasis of negotiations on the "sources of aggression" affecting India's security position. It would have added a new dimension to India's treaty relationship with the Soviet Union if the strategic factors relating to Tibet, Kashmir and Bangla Desh had in formal terms been recognised by the Soviet Union as important objectives of Indian policy. Soviet backing for India on the basis of the status quo, that is with the continued prospect of Chinese and Pakistan's adverse possession of Indian territory, does not suggest a major opportunity for India and can hardly be a cause for euphoria. One point is clear: the problem of Indian security is tied up with the ability of India to develop a whole range of possibilities including nuclear deterrence against the potential risks from the staking out of spheres of influence in Asia. The increasing naval build-up of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean and the Communist Chinese build-up in Tibet are developments which Indian strategists must view with alarm and both put India in a poor light in view of the possible repercussions on the precarious balance of power in the Asian region. What it all amounts to is that India's role in world affairs requires a higher performance in the region backed by a deterrence strategy and a tactical flexibility at a political level to work for an Asian detente. A new security policy with emphasis on nuclear armament would have manifest consequences in extending the political leeway of India in its opposition to American, Soviet and Communist Chinese hegemonial designs over the Asian landscape. The interests of the Soviet Union as a Super Power are reflected in Articles 8, 9 and 10 and the suspicion is bound to grow that the Russians might utilise India's difficulties for their own ends through a security doctrine designed to support Soviet military interventionism. It is a reasonably safe bet to forecast that the development of Indo-Soviet relations have entered a phase in which the maintenance of the autonomy of Indian foreign policy and the fulfilment of national goals will require a serious effort by Indian decision-makers to avoid entanglement with the Super Power doctrinal positions of the Soviet Union and to develop diplomatic sophistication to utilise contemporary and future currents in international society to achieve an independent orientation in multilateral relations. To enhance the power of leverage with Moscow and to mitigate the rigid consequences of the "special relationship" with Moscow,

Indian policy makers would need effective flexibility to accomplish a modus vivendi with Communist China. The early fulfilment of the national aspiration for a nuclear deterrent would undoubtedly generate psychological resources for a political programme of diplomatic settlements of equal interests and opportunities with ramifications consonant with India's role as a major international actor. At the centre of difficulties likely to be encountered by India is the Soviet predisposition to develop a command structure rather than a coalition of shared interests. The most important factor that will greatly influence the practical effects of the treaty relationship will be the extent of steadfast adherence to regional interests sharply distinguished from the apocalyptic "consultations" with which Soviet globalism can accommodate its grand designs. What this suggests is that the utility of the Indo-Soviet Treaty to India will correspond directly to India's ability to articulate political demands which serve the specific needs of an Asian peace order notwithstanding the fact that these demands breed serious risks for the functionally specific Super Power role of the Soviet Union. It would be unwise to see the increase of Soviet deployment in the Indian Ocean without the entire picture of Soviet global engagement in view. Any pandering to Soviet "special interests" would only buy humiliation for India and erode the power of Indian diplomacy. Some of the questions that will plague Indian policy makers will require explanations in very complex terms as against the simple constructs which served to explain India's frustrations and grievances against the other Super Power, the United States: Will there be situations in which India will offer naval, air and military bases to the Soviet Union? What are the sectors of national policy in India in which Russian influence and control will increase and whether this will provoke coalitions against India? How will the Treaty affect India's mediatory role?

Needless to say India cannot put its trust in the short-sighted rationality of either Super Power. What is necessary is recognition that the indispensable instrument for achieving optimum stability in the context of the new trends in international affairs is a broad spectrum of India's diplomatic and political relationships. India would do well to provide early proof that she is not subservient to Russian decision-making but retains her freedom of manoeuvre.

A Note on the Political Relevance of Oceanic Asia

The bi-polar view of the world arising out of the dominant position of the United States and the Soviet Union has created the vogue of regional identifications which relate chiefly to political problems in terms of Super Power rivalry. In a multipolar world it is difficult to see how the bi-polar outlook can offer a solid basis for outlining a regional framework.

Multilateral relations have a coherence which confers a special political role on the region and compels nation-states to adhere to the primacy of engagements in common social, economic, strategic and technological activities. The concentration on the use of the terms "South Asia," "South East Asia" and "East Asia" by political analysts has strengthened the tendency to focus on the *instability* of international and intra-national relationships in each of the regions signified by the three terms. This approach has also resulted in the subtraction of the major factor of the "oceanic orientation" of the political geography of the countries stretching from India *via* Indonesia *to* Japan. The mischief of this "non-oceanic" regionalisation becomes apparent from the growing literature on the "Third World" in which Super Power laden categories are used to define the conditions of durable peace and regional development. Viewed from the Soviet or the American vantage points the Oceanic Asian relationships are lacking in the capacity to develop a fundamental community of goals and no grand pattern of regional unity holds any promise for the foreseeable future.

A pervasive American naval presence in Oceanic Asia has developed enormously the intervention power and organising capability for political-security purposes of the United States and has had important foreign policy implications. The development of Okinawa, for example, led to important political manifestations whose nature and complexity determined the escalation of the Vietnam struggle. The "containment" pattern of naval deployment became for the United States the principal source of dynamic power domination to extend its influence in Asia. In the context of nuclear warfare and deterrence the United States conceived of Oceanic Asia as a unity and its own presence as a political symbol of its universal mission to respond to "communist challenges". But an intrinsic feature of American thinking in the "non-nuclear" context is the deliberate and conscious structuring of its political efforts to attenuate the historical unity of the oceanic zone of Asia. The requirements of the United States for bases in this area have been determined by her confrontation with the Soviet Union and by the innovative influence of technological developments. The reversion to Japanese control of Okinawa and the setting up of the naval communication facility in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean are both indicative of the changing priorities and purposes of American strategic deployment in the context of Super Power competition.

The objectives of United States policies in Asia have gravitated towards three separate spheres of its power political role: Firstly, the antagonism of India and Pakistan is assessed as an opportunity for the United States to maintain a political balance between the two, either

alone or in "cooperation" with the Russians. The United States has viewed as "unrealistic" India's efforts to promote a peace order in South East Asia or in East Asia and believes that a right sense of proportion would impel Indian policy makers to enhance political cooperation in the "congested area" of South Asia through liberal diplomatic overtures.

Secondly, although initially the United States China policy was preoccupied with Containment, the American response to the Sino-Soviet Split is to arrange a realistic compromise with Peking through mutual concessions. The United States sees its security umbrella over the Nationalist regime in Taipeh and its military intervention elsewhere in Asia, as consistent with a future role for Communist China which will be in terms of a new balance of power. The exacerbation of the Moscow-Peking conflict and the attenuation of Washington-Peking hostility will in the American assessment require politico-military solutions for Asian problems with varying options for the Super Powers and for Communist China. In the United States perspective in the present Asian situation disengagement by the United States can only be in the form of transformation of a predominantly military presence into a new strategic posture based on increased naval and air deployment. The barriers in Asia cannot be lowered until there is improvement in relations between the United States, Soviet Union and Communist China. The gaining of a nuclear capability by Communist China expresses in a spectacular way the vulnerability of the Asian countries and as such problems of national security of Asian countries, cannot in the American view, be tackled through an exclusively Asian security system.

Thirdly, the United States wants to maintain its "special relationship" with Japan and wishes to divert the process of Japan's "normalising" its international relationships, backed by its overwhelming economic strength, along channels which the United States can manipulate. It remains to be seen whether the "consultative ties" between Japan and the United States in their aggregate will narrow the field open to Japan to implement a dynamic Asian policy.

Mr. Nixon's gunboat diplomacy during the Indo-Pak war has undoubtedly inclined Indian public opinion in favour of tolerating or even welcoming a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The United States Navy's nuclear-powered aircraft carrier "Enterprise" will not be forgotten as a symbol of American arrogance for a long time to come, and Indian anxiety and distrust towards the United States will spur New Delhi to stridently challenge Washington's political aims. It should, however, be perfectly clear that a constructive confrontation with the United States is only possible if India gets rid of its psychological dependence on American

economic aid. The confrontation is necessary in the interests of long term Indo-American relations, because American realisation of the change in the balance of power in the Indian subcontinent after the emergence of Bangla Desh will not be aided by Indian defensiveness.

The manner in which the Soviet Union coped with the final phase of the liberation struggle of Bangla Desh and defended Indian actions in support of "decolonisation" of East Pakistan has established a basis for solidarity of interests in the future between India, Bangla Desh and the Soviet Union. If, however, this gives a fresh impetus to Moscow to force its economic and political ideologies on others, or to use the goodwill which was generated through a set of streamlined measures within the framework of Indo-Soviet Treaty, for broadening its strategic maxims into a Pax Sovietica, such Soviet behaviour could become intolerable for India as well as Bangla Desh.

The strategic objectives of the Soviet Union in Asia are vitally affected by the inescapable memory of the Tsarist dream of the Indian Ocean and South Asia (the fabulous Hindustan), the forbidding problem of maintaining the Sino-Soviet 4500 mile demarcation line, and the Soviet countermoves to the naval superiority of the United States. There can be no doubt that the Soviet Union has decided to concentrate on the political developments in the "sub-continent" of India and Pakistan and believes it to be important to encourage the two "sister" countries and Afghanistan and Nepal to think of the Soviet Union's regional role as concomitant with environmental stability. The extension of the Soviet strategic power to the Indian Ocean is tied up with the twin objectives of countering United States Polaris and Poseidon submarines and creating a permanent presence in the area stretching from Socotra (towards India's west) to Seychelles and Mauritius (India's South) and on to the Andaman Islands, dominating the Bay of Bengal. It is outside the "South Asian" area that the Soviet Union faces difficulties of developing a coherent political model; it remains to be seen whether Brezhnev's Asian collective security system will offer a solid basis for extending Soviet "protection" against Communist China's potential menace or whether the dynamism of Communist China's post-cultural revolution diplomacy will more than neutralise Soviet aims and generate fresh doubts in Asian minds about Soviet policies. Soviet political influence has to contend with the serious obstacle that as a "naval presence" in Oceanic Asia, it cannot avert being the 'mirror-image of the other Super Power, the United States, and its "peace initiatives" in the final analysis entail the costs and risks of arousing the worst suspicions. Despite the Soviet determination to fulfil its "historically determined" Super Power role in

Asia, there are three crucial lacunae which are likely to render the Soviet blueprint abortive. First of all, although "oceanic" concepts and approaches have been subdued in India's Asian policies, yet a framework of political, economic and strategic arrangement exists in embryonic form which can exert a more direct influence as soon as Indian policy makers decide not to confine themselves to "sub-continental" politics and develop policies in the direction of regional integration in Oceanic Asia. The second shortcoming in the Soviet approach is that the Russian style version of "Communist China's containment" is likely to yield results as meagre as its American counter part. The heritage of Tsarist expansion against China is a Soviet historical continuity and from the standpoint of Asian sentiment does not help on the side of Russian polemics. Finally, Japan's economic miracle and the high rates of economic growth of South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia have discredited the Soviet stereotypes of economic development and have promoted a popular Asian orientation which while welcoming constructive relations with the Soviets would firmly repudiate Soviet hegemonial designs.

After the end of the Second World War the defeated Japanese tried to get rid of the memory of the ideology of the Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. This was merely a consequence of the rejection of old-fashioned national plans which were linked to "empire-building" and the Japanese remained psychologically inhibited to project new thinking about regional relations. Japanese diplomacy fears being branded "expansionist" and would prefer not to resuscitate the terminology of Co-prosperity, yet in retrospect the dynamic integrative role of Japan in Asia appears as a consequence of its "oceanic point of view" on regionalism which evolved from the Co-prosperity plans. The proposals that Japan should primarily consider itself as part of a "community of developed nations" led by the United States, or that Japan and Soviet Union have to join together to contain Communist China, are both unlikely to lure Japan away from her growing role in the power structure of Oceanic Asia. Japan's acquisition of an independent nuclear capability will be the product primarily of her realisation that a peace order in Asia, so necessary for the maintenance of her "economic miracle," must be seen in the perspective of regional stability which is undermined by Super Power nuclear protection and over-involvement. The Japan-United States security arrangements are useful to maintain certain equilibrium during the re-emergence of Japan as a major political and military influence in Asia. The return of Okinawa has undoubtedly altered the status quo and must be seen in the perspective of the new opportunities for Japan in getting back territory in the adverse possession of the Russians. The Japanese policy of maintaining ties with the

Nationalist Chinese regime in Taiwan and at the same time developing economic and political relations with Communist China may have a significant impact in removing some of the obstacles to thought and communication between the rest of Oceanic Asia and Mainland China in the post-Mao period. Political and economic cooperation between Japan and India and Indonesia can be seen as a fairly straightforward business. It is in the case of the smaller countries that pressures may build up and warning signals to read danger to national sensitivity may be necessary for Japan. It is the awareness of India's "moderating role" in the Oceanic Asian Region that is likely to provide a substantial basis for recognition by Japan of the region's perimeter extending to and including India.

The antagonism between the Communist Chinese regime in Peking and the Nationalist Chinese regime in Taipeh has brought into use a language of propaganda and diplomatic and military moves which seem to be the consequence of a historic trauma affecting the Sinic world. The prestige and authority of either regime is only superficially related to the number of countries and organisations recognising it in the international sphere. Peking, for example, has found itself receiving vociferous backing from African countries like Ghana, Tunisia, Burundi and Central African Republic and subsequently embarrassed with "punitive" breaking off of diplomatic relations. The newly established diplomatic relations of Peking with Canada and Italy and the "Nixon Invitation" are "friendly gestures" but they clearly do not displace other priorities which can only be achieved by moving in the direction of a "regional settlement." Communist China's "globalism" may be the logic by which Peking will gain increasing freedom of diplomatic and strategic manoeuvre; it may equally well prove to be a superstition which after Mao's passing away would be the first thinking to be repudiated by his successors in authority. The Nationalist Government in Taiwan, a few incongruities notwithstanding, has by instilling a new life in its economy ushered in an era of close regional cooperation. The "China problem" indeed casts its shadow on the Oceanic Asian Region, but it is not an impossible proposition to suggest that the basis for common Asian interests in the post-Mao period may be found not through Chinese soldiers arrayed against the Soviet Union, but in a scientific-technological structure founded on the growing partnership of Asian governments and nations.

During the Bangla Desh crisis the Communist Chinese committed the error of assuming that India would remain unmindful of its political and strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal. That Peking unreservedly expected New Delhi to follow a static policy is more than clear

from the groundswell of apprehension which was manifest in Chou En-lai's outburst during the Indo-Pak war: "India originally was not a single entity. But the colonial rule of the British Empire fostered the Brahmin upper stratum's idea of building up an Indian empire." The Communist Chinese seem to have misconceived their order of priorities in the context of Bangla Desh on account of their exclusive regard for a globalist perspective and in the process ignoring the regional framework. The people of Bangla Desh are unlikely to forgive Peking for a long time for creating a threat to their national emancipation. By their clumsy actions the Maoists strengthened the political and psychological roots of the Indo-Soviet Treaty, a prospect which it should have been the task of a realistic Communist Chinese diplomacy to prevent. If Peking draws the proper lessons from the events in Bangla Desh, Sino-Indian relations can be reconstructed on new political conceptions which will take into account the emerging military equilibrium following the liquidation of Islamabad's colonialism in Bangla Desh.

During the euphoria of the Bandung days, Indonesian and Indian leaders expressed no lack of good intentions to create a political structure for regional cooperation and promised to investigate possibilities for enlarging cooperation across the oceanic lifelines. This Bandung outlook of both the States had of course ambivalent tendencies: Indonesia planning to create a regional system which it would steer aloof from others; and Indian foreign policy appeared through vague and all embracing propositions to project a role for bridging the distance between the Middle East and Africa on the one hand and the rest of Asia on the other. In the minds of the Indians and Indonesians as they faced each other after shaking off colonial rule, the ancient and sophisticated culture and the folkloric heritage of the people of the two countries opened prospects and perspectives for building a new Asian edifice. The historical precedents in Indian and Indonesian chronicles which recorded the achievements in the political, cultural and religious past linked to centuries of oceanic intercourse, awakened thoughts of a foreseeable future in which the ancient relationship would be recreated in new perceptions and opportunities with the help of modern technology. To attain effectiveness and to reflect political realism, however, these cultural connections should have been utilised to build up confidence and genuine experiments initiated to solve scientific, technological and economic problems for bilateral and regional cooperation. Instead both countries, with varying intensity, started using the Non-alignment dogma to make dramatic gestures for re-structuring global politics and almost closed their minds to the urgent task of democratisation of regional actions and saw each other as indulging in big power "chauvinism." The roots of

partnership between India and Indonesia are deep enough and have survived the excesses of the New Emerging Forces period, but the neglect of problems of Asian security by the political leaderships of the two countries has undoubtedly created political and diplomatic obscurantism with negative consequences for the entire region.

The outlook for the future in both countries is uncertain, but the normalisation of relationship between Suharto's Indonesia and India and the removal of the tension and friction of the "Crush Malaysia" days have presented an opportunity for practical steps for Indian-Indonesian cooperation for both peacekeeping and for strengthening security in the region. Can India accept that its national security and its primary political relations require urgent attempts to move in the direction of the Oceanic Asian Region and refuse to capitulate to Soviet pressure to "accommodate" New Delhi with Islamabad in a South Asian region incompatible with a meaningful Indian role in Asian politics? Will Indonesia in the post-Vietnam war period be prepared to direct its energies to a wider course of political cooperation in the Oceanic Asian Region and forego the parochialism that manifests itself in Indonesian alarm against the "intrusion" of Indian or Japanese influence in "South East Asia"?

The answers to these crucial questions would have profound consequences for the emerging relationship of political forces in the seventies and the eighties in the Oceanic Asian Region stretching from India to Japan, and it is only in an affirmative context that the logistics of a peace order in Asia can be hopefully comprehended.

NON-APPEASEMENT: A RECONSTRUCTION OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The Use of Indian Power

Four aspects are of importance in considering the realities of India's influence in contemporary international relations: the primacy of Indian nationalism as a moving force of the 20th century; the scale of popular participation in the Indian polity; the level of economic and social development already achieved and the ambitious national programme for utilisation of India's vast human and physical resources; and the politically significant nuclear potential of India's atomic establishment. It is clear enough from the statements made by Indian policy makers that Non-alignment was regarded as a political breakthrough in enhancing India's capacity in the short space of two decades of independent participation in international politics. Yet the results when judged in sober and realistic terms of national security, economic development, and Indian influence in Asia, have been meagre. Non-alignment has developed some constructive relations as a reaction against minor violations of the international order but political circumstances have not allowed the non-aligned nations including India to make headway to use the channels of diplomacy for excluding American and Soviet influence of a neo-colonialist character. Although a good case can perhaps be made for the proposition that the Soviet Union's verbal acceptance of non-alignment created conditions which did have a salutary effect on diplomatic relations, it can hardly be questioned that the motivations of Soviet policy have been to place as many of the non-aligned countries in a client relationship to the Soviet Union as is conducive to an orderly process of expansion of political influence. Turning to the various kinds of influence the United States seeks to assert among the non-aligned, ample evidence of strategy and tactics of neo-colonialism may be found.

There can be no doubt that the theme of territorial integrity is of decisive importance for a developing nation like India which is determined to resist intrusion of external influence. The basic political posture of Indian non-alignment has compelled India to remain passive in the face of loss of territory. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States have recognised the actual frontiers claimed by India. India's posture in Asia would be substantially strengthened if the first priority had been given to a national security policy instead of relying upon the United States and the Soviet Union as the two international policemen. The truly creative tasks of Indian foreign policy could not be fulfilled unless India achieved practical solutions of the encroachments made upon Indian territory by Pakistan and Communist China. India's dependence on the two Super Powers jeopardised all efforts by India to act on behalf of the other countries who wished to resist the hegemonistic actions of the Soviets and the

Americans. The political and psychological benefits of a harmonious partnership with the middle and small powers in Asia was denied to India as long as India was unable to resolve the ambivalence in its policy towards the two Super Powers. Indian non-alignment failed to check the disruptive effects of deep Soviet and United States involvement in the Indian subcontinent. In her relations with the Super Powers, India had experienced the perniciousness of their preoccupation with the stability of the international system, and the consequent neglect of the territorial foundations of Indian security. Thus India's "friendly relationship" with both the Super Powers in the focus of Non-alignment was manifest in the form of their over-involvement and their being able to count on a high degree of Appeasement by India towards those who threatened Indian security. The United States provided military aid to Pakistan not as an end in itself but clearly to secure important adjustments in Indian aims. What seems to have happened is that United States policy makers started with the historical setting of their anti-communist crusade, and subsequently saw their military assistance to Islamabad as a means of effective intervention in the Indian subcontinent. Despite brave talk about resisting Pakistan's claims, India's actions gave rise to the impression that integration of Kashmir in the Indian Union still had to be fully consolidated. This insecure perspective on Kashmir has been a catalyst for United States involvement which has accentuated political tensions. The starting point of the Pakistan-United States relationship has been aptly described as a "diplomatic act against nature" and it has led the United States towards the dubious undertaking of salvaging Islamabad from the Bangla Desh imbroglio. The United States has not relented in its pressures against India and is clear that any substantial improvement in India's military posture will not take place with American consent.

Since the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty the prime task of Indian foreign policy makers should be to elaborate practical steps by which the Soviet Union should be encouraged to give serious consideration to the possibility of India's emergence as a major power with an independent status. The challenge posed to Moscow by Peking seems to have made it acceptable to Soviet leadership that India should develop a military structure which can compensate for the consequences of the acute Sino-Soviet friction. It is extremely difficult to judge whether the Soviet Union is prepared to endorse India's political and military objectives without dictating the Soviet line on the current strategic issues. Until the outbreak of the Indo-Pak war, the Soviet Union utilised India's increased military dependence to discourage what it chose to describe as "Indian adventurism" and in the context of Bangla Desh the Soviets at first underlined the advisability of accommodation. India's diplomatic firmness and the

positive achievements of the Indian army, as well as the unilateral support of President Nixon for the military junta in Islamabad swung the Soviets to share with India a wider horizon of interest in relation to Bangla Desh. From this point onwards the Soviets provided indispensable support to New Delhi which was relatively unburdened by their Super-power-encrusted role which conceivably might have remained lukewarm towards complete national independence for Bangla Desh. It should specifically be the task of Indian foreign policy to prevent the sliding back of Indo-Soviet relations by adding to India's potential by expressly retaining a freedom of military action in regional or international crises in the future. The special importance of the Soviet Union in India's short term strategic arrangements is evident, but in the consideration of broader horizons which include nuclear weapons capability India will have to resist Soviet attempts to restrict Indian military preparedness to conventional level. The formalising of the existing relationship in terms of the Indo-Soviet Treaty is useful in that it provides for straightforward political relations and eliminates to some extent efforts to give an ideological complexion to the practical cooperation between India and Soviet Union The central issue that will arise in the implementation of the Treaty is the demarcation between Soviet and Indian power in the interests of an Asian peace order. It will be deceptive to appeal to permanent identity of interests between the Soviet Union and India in the face of national resistance to both American and the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. Political conversations with the Soviet Union under the Indo-Soviet Treaty must for India be expressions of strength and not weakness, and therefore New Delhi cannot afford to relent in resisting Soviet globalism. The Indo-Soviet Treaty provides a framework which can be used both for appeasement and for resisting intervention. There are no predetermined indications as to which role India must play. It should be the task of Indian foreign policy to bring Indian national interest from the periphery to the very centre of Indian political efforts, and to unhesitatingly challenge Soviet hegemonial proclivities not only when they press against India but also in the rest of the world and particularly in Asia.

Indian National Interest and the International Order

India's diplomatic efforts to deal with the mounting threats to peace and security in Asia have been unsuccessful in evoking meaningful responses, and there is an inexhaustible list of situations producing tensions which suggests that in the contemporary world Asia is in fact the most conflict-prone continent. There were two classes of policy measures that India used to develop constructive courses for reducing the levels of coercion and violence in Asia. India

tried to promote "neighbourliness, agreements on non-aggression and mutual respect" through a role of spokesmanship for the building up of a better world. Alternatively, India tried to encourage the creation of substantive interest, transcending the scope of global rivalry, between the two Super Powers. Indian policy makers argued strongly in favour of the convergence of the larger national interests of the Soviet Union and the United States once the narrow Cold War concerns were transcended and outlined the ways in which the capacity of the Super Powers to help maintain international peace and security would be enhanced. These suggestions were grounded in a view of the world in which the Super Powers were supposed to hold a firm vision of a just and durable Peace and the restoration of a reciprocal dialogue between them would automatically lead them to expectations and behaviour in keeping with the interest of small nations.

Did the actual behaviour of the United States or the Soviet Union really add up to a benevolent programme of impartial settlement of political conflicts? The position became clearer when we recall that Super Power responses have in fact betokened "beggar-my-neighbour policies" in relation to conflict-management at the cost of middle and small powers. The specific reasons for such behaviour are not far to seek. The logic of the thermonuclear relationship summons both the Super Powers to unsettling the compromises which translate their intrinsic interest in the structure of the international system. The United States-Soviet Union bilateralism bears a semblance of respectability as a "forward-looking" policy of world order but limitations of violence, intimidations and threats against small nations cannot be identified as the main dimension of the Super Power quest of peace and security. The Super Power bilateralism acknowledges the sole and legitimate right of Super Power policy to impose hierarchical obligations and in fact dictates intervention to oust incipient threats to the structure of the system. The Nixon doctrine and the Brezhnev doctrine are attempts to solve appropriately the problem of long-term perpetuation of the Super Power political environment and its inherent characteristics developed through bilateral transactions.

Hierarchical Structure

Many changes in the foreign relations of the Super Powers with Communist China have jeopardised Indian influence because of the failure of New Delhi to accept the concept of "deterrence" as a key element in the maintenance of peace and security. The "defensive" goals of Indian military arrangements have inhibited India from playing a major independent role in international politics since the return of Peking to an active role after the Cultural

Revolution. India can no longer count on the possibility of offering its good offices for achieving specific bargains between the Super Powers. Nor can the prospect of intensification of conflict with Communist China any longer be perceived as an effective way of enhancing Indian influence with the United States. The point is that the parallel interests of both the Super Powers will almost surely engender vested interests affecting India unless she can by her actions serve warnings on them which will clarify Indian intentions with regard to power-management in the international system. India's delayed but decisive action to solve the problem of Bangla Desh is of greater importance if its symbolic significance for other problems which will confront Indian foreign policy is taken into account.

Has the unprecedented Kissinger diplomacy for establishing political consensus between the United States and the Communist Chinese conclusively destroyed the Super Power equation between the United States and the Soviet Union? Under contemporary conditions there are undoubtedly increased opportunities for the Americans and the Communist Chinese lo move towards negotiating positions which can help to lessen pressures on both of them from the Soviet Union. It is, however, inconceivable that innovations in Sino-American relations can by themselves create such a political fall-out that commitments of the Super Powers to construct an international political order by maintaining consultative procedures on a bilateral basis will be seriously affected. The Indian obsession with the "Washington-Peking axis" will only bedevil the formulation of effective diplomacy against the informal commitments which obtain between the two Super Powers and will entangle India's policy towards Peking in unproductive dilemmas instead of developing a direct negotiating programme with Peking on a quid pro quo basis. It is necessary for Indian policy makers to develop an accurate picture of Super Power bilateralism and not be misled by the ambiguity with which political Super Powerhood is conferred by either of them on Communist China in order to augment pressure in their "controlled rivalry." India can in fact obtain a substantial improvement in its relations with Peking by showing its resolve to check the influence of both the Super Powers in Asian affairs. But India should firmly reject the wisdom of regarding Peking as the third Super Power. India should take advantage of the "new mood" in Peking but not with a mentality of appeasement.

Time Perspective

The position that since the Indo-Soviet Treaty is operative for two decades ahead, India should be prepared to attach itself to Soviet policies and concerns till the *fin de siecle* is obviously absurd. The critical factor in Indian behaviour after a definite pattern of deterrence has been established within the context of the working relationship with the Soviets will be the development of a common Asian approach to the questions of peace and security. In promoting Asian progress towards a peace order, India will have to make it abundantly clear that she is not functioning as the agent of Soviet interests in Asia. The United States withdrawal from Indochina is a process to which India must react by direct reference to the local and regional political situations and not by adherence to the global requirements of any of the outside powers. The increasing American contacts with Peking must be measured for their effect on Indian interests on a pragmatic basis without overreactions. New Delhi and Peking should work towards a Nonaggression Treaty as part of the process of normalising their diplomatic relations, and keep in view the antecedents to the present situations which created mutual frustration. India's "detente diplomacy" towards Communist China cannot be a blind imitation of the United States or for that matter of Japan. The Sino-Indian relationship is more complicated since both the countries are ideological nerve centres of Asia. It is evident that the seventies have come to have an identity of a decade for a major effort for negotiations and peace. The greatest potential for destroying the environment of peace is to be found in the spectrum of problems in Sino-Soviet relations. Bridges of concrete understanding between India and Russia on the one hand and India and Communist China on the other can reverse the terrible prognostications for the future. The hopes for a sudden thaw in New Delhi's relations with Peking are highly unrealistic. Indian diplomacy has to effectively recover the initiative which still remains with Peking. A precipitate withdrawal of Indian territorial claims will not foster the acceptance of equality which alone can serve as the basis of Asian solidarity and widen the scope for closer political links with Peking. India's appeasement of Washington and Moscow constitutes the most important political-cum-psychological obstacle to the establishment of a new framework which would help ensure mutuality of interests between India and China. It would be folly for New Delhi during the 1970s to attempt to sell to Peking an appeasement policy as a means of putting Sino-Indian relations on a cordial basis. What Peking above all dislikes is the prospect of New Delhi kowtowing to Moscow or Washington, and as long as India refuses to oppose the

hegemonial designs of Washington and Moscow her appeasement-oriented proposals towards Peking cannot by themselves pave the way to an India-Communist China detente.

In the 1970s if India adopts Non Appeasement as a foreign policy system, she can proceed to forge instruments for negotiations which can utilise new conceptions of peace in Asia and in the world as a whole. These "new conceptions" are not the monopoly of any one nation or any one decision maker, but are reflected in the new approaches to major international questions which taken together are paving the way to a new era in international relations. To recognise that non-alignment is no longer a "progressive" foreign policy system is to cut at the root of the illusion that by making concessions to one or other of the Super Powers India is drawing closer to the goal of peace. The Indo-Pak war of 1971, the anarchic violence of Islamabad's occupation forces in Bangla Desh and India's failure to sustain a peacekeeping role in Asia so far urgently require that New Delhi should lose no time in developing a national consensus for a reconstructionist programme in keeping with the new constellation of world politics. The following seven perspectives are relevant to a policy of Non Appeasement in the 1970s:

(1) *Multilateral relations in the Asian area*: The political leeway open to India can be widened only if Indian foreign policy answers the psychological aspirations of the majority of Asian states. India's generosity towards the Super Powers has made her suspicious in the eyes of those Asian states who wish to take full advantage of the waning of the cold war for the expansion of regional contacts. A forward diplomacy by India in the Asian sphere has a vast potential provided New Delhi spells out its adherence to a clear cut distinction between the problems of the Asian Community and world problems. India's opposition to the over-commitment of the Soviet Union and the United States in Asia will confront Communist China with a new reality: that India's independent role in the reconstruction of an Asian political order will greatly increase her attractiveness as a partner in political dialogue. So long as India raises its voice for the rights of Asian states, irrespective of the diversity of social systems, Peking will be in difficult position in building pressures against India. To be successful such a policy should be completely unencumbered by the "arrogance" of Soviet, American or Communist Chinese power. To be sure, Indian decision-makers can profit from de Gaulle's example that did not permit United States-French treaty relations to inculcate political diffidence where French and European interests were concerned.

India's Asian policy must be made more credible to Japan and Indonesia and India must refuse to allow any super-imposition of the political overtones of the Indo-Soviet Treaty on the further steps that are necessary for the construction of a stable political and economic relationship with these two countries in an Asian regional context.

(2) *Independence in Nuclear Affairs:* It is difficult to imagine how Indian decision-makers have so far ignored a fundamental concept of nuclear equilibrium which is predetermining the new proposals for relaxation of world wide tensions. This has been described as the "fusion of the nuclear and conventional deterrent components". From India's angle, the potential of nuclear powers using political blackmail against her has acquired a new dimension. India is thus faced with a choice in the 1970s—either she conspicuously begins the transition to nuclear powerhood or she acknowledges that the central objectives of her foreign policy can be frustrated by the intimidation of existing nuclear powers.

India's initiatives towards nuclearisation will be resisted by the Soviet Union and the United States and sanctions may be threatened. One might ask in this connection, why the Soviet Union which knows how the Sino-Soviet cooperation broke up on the issues of Chinese nuclearisation can support similar proposals against India with which it has just signed a Treaty. India's communications on her nuclear future have been highly ambiguous and the Soviet Union could claim that it lacked criteria to judge India's intentions. Given the present Soviet analysis of the world situation, Moscow would have to retreat if India showed a resolve to fight for a nuclear status with tenacity. Indeed, New Delhi can put additional pressure on Moscow by supporting the view that in terms of the Indo-Soviet Treaty, Soviet decision-makers must give up manipulations to bar the way to India's nuclear future and work for bilateral nuclear cooperation.

(3) *Transformation of Sino-Indian Relations:* The process of normalisation of relations between New Delhi and Peking must be seen in terms of the future peace and security of Asia and not as a technique of achieving short-run gains which will merely permit Communist China to raise the price for more fruitful relations. At this critical juncture a question mark hangs over the significance of the gestures the men in Peking and

their representatives abroad have been making towards Indians. India should adopt a flexible attitude and promote direct negotiating links between the two Governments. A rapprochement with Communist China however does not mean that the problem of Tibet should be avoided or that the wide-ranging inferences in Peking's foreign policy with reference to Japan and Taiwan should meet with Indian acquiescence. New political currents in Asia can be exploited by India in her favour to secure a stable Sino-Indian relationship provided India does not convey an "appeasement" attitude to Peking. Several techniques can be used: First, India can propose the setting up of an organisation for joint cooperative effort in economic development and technical assistance of a semi-governmental character. Second, India should advance proposals for a new approach to scientific and cultural relations which would reduce and eventually remove all barriers in the relationship of the two peoples. Third, New Delhi should propose bilateral security talks whose principal objective should be to demonstrate the seriousness of the intention of both sides to create a balanced military relationship. Fourth, from the Indian side it should be insisted that Peking should give proof of its declaration that it does not seek super power status by entering into new conversations with India to eliminate nuclear weapons from Tibet. Fifth, Peking and New Delhi should approach the Tibet question with a sense of responsibility which will follow if the "era of negotiations" is directly related to the interdependence of Peking, New Delhi and the Dalai Lama as the symbol of the general ethos of the Tibetans. Sixth, Peking and New Delhi from the common vantage point of Oceanic Asian powers should react vigorously against naval force deployments in Asian waters by the Super Powers and both should conduct a naval strategic dialogue aimed at safeguarding mutual interests. Seventh, India need not accept a moratorium on relations with Taiwan; on the contrary, India should express its willingness to play a role for improving relations between Peking and Taipeh to further the principle of reducing the use of force in the new Asian system. Eighth, India should examine the psychological effects of Sino-Soviet tensions and those flowing from the susceptibility of the Communist Chinese to the "revival of Japanese militarism", and make it clear that India will not make any one-sided assessments which jeopardise bona-fide Chinese interests.

(4) *The new political model of Bangla Desh and the Pakistani anachronism*:—the hostility of Islamabad to the people of Bangla Desh will smoulder on even after the

liberation forces and the Indian forces have achieved their purpose. There is little ground for optimism that Islamabad on its own will make efforts to usher in a new atmosphere of "live and let live". This necessitates long-term planning by New Delhi to keep the forces of Pakistani militarism and revanchism in effective check. The bursts of enthusiasm in Bangla Desh and in India are not substitutes for effective negotiations so that political relations between the two sides become a firm linchpin of Asian security. New Delhi must do its homework in order to reduce if not eliminate friction which is likely to occur in day to day operational activities of the two Governments. India should not immobilise either itself or Bangla Desh by foisting a "special relationship", but at the same time India should show an active interest in the creation of fruitful relations on a multilateral basis between Bangla Desh and its neighbours. If Bangla Desh is not to come under the tutelage of either of the two Super Powers and if tensions with Communist China are to be avoided, India must transcend the rhetoric of euphoria and turn to a candid analysis of the fundamentals for a long range programme which can effectively replace the outworn hegemony of Islamabad with an institutionalised consensus arrangement. Indian decision-making and policy-formulation should seek a broad based construction of common purpose with Bangla Desh through the dimension of an Asian community and not in terms of a uniquely Indian responsibility.

(5) *A New Indochina Conference:* — Peacemaking in war torn Indochina must not again become an exercise in manoeuvring among the Super Powers. India should not hesitate to recognise the strength of nationalist sentiments and should play an active role whereby the ideological hatchet can be buried. India must maintain its links with the several governments in Indochina and utilise the opportunity of renewed negotiations to suggest guidelines for a new Indochina security system which can eschew both military and paramilitary confrontation in the future. Indian involvement in Indochina in support of the rights of small nations will be an important factor to eliminate appeasement of those who wish to execute plans of expansion at the cost of peace and security of the Vietnamese, Cambodians and the Laotian people.

(6) *A Major Strategy for the Indian Ocean*: India must advance fundamental proposals for the removal of external pressures which are a direct threat to the littoral states. India's capacity for naval self-defence must be enlarged to enable her to discharge an

effective "peace-keeping" function. India must develop direct contacts with Asian and African states to promote security in the Indian Ocean area. The elimination of Super Power influence from the Indian Ocean must rank as a high priority aim of Indian foreign policy. This requires the establishment of a programme of naval expansion by India and the setting up of machinery for joint review and consultation of the states which are opposed to outside naval involvement in the Indian Ocean. Despite all the uncertainty that exists about territorial claims in respect of the Ocean, the fact remains that that new criteria are being shaped to justify the adoption of new techniques to utilise the immense natural resources of the seabed. India should adopt a pragmatic and cooperative attitude and the leitmotif of Indian thinking on the utilisation of oceanic resources should be our determination to protect our interests on a reciprocal basis with developing Asian and African countries and to resist adherence to the frozen dominance of the two Super Powers.

(7) *Permanent Membership of the Security Council*: The background of the genesis of the United Nations System has to be recalled to understand the anxiety of the Asian peoples that the world body has still not transcended the racial basis which permitted exploitation of Asia. There are indications that Peking will exert increasing pressure for the replacement of the earlier "white supremacy" by a new species of polity in which it will invoke the sanction of the public opinion of the non-white world to exploit the guilt of the colonial past of the white nations including the Russians. The unrelenting advocacy by Peking of the cause of the non-whites is unlikely to produce the adjustments in political relationships which are required for a new equilibrium. A comprehensive restructuring which would provide the basis for a rational give-and-take in international political participation would at the very least require permanent membership of the Security Council not only for India, but also for Indonesia and Japan. India's effort must be to enlarge the Asian participation in the United Nations system and to eliminate the position of subservience which the Super Powers have forced on Asian nations. A coherent role for India must inevitably focus on the veto-power which permanent membership of the Security Council entails. Those who oppose the rationale of the veto power share an abstract commitment which is not related to basic attitudes and objectives of significant constituent sections of the United Nations organisation. India's Non Appeasement orientation will require her to challenge the distribution of political influence instead of accepting a permanent state of affairs and

> the veto-power will express a tangible limit to the influence of other powers on Indian policy-making. The inescapable conclusion seems to be that India's political sophistication in the 1970s necessitates an identifiable role of political responsibility and the best focus for this in the United Nations system is in the institutional values linked with permanent membership of the Security Council.

The task of Indian foreign policy makers cannot when all is said be defined by hard and fast criteria. Non-alignment turned out to be a scenario which instead of creating greater opportunities on matters of basic foreign policy increasingly raised technical barriers to policy adjustments and stimulated counterproductive rigid and one-sided relationships. What will be the manifestations of Non Appeasement for India in the context of the new global order? In an important sense Indian decision-makers who adhere to Non Appeasement will find themselves free to come up with imaginative yet practical proposals to deal hopefully with the powerful forces of change with which India's national interest as a modernising society is strongly linked.

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